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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the representations of the self as a cultural agent, both reacting 
to and actively shaping codes of social and artistic respectability, as displayed in the 
diaries  of  the  canonical  Victorian  writers  Lady  Elizabeth  Eastlake,  Henry  Crabb 
Robinson, George Eliot, George Gissing, John Ruskin and Gerard Manley Hopkins. It 
analyses  the  impact  of  wider  ideological  and  social  imperatives  on  the  diarists’ 
subjective experience and reads their tendency to silence the self as a symptom of the 
cultural pressure to merge their private and public persona. These diaries represented 
a  forum  in  which  the  diarists  perpetually  negotiated  their  own  value  within  the 
Victorian ideology of productivity and thus not only reflect their inner world but also 
the cultural climate of the nineteenth century.  
Chapter  One  traces  the  selected  diarists’  reluctance  to  reveal  private 
information, as well as their tendency to foreground professional productivity, to the 
social pressure to efface emotions relating to the self and to only cultivate those that 
nurtured the community. It identifies the similarities between the compulsive self-
discipline  advocated  in  the  psychological  discourse  of  the  period,  particularly 
Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the Will (1859), and the willingness to both live 
up to and actively shape the cultural codes of respectability that Elizabeth Eastlake 
and  Henry  Crabb  Robinson  display  in  their  diaries.  Chapter  Two  compares  and 
contrasts  the  desire  for  maximal  professional  productivity  as  exhibited  in  George 
Eliot’s and George Gissing’s diaries. Both worked obstinately in order to increase 
their own value: whereas Eliot sought to redeem her ‘guilt of the privileged,’ Gissing 
desperately needed to increase his financial solvency through literary output. Chapter 
Three  discusses  the  ways  in  which  John  Ruskin’s  diary  helped  him  block  out 
unrespectable  and  painful  private  experiences  through  transforming  his  obsessive   3 
desire to appropriate and “feel” visual experience into a professional task. Chapter 
Four shows that Gerard Manley Hopkins—because he was acutely concerned by his 
cultural  otherness  caused  by  his  homosexuality—not  only  sought  refuge  and 
validation by joining the Jesuits, but by narrowing his realm of experience to nature, 
merged the private and the public self into the figure of the professional, asexual, 
dutiful and disinterested observer.   
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis reads the diaries of the Victorian cultural commentators Lady Elizabeth 
Rigby  Eastlake  (1809-1893),  Henry  Crabb  Robinson  (1775-1867),  the  novelists 
George Eliot (1819-1890) and George Gissing (1857-1903), the critic, philosopher 
and artist John Ruskin (1819-1900) and the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) 
as the products of, responses to and shapers of their cultural reality.
1 These writers all 
came from very similar middle-class backgrounds and all had parents who, from an 
early  age,  instilled  the  habit  of  diligent  work  in  them.  Nonetheless,  these 
commonalities did not produce uniformity of behaviour and ideology; on the contrary, 
the diaries under consideration reflect the personal reality of literary production and 
reveal how each of these writers positioned him- or herself within his or her cultural 
context, giving access to the subjective consciousness that informed his or her artistic 
output. In tune with the Victorian culture of self-improvement, these “professional” 
diaries are extroverted, rather than introverted, and reflect the diarists’ efforts to both 
conform  to  and  reform  their  culture’s  enthusiasm  for  self-improvement  and  self-
discipline.  
The diaries show strong similarities between the self-reported behaviour of the 
Victorian sages, such as Eliot and Ruskin, and the dissenters, such as Gissing and 
Hopkins, who, although they purposefully dissociated themselves ideologically from 
the  pressures  of  Victorian  communitarianism  and  the  Protestant  work  ethic, 
                                                 
1 These literary diaries, perhaps more so than domestic or professional diaries, translate the Victorian 
“spirit of the age” through the increased receptivity of the artist to his or her culture. Albert Gräser has 
argued that “[t]he artist perceives the tension between the ‘I’ and the ‘you,’ between the individual and 
the  community,  as  well  as  between  the  person  and  the  environment,  much  more  acutely  than  the 
ordinary human being.” Although literary diaries do not reflect a more comprehensive picture of an era, 
they exemplify the effects of contemporary philosophy, as well as science, economy and politics, on 
the  mind  of  an  individual  who  deliberately  exposes  him-  or  herself  to  the  intellectual  and  artistic 
productions of his or her culture and reproduces them for an audience. Albert Gräser, Das Literarische 
Tagebuch:  Studien  über  Elemente  des  Tagebuchs  als  Kunstform  (Saarbrücken:  West-Ost-Verlag 
Gmbh., 1955), p. 99 (My translation).    5 
nonetheless  advocated  a  regime  of  strict  self-discipline  by  which  they  sought  to 
compensate  for  their  unrespectable  otherness.  The  texts  that  this  thesis  examines 
cannot be seen to represent examples of “archetypal” Victorian diary writing, as no 
such thing exists. Although the diary is a cultural product that always reflects the 
material  circumstances  of  its  creation,  the  variety  of  uses  that  it  was  put  to  by 
individuals is so wide-ranging that no specific Victorian type can be identified. This 
study  concentrates  on  the  ways  in  which  the  selected  Victorian  writers  used  the 
diary’s  self-regulatory  mechanisms  in  order  to  achieve  maximal  productivity  and 
shows that the diary formed an integral component of the reality of authorship. These 
writers equated their value as individuals with the value of their literary production 
and their private records reveal an almost total identification with their professional 
occupation—to the point that these documents can be categorised as “professional” 
diaries.  This  new  historicist  investigation  seeks  to  demonstrate  that,  beyond  its 
function as a tool for time management and the observation of the external world, the 
diary can also further “self-education” and constitute a forum for self-cultivation that 
allows the diarist to craft and reinforce a persona specifically adapted to his or her 
professional  needs,  while  simultaneously  catering  to  the  cultural  codes  of 
respectability which are perpetuated through his or her work.
2  
This thesis represents a unique contribution to both Victorian studies and life 
writing criticism as none of the existing collections and bibliographies dealing with 
the diary genre focus on the Victorian age at large.
3 Typically, scholarly articles on 
                                                 
2 Term coined by Joseph Marie de Gerardo, Self-Education, or the Means and Art of Moral Progress, 
Elizabeth  Palmer Peabody, trans. (Boston: Carter and Hendee, 1830) 
3 A remarkable collection is Trev Lynn Broughton, ed., Autobiography: Critical Concepts in Literary 
and  Cultural  Studies,  vol.  IV  (London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  2007).  Anthologies,  beside 
Christopher  Sampson  Handley’s,  include  Arthur  Ponsonby,  English  Diaries:  A  Review  of  English 
Diaries from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century (London: Methuen & Co., 1923) and More English 
Diaries: Further Reviews of Diaries from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century (London Methuen & 
Co.,  1927);  Philipp  Dunaway  and  Melvin  Evans,  A  Treasury  of  the  World’s  Greatest  Diaries 
(Doubleday, 1957).   6 
selected diarists can be found in volumes on autobiographical practices in general, but 
Robert  A.  Fothergill’s  Private  Chronicles  (1974)  still  seems  to  remain  the  only 
monograph  that  addresses  the  diary  genre  specifically.
4 Doll  and  Munns,  in  their 
collection  of  essays  on  seventeenth-  and  eighteenth-century  diaries,  deplore  the 
scattered state of diary criticism, when they rightly remark: “Most discussion must be 
sought in introductions to and reviews of published diaries [with] the overwhelming 
subjects  in  such  works  [being]  biographical  or  historical.”
5 In  seventeenth-  and 
eighteenth-century studies, “the practice of publishing diaries and journals, excluding 
travel journals […] has always lagged far behind other canonical and noncanonical 
texts,” as Doll and Munns claim.  
Whereas  the  relative  sparsity  of  published  journals  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth centuries may be the reason for the meagre body of diary criticism in this 
field, the same is not true for nineteenth-century studies. Diaries were published and 
read widely during, as well as beyond, the Victorian era. Politicians, public figures 
and  writers  habitually  kept  a  diary  and  many  of  them  were  published,  either 
posthumously, or even during the diarist’s life time. Given that the publication of 
diaristic records was an ongoing practice, diarists knew, or at least suspected or hoped, 
that their diaries might be printed after their death. In addition, the style and content 
of already issued diaries surely affected the narrative choices of a diarist, a fact which 
challenges  the  idea  of  the  diary  as  unplanned  writing.  Spontaneity  and  emotional 
candour are often seen as the fundamental characteristics of the genre, emphasising its 
contrast to formal autobiography. However, the brief list of diaries that were read 
and/or published in the nineteenth century I shall offer will demonstrate the enormous 
                                                 
4 Robert A. Fothergill, Private Chronicles: A Study of English Diaries (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974). 
5 Dan Doll and Jessica Munns, Recording and Reordering: Essays on the Seventeenth-century and 
Eighteenth-Century Diary and Journal (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006), p. 9.    7 
variety  among  diaristic  texts  and  the  multiplicity  of  interpretations  of  the  generic 
characteristics.  Despite  a  general  tendency  to  monitor  the  intensity  of  emotions 
displayed  in  the  diary,  the  extent  of  self-disclosure  and  self-scrutiny  that  diarists 
exhibit varies according to their perceptions of what constitutes privacy. Efforts to 
safeguard privacy took different shapes: whereas some diarists left out the self in 
order  to  protect  it  from  public  judgment,  others  used  their  diaristic  records  to 
construct  and  promote  a  public  persona  that  acted  as  a  flashy  shield  for  privacy. 
Frequently,  but  not  always,  professional  diaries  tend  to  be  reticent  in  revealing 
personal information and are rather defensive, while the more socially oriented diaries 
have a propensity to be forthcoming about their author’s experiences in the public 
domain. We can also detect differences in emotional attachment to the diary as an 
object:  where  some  diarists  cherished  their  diaries’  material  presence,  others  felt 
compelled to destroy their private accounts.  
For diarists such as Samuel Pepys (1658-1703), Frances Burney (1776-1828) 
and Frances Kemble, the diary was a carefully crafted text, which was designed to 
frame a deliberately constructed persona. Many Victorian writers would have been 
familiar  with  the  diary  that  Pepys  kept  from  1660-1669.  Although  it  displays  a 
consistent preoccupation with dailiness and chronology, many of its entries were in 
fact pre-conceived, re-written and based on notes. As such, the diary came close to an 
autobiography representing Pepys’s social and professional life. It was first published 
(and  heavily  edited)  by  Lord  Braybrooke  in  1825,  who  then  issued  an  extended 
version  of  five  volumes  in  1848-1849  (reprinted  in  1851).
6 Rev.  Mynors  Bright 
published Pepys’s diary in six volumes in 1875-79, but his edition comprised but few 
                                                 
6 Richard Lord Braybrooke, ed., Memoirs of Samuel Pepys, Esq., Comprising His Diary from 1659 to 
1669, 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1825).   8 
copies and was not re-issued.
7 Henry B. Wheatley extended the published diary to ten 
volumes in 1893-99.
8 The most complete version (eleven volumes) was provided by 
Robert Latham and William Matthews in 1970-1983.
9 The fact that several editions 
were printed in the nineteenth century points to a growing interest in the veracious 
representation of historical characters.  
Much  like  Pepys’s  famous  and  influential  diary,  Frances  Burney’s  private 
writings  (diaries  and  letters)  frequently  took  the  shape  of  commendatory 
advertisements for their author. With the exception of her early diaries, which are 
written for the eye of “Nobody,” the style in which Burney’s diaries and letters are 
composed is strikingly similar—both clearly address a wide audience and seem to 
have been written with the objective to portray the writer as a socialising marvel to 
her audience. Burney’s great niece Charlotte Barrett first published her subject’s diary 
in conjunction with her letters and extracts from the journals of her sisters Susan and 
Charlotte Burney.
10 Barrett’s biographical project, which started in 1840, took her 
many  years  to  complete  but  she  ultimately  succeeded  in  covering  the  duration  of 
Burney’s life. Annie Raine Ellis republished Burney’s diaries in a similar format in 
1889 and 1907.
11 This collage technique was also adopted by Thomas Sadler, the 
editor  of  Henry  Crabb  Robinson’s  diary  and  Charles  Eastlake  Smith,  Elizabeth 
                                                 
7 Mynors  Bright,  ed.,  Diary  and  Correspondence  of  Samuel  Pepys,  Esq.,  F.  R.  S.:  From  His  Ms. 
Cypher in the Pepysian Library, with a Life and Notes by Richard Lord Braybrooke ; Deciphered, with 
Additional Notes, by Rev. Mynors Bright (London: Bickers & Son, 1879).  
8 Henry B. Wheatley, ed., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, M.A., F.R.S., Clerk of the Acts and Secretary to 
the Admirality, 10 vols. (London: Bell, 1893-99).  
9 Robert Latham and William Matthews, eds., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, 11 vols. (London: G. Bell & 
Sons, 1970-83).  
10 Charlotte  Barrett,  ed.,  Diary  and  Letters  of  Madame  D'Arblay:  1797  to  1840, 4  vols.  (London: 
Bickers and Son, 1840). 
11 Annie Raine Ellis, ed., The Early Diary of Frances Burney, 1768-1778: With a Selection From Her 
Correspondence and From the Journals of her Sisters Susan and Charlotte Burney (G. Bell, 1907).    9 
Eastlake’s nephew and  editor of her life writings.
12 The objective of this editorial 
practice seems to have been to represent the essence of the subject’s life in a way that 
would  captivate  the  audience’s  attention.  In  fact,  however,  although  this  method 
allows  for  a  vivid  account  of  the  subject’s  social  life,  it  skews  the  reader’s 
appreciation of the diarist/letter writer’s unique expression of his or her subjectivity. 
However, Burney seems to have been so conscious of the audience she sought to 
manipulate that she assumed the role of the editor herself. 
  The  diaries  of  the  famous  actress  and  writer  Fanny  Kemble  not  only 
consistently challenged the defining characteristics of the diary genre, but effectively 
overcame  the  boundaries  between  the  public  and  the  private  when  they  were 
published. The style and content of the diaries mark them as texts were designed to 
impress  and  educate  actual  readers,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  1832-33  diary,  which 
recounts  Kemble’s  travels  to  America  and  describes  her  emotional  reactions  to 
unfamiliar  circumstances  in  a  very  unapologetic  fashion.
13  Among  the  many 
autobiographical writings that she published is her Journal in two volumes, which she 
released herself in 1835 in what seems to be an attempt to sensitise her reader’s visual 
perceptiveness.
14 It was republished in 1999 by Monica Gough.
15 Kemble’s Journal 
of  a  Residence  on  a  Georgian  Plantation  1838-39,  which  she  originally  kept  for 
Elizabeth  Dwight  Sedgwick,  was  published  in  1863  to  support  the  cause  of 
abolitionism. For several months in 1838-39, Kemble lived on a plantation in Georgia, 
which  her  husband  had  inherited,  and  she  was  revolted  by  the  treatment  of  the 
hundreds of slaves that the family exploited for their own gain. This journal was re-
                                                 
12 Thomas, Sadler, ed., Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson, 3 vols. 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1869); Charles Eastlake Smith, ed., Journals and Correspondence of 
Lady Eastlake, (London: John Murray, 1895). 
13 Frances Anne Kemble, Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation 1838-1839 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1863).  
14 Frances Anne Butler, Journal, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1835).   
15 Monica Gough, ed., Journal of a Young Actress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).    10 
published by J.A. Scott in 1961 and has attracted an enormous amount of attention in 
recent years from different academic disciplines, such as the social sciences, history 
and literary studies, which has led to and was triggered by new editions in 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2009.
16 Kemble’s famous autobiography Records of a Girlhood, which she 
issued in 1878 and which was republished in 2007 and 2009, can be seen as another 
conscious effort to manipulate public judgment: “I have thought that my gossip about 
myself may be as acceptable [as] gossip about me written by another.”
17 Kemble is 
one of few Victorian authors who self-confidently published several diaries and an 
autobiography, hence elevating her own life to a matter of importance and using her 
public position to further the cause of underprivileged human beings.  
  Although the diary of the famous Romantic Lord Byron (1788-1824), can, 
compared to Kemble’s, be distinguished by a similarly unapologetic attitude to his 
own emotions, less importance is attributed to a potential or actual reader. In his diary, 
Byron reviews his past and present emotions with impressive frankness and clearly 
takes  pleasure  in  engaging  with  himself,  his  contemporaries  and  his  physical 
environment through writing. It was first published in two volumes by Thomas Moore 
in 1830 and substantially extended by Rowland E. Prothero to six volumes in 1898-
1901.
18 As with Pepys’s diary, it was not until 1973-1994 that Leslie A. Marchand 
published a complete edition in thirteen volumes.
19  
Whereas some diarists prioritise their social and emotional lives, others give 
special attention to their professional selves. The diary of the famous Romantic writer 
Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), for instance, displays much less emotional exaltation 
                                                 
16 John Anthony Scott, ed., Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation 1838-1839 (New York: 
Knopf, 1961).  
17 Frances Anne Kemble, Records of a Girlhood (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2009), p. 9.  
18 Thomas Moore, ed., Letters and Journals of Lord Byron: with Notices of His Life, 2 vols. (London, 
1830); Rowland E. Prothero, ed., The Works of Lord Byron, A New Revised and Enlarged Edition: 
Letters and Journals, 6 vols. (London, 1898-1901).  
19 Leslie A. Marchand, ed., Byron’s Letters and Journals, 13 vols. (London: John Murray, 1973-1994).    11 
than Byron’s and, much like George Gissing’s, can be characterised by its accounts of 
relentless  work.  Leaving  out  the  emotional  self,  Scott’s  diary  foregrounds  his 
professional self and is, as Christopher Sampson Hadley claims, “entirely without 
self-pity.”
20 The first printed version in two volumes was edited and published by 
David Douglas in 1890 and it was followed by J.G. Tait’s three volumes in 1939, 
1941  and  1946  and  W.E.K.  Anderson’s  1972  edition.
21 This  publication  history 
demonstrates a continuous desire on the side of critics to get the story right and an 
increasing willingness to let the diarist speak for him- or herself.  
Dorothy Wordsworth (1771-1855) almost categorically left out the self from 
her diary and principally used it as a poetic record of the tours she undertook with her 
brother William. The diary, which Dorothy kept with many long interruptions from 
1789-1828, contains very few instances in which she asserts herself as an individual. 
It differs from other “professional” diaries in that its lengthy entries are composed 
with utmost care and lovingly depict natural scenes. Although Ruskin (Chapter Three) 
similarly used his diary as a recipient for visual experience, his emotional reactions 
form an integral part of his records  and in this way  greatly  differs from Dorothy 
Wordsworth’s.  Because  of  its  brilliance,  Dorothy’s  diaristic  writing  consistently 
served as a source of inspiration to William and has been much praised for its poetic 
genius by literary critics. It was first published by William Knight in 1897 in two 
volumes but extracts had already appeared in Edmund Lee’s 1886 Story of A Sister’s 
Love.
22 E. de Selincourt republished the diary in 1941 and 1952.
23 A lot of attention 
                                                 
20  Christopher  Sampson  Hadley,  An  Annotated  Bibliography  of  Diaries  Published  in  English 
(Christopher Handley, 2002).  
21 David Douglas, ed., The Journal of Sir Walter Scott: from the Original at Abbotsford (Edinburgh, 
1890); J.G. Gait, ed., The Journal of Walter Scott (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1939); W.E.K. Anderson, 
ed., The Journal of Sir Walter Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).  
22 William Knight, ed., The Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, 2 vols. (London, 1897); Edmund Lee, 
Story of a Sister’s Love (J. Clarke & co., 1886).  
23 E. de Selincourt, ed., Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1941), reprinted 
1952.    12 
has been paid to the Grasmere journals, which Helen Darbishire first published in 
1958 and Mary Moorman edited in 1971.
24 Mary Ellen Bellanca has recently (2007) 
read Dorothy’s diaristic achievement as the work of a natural historian.
25 It is thus 
thanks to the diary that Dorothy Wordsworth is remembered as a talented poet and 
writer in her own right.  
Some diaries, such as William Allingham’s (1820-1889), avoid the self as a 
topic to write about and instead constitute a “tribute” to other writers.
26 Allingham 
was  a  close  friend  of  Alfred  Lord  Tennyson’s  (1809-1892),  who  described  his 
interactions  with  the  poet  and  his  entourage  in  elaborate  detail.  He  generally 
foregrounded his social persona, offering little information regarding his inner life. 
His diary, which he kept from 1847-1889, was first published by H. Allingham and D. 
Radford in 1907 and since 1967 has been published in regular intervals: 1985, 1990 
and 2000.  
Although the diary of Edith Simcox (1844-1901) has been read as a “tribute”-
diary to George Eliot, such an attitude disregards her extensive engagement with her 
own emotional and professional aspirations and doubts. Significantly, Simcox had 
named her diary Autobiography of a Shirtmaker in order to stress her professional 
vocation,  but  her  editors,  Constance  M.  Fulmer  and  Margaret  E.  Barfield,  when 
publishing the diary in  1998, changed the title  to A Monument of the  Memory of 
George Eliot. This editorial move dissociates Simcox from her own work and renders 
her position as George Eliot’s biggest admirer permanent. Simcox did indeed call her 
                                                 
24 Helen  Darbishire,  ed.,  The  Journals  of  Dorothy  Wordsworth:  The  Alfoxden  Journal,  1789:  The 
Grasmere  Journals:  1800-1803  (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1958);  Mary  Moorman,  ed., 
Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).  
25 Bellanca, Mary Ellen, Daybooks of Discovery: Nature Diaries in Britain, 1770-1870 (Charlottesville 
and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
26 Allingham, H. and Radford, D., William Allingham’s Diary: 1847-1889 (London: Centaur Press, 
2000); Constance Marie Fulmer and Margaret E. Barfield, eds., A Monument to the Memory of George 
Eliot: Edith J. Simcox’s Autobiography of a Shirtmaker (Taylor & Francis,  
   13 
diary “acta diurnal amoris,” and mentioned George Eliot in almost every entry until 
many  years  after  her  hero’s  death,  but,  nonetheless,  the  diary  also  constituted  an 
important  forum  in  which  she  reviewed  and  stored  her  daily  experiences  and 
encounters with politicians and public figures of the day. Moreover, her diary bears 
witness to her reflections about the morals, philosophy, love, religion and her own 
emotions, which she reveals with astounding candour.  
The desire to guarantee the privacy of the diarist culminates in the destruction 
of the diary. Many Victorian writers, such as Thomas Hardy (1840-1928), who made 
extensive  use  of  diaries,  commonplace  books,  notebooks  and  related  memoranda, 
destroyed  the  majority  of  their  private  records  and  refused  to  be  remembered  as 
diarists. Charles Dickens’s (1812-1870) only extant diary, which stretches from 1838 
to 1841, was only preserved coincidentally, as he burnt all his other diaristic writings. 
This tendency to cancel out personal existence reveals these writers’ awareness that 
diaries  could  be  published  posthumously  and  had  the  power  to  incriminate  their 
defenceless  author  beyond  redemption.  For  those  who  destroyed  their  diaries,  the 
desire to preserve their privacy and integrity overpowered the wish to impress future 
generations of potential, sometimes imagined, readers. 
Although  this  list  is  but  a  fragmentary  sketch,  it  accentuates  the  countless 
shapes diaristic writing took in the nineteenth century (and before). Some diarists, as 
Patricia Meyer Spacks has argued, “itemize nothing but the inconsequential,” whereas 
others “breach [their] privacy in rather dramatic fashion.”
27 There is indeed a vast 
difference between a confessional diary, such as Arthur Munby’s and a hermetically 
sealed account of professional activity, such as George Gissing’s.
28 Nevertheless, the 
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degree of emotional revelation displayed in a diary does not define its status as a 
private,  or  intimate,  document.  Spacks  makes  a  crucial  point  when  asserting  that 
“people zealously protect also the privacy of their lives’ monotony and the privacy of 
their  obsessive  concern  with  the  events  or  nonevents  defining  that  monotony.”
29 
Every diary, whether its tendency is confessional or professional, must thus be seen as 
the  materialisation  of  the  diarist’s  private  concerns;  whether  these  are  sexual 
relationships or the number of pages read or written each day is irrelevant. What is 
essential is that the diary embodies its author’s decision to elevate the “trivial into the 
significant” and thus affirms the importance of his or her existence.
30 
The  diaries  under  consideration  tend  to  rigorously  disregard  the  authors’ 
‘private’ lives and habitually omit painful experiences and exclude intimate emotions. 
However, as Wendy J. Wiener and George C. Rosenwald maintain, diary scholars 
should not ask “what life experiences have survived repression,” but “study what the 
subject has selected for preservation. For the act of remembrance is a choosing, a 
highlighting, a shaping, an enshrinement.”
31 Accordingly, in order to let the diarist 
speak for him- or herself, and to respectfully  “decode the meaning of  those texts 
within  their  context,”  as  Philippe  Lejeune  proposes,  I  have  identified  the  most 
pressing  concerns,  such  as  the  management  of  the  emotions,  work,  time  and 
observation, and have read them in light of the writers’ biographies, correspondence 
and literary work, considering the demands of a culture in which conservative and 
progressive beliefs coexisted.
32 Again, the personal or historical value of the diary 
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does not depend on the degree of self-disclosure, as each one is an expression of an 
individual consciousness moulded by culture. The analysis of the diarist’s responses 
to culture can shed light on both his or her self-perception and self-positioning within 
the social, political, economic ontological parameters in which he or she functions and 
can give us an idea of the contemporary cultural hierarchy of values.  
 
Diary and Genre 
The  reader,  editor,  biographer  and  critic  of  diaries  face  similar  difficulties  in 
interpreting  the  narrative  choices  that  determined  the  composition  of  a  diary. 
Although all four can be perfectly aware of the fact that generically the diary can be 
considered “a confession to the self with only the self as an auditor and without the 
public authority,” as Felicity Nussbaum has noted, they will inevitably discover that it 
provides but a “superficial illusion of transparency,” to use Spacks’s words.
33 As the 
brief list of published diaries has shown, editors have struggled to do justice to the 
respective  diarist.  With  manuscripts  frequently  comprising  thousands  of  heavily 
repetitive  pages,  selection  seems  imperative  but  assuredly  compromises  the 
authenticity of the diaristic record. Editorial framing, in its endeavour to accentuate 
the diary’s literary or historical merit, is liable to misrepresent the subject, as we shall 
see in the cases of Crabb Robinson and Eastlake (Chapter One). Although both the 
diary critic and the biographer take an interest in the truthful representation of the 
diarist, the fundamental difference in their approach consists of the former’s focus on 
the text and the investigation of the ways in which the diarist uses its material and 
conceptual form to ground him- or herself in the world. The latter would tend to use 
the  information  shared  in  the  diary  to  construct  the  author’s  life  narrative, 
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disregarding the importance of the contextual forum in which it was uttered. The 
boundaries between the work of the diary critic and that of the biographer can blur, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  diarists  such  as  Gissing,  whose  accounts  are  primarily 
concerned with establishing inventories of work done or money made.   
As much critical work has shown, the diary genre is characterised by its hybrid 
nature. The diaristic gesture is clearly a self-objectifying autobiographical attempt to 
give value to subjective experience by creating an anthologised record of daily life. 
Langford and West have eloquently summed up the particularities of this “uncertain 
genre” which belongs to several genres and is therefore excluded from all, as it is 
“uneasily balanced between literary and historical writing, between the spontaneity of 
reportage  and  the  reflectiveness  of  the  crafted  text,  between  selfhood  and  events, 
between subjectivity and objectivity [and] between the private and the public.”
34 The 
diary’s generic features can indeed be manipulated to reflect and contain the delights 
and pressures of individual lives, as well as cultural norms and literary styles and 
tastes. The extremely individualised form and content of a diary entry, which may 
take the shape of a single word, an extensive list, an elaborate travel account, or an 
analysis  of  the  diarist’s  psychological  state,  complicate  the  categorisation  and 
definition of the diaristic record. Individual entries (or sequences), if dated, tend to be 
characterised  by  temporal  immediacy,  but  frequently  document  experience 
retrospectively  and  must  thus  be  situated  at  the  generic  threshold  between  formal 
autobiography and diaristic writing. 
Questions regarding authorship and audience cause further difficulties. Due to 
its intrinsic desire to share experience, be it with the self, or an actual/imagined reader, 
the diary, through “auto-destination,” mimics the conventions of letter writing: the 
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person who writes the entry also receives it, as it were, frequently establishing links 
between entries, “catching up,” apologising, confessing, justifying, and, particularly 
in the case of Eliot, hoping for an absolving response.
35 Intratextual and intertextual 
references are, according to Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen, integral to the practices of letter 
writing, establishing a “dialogue of correspondence.”
36 Similarly, self-referencing and 
direct  allusions  to  previous  entries  are  a  common  characteristic  of  diary  writing, 
through which diarists tend to establish a continuity of text and persona. Chapter Two 
will highlight such ‘interactions between selves,’ focusing on the diary  of George 
Eliot.  As  the  writer  and  reader  are  identical,  the  diary  functions  as  a  formalised 
discourse between the two. 
Arguably, the fundamental motivation behind all autobiographical writing is 
the  desire  to  remember  and  be  remembered,  which  coexists  with  the  need  for 
confession and absolution. Rather than silently contemplating his or her thoughts, the 
diarist chooses to give them a material shape, thus inviting communication between 
writing  and  reading  selves,  as  well  as  between  him-  or  herself  and  a  confidante, 
stranger, or wider audience. This reaching out for a response from the self and/or the 
other  can  be  seen  as  the  unifying  quality  of  autobiographical  writing,  as  Carolyn 
Barros has convincingly argued: “a diary, a set of letters, an oral account, a collection 
of  photographs,  or  a  hymn  [;]  someone  is  telling  someone  else  that  something  is 
happening  to  me.”
37 Life-writing  genres,  such  as  spiritual  autobiography,  formal 
autobiography, memoirs, letter writing and diary writing, systematically overlap as 
they are products of individual consciousnesses perceiving themselves from a similar 
                                                 
35 Jean Rousset, « Le journal intime, texte sans destinataire? » Poétique, vol. 16 (1983), pp. 435-443, 
p. 438. 
36 Sanna-Kaisa Tnaskanen, “Intertextual Networks in the Correspondence of Lady Katherine Paston,” 
in Letter Writing, Terttu Nevalainen and Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen, eds. (Amsterdam and Philadelphia : 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007), p. 74. 
37  Barros,  Carolyn  A.,  Autobiography—Narrative  of  Transformation  (Ann  Arbor:  University  of 
Michigan Press, 1998), p. 8.   18 
“operational vantage point,” to use the words of Sidonie Smith, aiming to ensure the 
veracious and respectful treatment and remembrance of their lives.
38 
Despite  their  similar  generic  objectives,  the  conception  of  reality 
communicated by retrospective autobiographical accounts differs fundamentally from 
the  perspective  that  diaristic  writing  must  necessarily  adopt.  Whereas  the 
autobiographer “considers his or her destiny as a whole” and endeavours to create a 
unified version of the past, as Alain Girard has observed, the diarist does not have the 
advantage of retrospectively re-imagining his or her self, but “seeks to give to his or 
her present life a reality which ceaselessly escapes from his or her grasp.”
39 The diary 
thus captures the process of self-signification in which the diarist negotiates his own 
value within his or her cultural context. Autobiography can be seen as an effort to 
manipulate the judgment of the past by future generations. The diary, in contrast, 
seeks to fashion a self that is considered respectable in the present and the future. The 
fact  that  this  self-construct  is  usually  invisible  at  first  glance  does  not  mean  the 
diarist’s motivations are any less predetermined than the autobiographer’s.  
Diarists tend to use several life-writing genres for different purposes, as can be 
seen in the case of John Ruskin (Chapter Three). Ruskin did not use the diary as a 
forum for internal self-contemplation and only communicated truly personal issues 
via written correspondence that was explicitly addressed to a recipient. Considering 
the consistent silencing of the self that he practices in the diary, it is ironic that in Fors 
Clavigera (1871-1878 and 1880-1884), a collection of letters that takes the stylistic 
form of a diary and the material form of a pamphlet/magazine, Ruskin demonstrates 
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“reckless  and  absolute  candour,”  as  John  D.  Rosenberg  has  observed.
40 In  “The 
Convents of St. Quentin,” written in Brantwood on February 8
th 1880, he admits that:  
Fors contains much trivial and desultory talk […] Scattered up and down in it 
[…] there is much casual expression of my own personal feelings and faith, 
together with bits of autobiography, which were allowed place, not without 
some notion of their being useful, but yet imprudently, and even incontinently, 
because  I  could  not  at  the  moment  hold  my  tongue  about  what  vexed  or 
interested me, or returned soothingly to my memory.
41 
 
Whereas  in  the  diaries,  Ruskin  prudently  limits  the  content  of  his  entries  to 
professionally  useful  observations,  in  Fors,  this  rather  dignified  reticence  breaks 
down and gives way to “incontinent,” ebullient and self-revealing writing. The diary 
portrays Ruskin as the photographic intermediary between the world and the reader, 
but Fors shows a Ruskin longing for an “us of the old race” (“The Advent Collect”), 
solidarity and human understanding.
42 He now seems unresponsive to nature, which 
constitutes a fundamental change from the attitude manifested in the diaries: “For me, 
the birds do not sing, nor ever will,” but he still aspires to make others see: “but they 
would, for you, if you cared to have it so.”
43  
The  maxim  “Verba  Volant—scripta  manent”  (“Words  fly  away,  what  is 
written  stays  put”),  can  be  seen  as  the  primary  motive  of  the  diary  genre.
44 This 
applies to all forms of writing, but in the case of the diary, the writer’s desire to fix his 
or  her  personal  (temporal,  spatial  and  emotional)  reality  transcends  writing  as  a 
technology that aids intellectual reasoning.
45 The diary embodies an attempt to grasp 
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and  collect  different  facets  of  an  ever-changing  self  through,  to  use  the  words  of 
Robyn Sarah, its “contemplative nature, [its] engaged literacy, [its] respect for the 
past,  and  an  examined  life.”
46 The  diaristic  gesture  is  possessive,  analytic  and 
introspective, but always concerned with cultural rules for behaviour and conduct. 
The diary self-consciously articulates the diarist’s subjective experience of the world 
within the parameters of the culturally acceptable and hence its act of self-assertion is 
always  already  coupled  with  self-effacement.  Regenia  Gagnier  has  defined 
autobiographical  records  as  “rhetorical  projects  embedded  in  concrete  material 
situations,” and similarly, this thesis insists on their direct reflection of and indirect 
contribution to cultural circumstances.
47 
 
Critical approaches and methodology 
Despite  the  abundance  of  published  diaries,  Victorian  and  other,  Felicity  A. 
Nussbaum’s 1988 assessment that “a theory of diary has not yet evolved,” is still true 
in the realm of English-speaking diary scholarship.
48 Perhaps this is for good reason, 
as the definition of generic boundaries implies the constant danger of over-theorising 
the  particular  and  brushing  over  instances  of  dissidence,  thus  misrepresenting  the 
individual diarist. Despite the strongly subjective meaning that each diary has for its 
author, we can detect commonalities between diaries. Rather than to obtrude a generic 
frame onto the diaries I have considered, I have identified each text’s most urgent 
concerns and, taking a new historicist approach, read them in light of the author’s 
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work, letters and memoranda, as well as journalism, philosophy and psychology of 
the day. After individual study and contexualisation of the diaries in question, the 
themes of professional zeal and emotional regulation transpired and surpassed topics 
prevalent  in  other  Victorian  diaries,  such  as  social  life,  politics  and  sexuality. 
Although  I  distinguish  selective  repression  as  an  integral  factor  in  the 
professionalisation of the self, I by no means intend to take up and perpetuate the idea 
that the Victorians were fundamentally repressed, which was spread by critical work 
of the 1960s and 1970s. I use the Foucauldian model not to stress the dissemination of 
repression throughout the Victorian culture in general, but rather to indicate specific 
ways in which the diarist functions as the product and shaper of his or her culture by 
showing a variety of responses to the cult of self-improvement as well as individual 
interpretations of the diary’s generic characteristics.  
  My  endeavour  to  explore  Victorian  perceptions  of  the  desirability  and 
respectability of feeling bears resemblance to Gesa Stedman’s impetus for her study 
on  the  Victorian  discourses  on  the  emotions.
49  Although  Stedman  is  similarly 
interested in the influence of “the individual body and the feelings” on the “body 
politic of the nineteenth century,” our studies diverge on a methodological level.
50 
Whereas  Stedman’s  focus  on  nineteenth-century  novels  and  both  Victorian  and 
contemporary criticism provides an important survey of the language of the emotions 
in their cultural context, my thesis exhibits the “dialectic of the expression of the 
emotions and the necessity to control them” in the Victorian diary and shows that the 
compulsion  to  exert  self-censorship  that  can  be  detected  in  public  utterances  also 
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intruded into the supposedly free and private realm of the diaristic record.
51 The study 
of these well-known writers’ diaries can thus shed a new light on their perception of 
their function in the world. Whereas the examination of their published work reveals 
their  impact  on  Victorian  culture,  the  diaries  uncover  the  extent  to  which  they 
themselves  were  concretely  influenced  by  the  ideologies  of  the  day,  such  as  the 
necessity to control the emotions (Chapter One).  
  In  order  to  form  a  critical  understanding  of  the  diary  genre,  as  well  as  to 
develop methods of interpreting non-confessional diaries, I have frequently turned to 
French  diary  criticism,  which  has  produced  several  large-scale  monographs  that 
successfully  explore  the  effects  of  socio-political,  historical  and  philosophical 
developments  on  the  interiority  of  the  diarist  from  multiple  perspectives,  such  as 
psychoanalysis and sociology. The seminal French diary studies written by Philippe 
Lejeune,  Beatrice  Didier  and  Alain  Girard  include  both  genders  and  discuss  the 
importance  of  class  and  historical  moment,  as  well  as  generic  affinities.
52 Their 
comprehensive  and  in-depth  surveys,  more  so  than  the  disunited  and  rather 
fragmented body of English diary criticism, lucidly present the diary as a tool for 
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gaining  self-possession,  obliterating  the  need  for  a  possibly  disappointing  human 
other and maximally taking advantage of the time available to the individual.
53  
In contrast, English analyses tend to focus on the particular and refrain from 
establishing  all-encompassing  generalisations.  Nonetheless,  they  frequently  portray 
the diary as a specifically feminine form and aim to give a voice to the silenced.
54 In 
order to situate a diary among other autobiographical texts, while still respecting its 
unique articulation of authorial subjectivity, it was imperative to consult theoretical 
attempts  at  defining  the  genre,  as  well  as  case-specific  information,  such  as 
biographical references  and other forms of life  writing, and historical evidence of 
Victorian discourse.  
The approach of cultural historians to the diary was of little help when it came to 
the analysis of individual texts.
55 Research carried out by nineteenth-century critic 
Jakob Burkhardt and twentieth-century scholars Karl Joachim Weintraub and Georges 
Gusdorf, among others, has read the desire to communicate noteworthy information 
relating  to  the  self  as  the  product  of  “certain  metaphysical  preconditions,”  to  use 
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Gusdorf’s  words.
56 For  instance,  according  to  Weintraub,  in  ancient  Greece,  self-
searching was extremely limited because the conditions of the day did not encourage 
self-centred activity, as “individuals were embedded in the social mass of given blood 
relations. These earlier lines are enmeshed in and derive their meaning from basic 
social  and  kinship  relations.”
57 The  Middle  Ages,  Weintraub  argues,  present  a 
similarly  low  number  of  autobiographical  writings  because  the  medieval  societal 
structure differed from the social order of ancient Greece to a minimal degree: the 
Church took the place of the “polis.” While this thesis takes into account the “macro-
phenomena”  of  the  historical  context  in  which  the  Victorian  diaries  under 
consideration  were  conceived,  such  as  social  and  industrial  change,  it  devotes 
substantial  attention  to  the  individual  writer’s  private  utterances.  Rather  than  to 
impose a determinative framework, Chapter One’s discussion of selective repression 
acts  as  an  explanatory,  contextualising  basis  for  my  examination  of  the  chosen 
diarists’ tendency to prioritise discussions of their work over expressions of personal 
emotion in their diaries.  
Returning  to  my  previous  point,  there  is  obviously  reason  to  doubt  the 
possibility  of  a  total  immersion  of  the  individual  in  his  or  her  culture,  as  Marcel 
Mauss’s sociological investigations have revealed: “there has never been a human 
being  without  the  sense  not  only  of  his  body  but,  but  also  of  his  simultaneously 
mental  and  physical  individuality.”
58 It  does  indeed  seem  obvious  that  intelligent 
beings, aware of their inner and outer particularities, would form a concept of self, 
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even if the term “self” is not in common usage. However, for autobiographical writing 
to occur, “belief in the inward self as a responsible agent” needs to be encouraged, as, 
according to Roger Smith, “the Protestant sensibility” did.
59 Factors such as political 
restructuring,  technological  advancement,  religious  reformation  and  scientific 
progress all have an impact on the individual and his or her material environment.  
Peter Burke has warned that a lack of autobiographical records must not be 
equated with a lack of self-consciousness: 
It is obviously dangerous to argue from the rarity of ego-documents before 
1500 that self-consciousness was undeveloped, since modern Western links 
between writing and self-examination are not universal. The kinds of texts 
produced in a given culture are related not only to its central values, but also to 
local assumptions about the uses of literacy (and we must not forget that only 
a minority of the population of Renaissance Europe was able to write).
 60 
 
Indeed, when considering the material reality in which autobiographical records are 
produced, we must take into account the practical aspects of culture. Victorian culture, 
with its immense output of literary, journalistic, scientific, educational, recreational 
and  promotional  publications,  insisted  on  the  supremacy  of  the  written  word.
61 
Literacy equated the ability to disseminate one’s knowledge and celebrities, such as 
Ruskin,  published  almost  everything  they  wrote.  Literacy  also  meant  that  writing 
could become a professional, bread-winning activity, which kept Gissing from the 
much-dreaded  workhouse.  The  economic  importance  of  writing  and  the  general 
eagerness  to  publish  written  work  can  arguably  be  seen  as  a  crucial  factor  that 
determined the shape (content and form) of Victorian life writing. As we have seen, 
even though diaries were not always designed for publication, it is very likely that 
many  of  them  were  written  with  publication  in  mind,  or  defensively  anticipated 
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external judgment. The cultural association of writing and economic value could be 
seen to have stimulated diarists’ desire to use their temporal and emotional resources 
wisely and to appropriate their own lives, as Chapter Two discusses at length.  
From a political point of view, the liberalism that was in place in Victorian 
Britain was “a new type of social order related to a novel mode of production that was 
marked  in  contrast  to  either  feudalism  or  the  ancient  republics,”  as  Richard  Paul 
Bellamy has noted.
62 In light of Weintraub’s metaphysical theories of autobiography, 
we  might  remark  that  liberal  individuals  did  not  adhere  to  a  “unitary  body  of 
principles dubbed the capitalist ideology” but that still their society was not atomized, 
as  they  strove  to  maintain  the  communitarian  spirit  of  past  civilizations.
63  As 
evidenced  by  the  diaries  this  thesis  examines,  the  Victorians  strove  to  establish  a 
“meritocratic  society  of  self-reliant  and  responsible  citizens”  who  were  united  “in 
pursuit  of  individual,  social,  material  and  moral  improvement,”
  which  was  not 
opposed  to  the  community-based  system  that  dominated  the  Greek  “polis.”
  64 
However, since Victorian individuals had both the right and the duty to maximise 
their  own  profit,  they  also  assumed  an  undeniable,  but  not  clearly  defined, 
responsibility  towards  the  community,  which  meant  that  their  role  in  society  was 
ambiguous. As a result, the diarists in this thesis constantly evaluated their behaviour 
in search for the appropriate conduct. Their diaries helped them ‘find a place for the 
self.’  
 
Themes: Time, Work and Extraverted Narrative 
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Rather than ruminate in isolation, the diarists under consideration used their diaries as 
a means to process the external world and to position themselves in relation to their 
cultural reality. The diaristic gesture’s primarily appropriative function  consists of 
arresting and organising the temporal, which catered to the diarists’ need to use their 
limited time on earth as productively as possible. They were eager to ensure the self-
disciplined employment of time for the purposes of work, which ideally benefited the 
community.  As  the  appropriation  and  possession  of  emotional  experience  was 
complicated due to Victorian culture’s condemnation of passion, sullenness and self-
complacency  (Chapter  One),  a  preoccupation  with  visual  observations  (Chapters 
Three  and  Four)  and  work  schedules  (Chapter  Two)  constituted  a  legitimised 
substitute for engaging with the self directly.  
Gradual secularisation, which denied the comforting belief in an afterlife, can 
be seen to have reinforced the pressures exerted by the Protestant work ethic and 
made productivity the standard for measuring human value. Martin Hewitt has thus 
viewed the extensive use and availability of (often preformatted) diaries after 1830 as 
the product of this capitalist lifestyle: 
The industrialization of time created wide demand for desk and pocket diaries 
to  record  meetings  arranged  and  transactions  conducted.  The  rise  of 
bureaucracy brought the spread of the diary as a tool for management.
65  
 
In this “meritocratic” culture, the treatment of time as a precious resource that was not 
to  be  wasted  converged  with  the  pressure  to  work  tirelessly  and  encouraged  the 
diarists this thesis discusses to take maximal advantage of their available time. By 
verbally  rendering  and  inscribing  the  lived  moment,  they  claimed  ownership  over 
their experience and sought to prove to themselves and to potential readers that they 
were/had been hard-working, useful members of society. Wastefulness  of life and 
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misdirected energies were considered major sins and this awareness was progressively 
forged  and  reinforced  by  the  diary,  which,  as  Robert  A.  Fothergill  has  observed, 
shaped “a mental attitude [cultivating] systematic and discriminating observation. The 
journal is an instrument for seeing more clearly and remembering more profitably.”
66 
Through re-reading, the diarists were able to (re-)establish connections to their past 
selves, which allowed them to take an educational short-cut: instead of having to re-
gain  knowledge,  they  could  learn  from  the  inscribed  events  and  relativise  new 
experiences.  Thus,  in  their  attempt  to  use  time  and  experience  “profitably,”  their 
whole lives became work. 
Besides  consistently  documenting  their  professional  progress,  the  diarists 
under examination demonstrate a keen interest in observing their natural and urban 
environment, rather than reflecting on interhuman relationships. Eliot’s and Gissing’s 
fiction  demonstrates  very  developed  observational  skills  when  it  comes  to  human 
character, but their diaries, although less consistently than Ruskin’s and Hopkins’s, 
tend  to  privilege  descriptions  of  the  natural  world  (and  artefacts)  over  human 
interactions. This tendency to foreground descriptions of natural scenery accentuates 
these diaries’ ‘professional’ nature and their role as equipment to the observer. The 
function of these texts, as Mary Ellen Bellanca has explained, was often more than 
that of “[repositories] of raw information,” as they provided diarists with 
a versatile instrument for investigating not only nature but also themselves as 
perceiving  subjects—for  responding  to  experience  and  reconstructing 
discovery as well as fashioning modes of expression that would later inform 
other writings, including published works in other forms.
67 
  
The diary’s capacity to establish a self-objectifying distance between selves, allows 
the observer to watch him- or herself in the process of visually studying the world. In 
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this sense, for Ruskin and Hopkins in particular, the diary was a tool that allowed 
them to store and process visual experience and ‘train the eye,’ as well as to construct 
themselves  purely  as  observers.  We  might  argue  that  their  diary’s  strict  focus  on 
visual reality implies a conscious choice to block out undesirable emotions, such as 
sexual confusion. 
 
Chapters 
As I have announced, the selected ‘professional’ diaries can be characterised by their 
determination to improve the diarists’ productivity through an unwavering focus on 
work.  The  daily  inventory  of  tasks  accomplished,  progress  made  and  set-backs 
suffered establishes a competition between the writing selves (past, present and future) 
and encourages the identification of the diarist with his or her work. For the diarists in 
question,  the  diary  was  an  essential  instrument  in  the  implementation  of  the  self-
discipline  necessary  to  maximise  productivity  and  respectability.  Although  all  the 
authors this thesis discusses are seminal Victorian writers whose work has received 
extensive  critical  attention,  their  diaries  have  largely  been  ignored.  Even  if  these 
authors’ lives and publication histories are quite dissimilar, all of them display an 
eagerness to excel at their work and to avoid hostile social judgment by consistently 
monitoring the propriety of their utterances and actions. Their diaries can be seen as 
attempts to find the fragile balance between self-assertion and self-effacement.  
Chapter One aims to situate Eastlake’s, Crabb Robinson’s, Eliot’s, Gissing’s, 
Ruskin’s and Hopkins’s obsession with self-discipline within their culture’s passion 
for  self-improvement.  As  professional  motivation  and  the  selective  repression  of 
emotion tend to be deeply intertwined in the texts under scrutiny, I shall analyse the 
instructions for emotional control as evidenced in the psychological discourse of the   30 
nineteenth century and take Alexander Bain’s (1818-1809) psychology manual The 
Emotions and the  Will of 1859 as a conceptual basis. Bain’s title has eponymous 
significance in that it accentuates the fundamentally bipolar organisation that he and 
many of his contemporaries and colleagues perceived to be the essence of a person. 
Before the strength of the will achieved dominance over the emotions, the human 
being was not considered a person, but rather an infant, madman/woman or criminal. 
Emotional control came to be seen as the mark of civilisation and respectability. 
 The first diarist discussed is art critic, artist and journalist, Lady Elizabeth 
Eastlake (1809-1893). She figures in this thesis because she was a woman in a male-
dominated world and wrote articles that defined the traits of character and behaviour 
that were desirable in a respectable female, as her famously scathing review of Jane 
Eyre shows.
68 Although Eastlake never advocated total immunity from emotion, she 
insisted that work should always counteract emotional weakness and thus helped to 
reinforce her culture’s association of professional diligence with emotional control. 
Her diaries have mostly been ransacked for their biographical content and have not 
been read in their own right. Although they have been edited and reassembled with 
little sensitivity, they reveal a woman who not only cultivated a façade of moral and 
intellectual  perfection,  but  who  fervently  strove  to  substantialise  this  persona  by 
embodying and being an honourable and principled person. 
Eastlake’s heavily didactic cultural commentary supported Bain’s idea that the 
emotions  needed  to  be  managed  and  used  for  artistic  creation,  rather  than  self-
indulgent self-contemplation. Both Bain and Eastlake display a strong belief in the 
individual’s  responsibility  to  control  “passionate  [emotional]  outbursts”  for  the 
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benefit  of  the  community.
69 Alongside  this  encouraged  selective  repression,  both 
deemed enthusiastic emotion to be a crucial component of creativity. As Henry Crabb 
Robinson’s  (1775-1867)  diary  shows,  the  Victorian  artist  was  under  considerable 
pressure to find this ideal emotional equilibrium. Crabb Robinson was a well-known 
Victorian  lawyer,  who  was  closely  acquainted  with  the  intellectual  elite  of  the 
nineteenth century, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, as well as Goethe and Schiller. 
He used his diary primarily to document his interactions (verbal and written) with his 
famous friends, as well as to vent his opinions on contemporary philosophy. As with 
Eastlake, his diary has not been the object of scholarly investigation and is often used 
as  a  reference  text  to  deliver  ‘authentic’  Victorian  ‘first-hand’  ‘facts,’  as  well  as 
background information on the members of the diarist’s social circle. His estimations 
of  his  personal  value  correlate  with  his  regrets  over  his  failed  artistic  career  and 
accentuate the desire, or duty, to achieve professional success that we see in the other 
diaries  of  this  thesis.  His  (heavily  edited)  records  show  that  he  was  severely 
intimidated by the general cultural call for just enough emotion, which stifled his own 
creative  energy.  The  disappointment,  humiliation  and  shame  that  came  from  this 
‘poetic  dryness’  (which  is  also  evident  in  Hopkins’s  career)  demonstrate  that,  for 
Crabb  Robinson,  artistic  prowess  was  the  highest  distinction  of  the  human  being, 
which he felt that, for him, was always out of reach. 
This chapter contrasts two types of cultural commentators: on the one hand, 
Lady  Eastlake,  who  was  confident  in  her  professional  authority  and  sought  to 
influence others; on the other, Crabb Robinson, who, although he had a successful 
legal career, was not able to fulfil his professional vision and spent his life coming to 
terms with the compromises he had to make. I consider some of the cultural roots of 
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the habitual self-effacement, which all the diarists that this thesis examines seem to 
have exerted for the sake of foregrounding their work. It also presents the diary’s role 
as a self-monitoring tool that could help the diarist adhere to the culturally determined 
duty to tailor a self that protects, rather than challenges, the community. 
Chapter Two focuses on the diaries of the renowned Victorian realists George 
Eliot (1819-1890) and George Gissing (1857-1903). Eliot was a female sage who 
hoped to transform society through her fiction and, as her diaries show, attempted to 
craft  a  genuinely  noble  and  selfless  person.  Although  Gissing’s  novels  are  often 
mentioned  alongside  Eliot’s,  he  was  not  motivated  by  the  same  determination  to 
achieve  social  change  through  his  fictional  creations,  but  struggled  for  financial, 
rather than moral, survival. Reading the diaries of these realist novelists, whose works 
appear at different extremes of the spectrum of realism, reveals the ways in which 
material  reality  can  inform  and  reinforce  a  writer’s  moral  philosophy  (Comte’s 
positivism for Eliot and Schopenauerian pessimism in Gissing’s case). Despite the 
drastic difference in material wealth that separated these two authors, their diaries 
show that both treated work as a new form of religiosity that determined their value as 
individuals. Both constantly deplored their inability to produce fictional and essayistic 
writing. 
Eliot’s diary shows that her ideal of an uninterrupted, rigorous work-discipline 
exerted a significant strain on her and caused a constant personal struggle between 
self-abnegation and self-assertion. For Eliot, lack of work signified the neglect of her 
readers who depended on her for moral guidance. Failure to produce literature thus 
established  her  as  a  weak  and  selfish  human  being  who  had  disappointed  the 
community by not paying back the debt that came with her financial and romantic 
privileges and who had deserted her positivist ideals. Eliot’s diary reveals that her   33 
didactic fiction, through which she sought to redeem her guilt towards her readers, 
was the product of endless crises of confidence, caused by her own, exceedingly high, 
literary standards. The diary offers a space for weakness and complaint, but, in tune 
with the cultural pressure to silence such emotions, Eliot refuses to wholly indulge in 
her lamentations and always reassures herself and her invisible reader that despite 
momentary discomfort she is extremely grateful for her blessings. Through frequently 
re-reading her diaries and consequently interacting with past selves, Eliot sought to 
cultivate  a  self-contained,  balanced  and  productive  persona  who  could  “touch  the 
hearts of [her] fellowmen” and accomplish social change.
70 Significantly, Eliot did 
not employ her diary as a confessional vent, but instead used her letters and fictional 
works to utter and transcend emotional turmoil. 
  George  Gissing’s  (1857-1903)  diary  displays  an  even  more  obstinate 
compulsion  to  produce  work  and  a  more  consistent  equation  of  professional 
productivity  with  personal  value.  Gissing  needed  to  produce  literature  at  an 
astonishing speed in order to overcome the misery of poverty which he experienced as 
shameful and unrespectable. He used his diary as a tool to monitor his rate of literary 
output and to exert additional pressure on himself, and, usually only when he could 
report genuine happiness, did he inscribe experiences that were personal rather than 
professional. Gissing’s practice of diary keeping reflects the divided nature of his life: 
because material want and anxiety dominated his professional existence, he rarely 
shared  anything  beyond  his  progress  with  his  diary.  During  his  travels,  however, 
when Gissing was in the pleasurable proximity of great art, his diary entries swelled 
in size and became more descriptive. It seems that in the idealised world of Italy and 
Greece,  Gissing  felt  he  was  truly  alive,  which  shows  that  work  was  the  only 
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component  of  his  comparatively  dreary  London  life  that  deserved  recording.  He 
tended to reveal more personal information in his letters—for instance, among many 
other instances, the diary fails to disclose the romantic developments with Gabrielle 
Fleury, but his letters to her expose his obsessive love. 
Chapter  Three  examines  the  published  diaries  of  art  critic  and  philosopher 
John Ruskin (1819-1900), whose extraordinary body of publications is evidence for a 
life spent in the service of work. His diaristic writing was similarly extensive, as for 
Ruskin,  undocumented  experience  was  wasted.  I  shall  treat  Ruskin’s  deliberate 
disregard of his personal life in his diaries and his autobiography as a prime example 
of the selective consciousness at work in many Victorian diaries. As Andrew Leng 
has pointed out, Ruskin, in his extensive “self-mythologization,” simply omitted his 
“disastrous marriage and the humiliating scandal surrounding its annulment on the 
grounds  of  non-consummation.”
71  Through  foregrounding  his  professional  self, 
Ruskin’s diary displays an unwavering focus on visual reality, which reveals a refusal 
to  engage  with  the  unrespectable  aspects  of  his  past  and  present  life  and  is  self-
assertive in its self-effacing censorship. The diary precedes Ruskin’s determination to 
“[pass] in total silence things which I have no pleasure in reviewing,” which he made 
explicit in Praeterita (1885-1889).
72  
Whereas for Eliot and Gissing pleasure stood in direct opposition to work, for 
Ruskin, gratifying emotion was an integral part of the labour-intensive process of 
observation,  as  his  diary  shows.  The  other  diarists  only  sporadically  included 
extensive travel reports into their diaries, but Ruskin’s overflows with lengthy and 
very detailed visual descriptions of his external environment. Although Ruskin, like 
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Crabb Robinson, viewed emotion as the necessary spark that invested art with life and 
meaning, he employed it for the purposes of work and did not respect its natural 
dynamic  of  excitability  and  satiability,  which  was  the  cause  of  much  frustration. 
Instead, he constantly forced himself to feel touched by landscapes and architecture 
when  he  was  emotionally  drained  and  incapable  of  connecting  to  the  observed 
objects/events.  Like  Gissing’s,  Ruskin’s  diary  strikes  through  its  remarkably 
consistent silencing of private emotions, which stands in stark contrast to the desire 
for the total possession of visual scenes, which Ruskin expressed frequently.  
  Chapter Four scrutinises the diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889), the 
now famous Jesuit poet who existed at the periphery of the Victorian art world. None 
of Hopkins’s poems were published in his lifetime, for his religious and his poetic self 
were  in  a  constant  state  of  conflict.  His  diary  primarily  translates  his  poetic 
consciousness, rendering Hopkins’s wilful focus on the descriptions of visual objects. 
In some ways, the diary can be seen to embody Hopkins’s effort to distance himself 
from his subversive and unrespectable homosexual emotions, which was finalised by 
his decision to join the Jesuit order and devote his body and mind to God. His diary 
shows that, in order to divert from “dangerous” emotions, Hopkins developed his 
observational  skills  and,  through  inscribing  his  impressions  into  this  record, 
strengthened his imagined connection to the natural world. Initially Hopkins used the 
diary form to monitor and quench his inappropriate homosexual interests and it later 
served as a forum in which to construct himself as a necessary observer of nature—a 
task that took the shape of a profession: in order to include and ground himself in 
God’s creation, Hopkins consistently animated non-human natural objects, imagining 
them to invite and return his gaze. Hopkins then received validation for his efforts to 
fulfil  nature’s  need  to  be  perceived  by  a  human  consciousness,  which,  in  the   36 
terminology he developed in his diary, was called “inscape.” Presumably, Hopkins 
eventually gave up on his diary because his work as a priest was too demanding and 
completely  swallowed  his  time,  to  the  point  that  he  could  no  longer  cultivate  his 
observational skills, which led to the despair of the “terrible” sonnets. 
  The Victorian diaries under examination can be seen as the diarists’ attempts 
to monitor the intensity and propriety of their emotions and employ them to increase 
their  professional  output.  Eastlake,  Crabb  Robinson,  Eliot,  Gissing,  Ruskin  and 
Hopkins  perceived  self-scrutiny  as  a  useful  activity  only  when  it  could  serve  the 
perfection and maximisation of their intellectual endeavour, not when it encouraged 
self-indulgent  rumination.  Constantly  aiming  to  inspirit  themselves,  these  diarists 
preached the codes of silent discipline to themselves and, through their published 
work, to a wider audience.
73 
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Chapter One 
 
Silencing  the  Self:  Victorian  Psychology  and  Social  Life:  Alexander  Bain, 
Elizabeth  Eastlake and Henry Crabb Robinson. 
 
The diaries that this thesis examines are characterised by their reluctance to reveal 
intimate  detail  about  their  authors.  These  private  records  are  distinguished  by  the 
diarists’ determination to maintain a disciplined work routine and to exert control over 
their emotions of anger, pride and passion. Invariably, the diarists portray self-control 
as  a  quality  that  is  essential  for  maintaining  a  rigorous  work  ethic  and  thus  an 
inestimably  desirable  trait  of  character.  Emotionally  indulgent  behaviour,  such  as 
vanity,  self-pity  or  lethargy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  regarded  as  a  sign  of  personal 
weakness which has to be extirpated. This chapter will read the deliberate silencing of 
the self displayed in the diaries under investigation as a symptom of a more general 
societal pressure to hush the emotions, minimise references to the self and cultivate 
other-oriented behaviour, as evidenced in the psychological discourse of the period. It 
will consider the impact of Evangelical self-abnegation and political uncertainty on 
these diarists’ desire for a disciplined management of their emotions and show that 
repression  did  by  no  means  target  all  emotions,  but  was  employed  in  specific 
situations to achieve specific results.   
Alexander  Bain’s  (1818-1903)  psychology  textbook  The  Emotions  and  the 
Will  (1859)  investigates  and  disseminates  the  mechanisms  inherent  in  emotional 
control  and  thus  assumes  a  function  similar  to  Victorian  advice  literature.
1 Bain 
believed that through will-power, the individual could control and train his or her 
emotions like limbs. I shall investigate the reoccurrence of similar instructions for 
repressing the emotions in favour of professional diligence in the diaries and critical 
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work of two extremely influential Victorian public figures: Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake 
(1809-1893), the art critic and writer who was a “central figure in the Victorian art 
scene” and the lawyer and linguist Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) who was “a 
significant  cultural  mediator  and  channel  of  communication  between  English  and 
German letters.”
2 Due to their high-ranking social circles—Eastlake’s was composed 
of celebrities such as Ruskin, Turner and Carlyle and Crabb Robinson was friends 
with Wordsworth, Coleridge and Goethe—their views would have influenced a large 
number  of  their  contemporaries.  At  the  same  time,  like  Bain,  they  adopted 
behavioural guidelines that were pervading the culture, which were reflected in both 
their diaries and their work. 
The  Victorian  diarists  that  this  thesis  examines  evidently  come  from  a 
privileged background and the moral concerns they uttered in their private records 
reflect  upper-middle-class  ideas  of  respectability,  rather  than  rendering  a 
comprehensive picture of the Victorian cultural climate. All of them, George Eliot and 
George Gissing (Chapter Two) in particular, were “writers [who] spread the cult of 
self-awareness to the reading middle classes” and “professed a heartfelt interest in the 
secret  needs  and  conflicting  emotions  concealed  beneath  civilized  surfaces,”  thus 
“[mapping] inner space,” to use the words of Peter Gay.
3 Their diaries are dominated 
by a persistent struggle to tend to the various duties their cultural context demanded 
them to accomplish. Eliot and Gissing used the diary’s organisational structure to 
monitor daily accomplishments and failures. For Ruskin (Chapter Three), the diary 
represented a repository for his visual experience, which he felt compelled to preserve 
from  oblivion.  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins  (Chapter  Four)  felt  a  similar  duty  to 
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appropriate his visual environment, insisting on his own presence as an observer in 
the tableaux he depicted.  
Eastlake,  Crabb  Robinson,  Eliot,  Gissing,  Ruskin  and  Hopkins  used  their 
diaries as tools to enforce self-imposed as well as culturally determined duties and 
cannot be seen to fully conform to the functions—“expression” and “reflection”— 
that  diary  critic  Philippe  Lejeune  views  as  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the 
twentieth-century diary.
4 I shall argue that, due to the cultural codes of propriety, the 
“[releasing and unloading of] the weight of emotions” inherent in diaristic expression 
often inspired the diarists with shame, which led them to give in to “the impulse to 
destroy.”
5 Lejeune convincingly argues that through this final separation of the self 
and the emotion, diarists are able to “liberate” themselves from “the weight of the 
past.”
6 Lady Eastlake destroyed some of the diaries she thought too revealing and 
Ruskin determined from the start to keep one diary for feelings and one for thoughts, 
thus weeding out the undesirable emotional overgrowth. The present diaries fit into 
Lejeune’s  framework  in  that  they  can  primarily  be  considered  as  instruments  for 
“analysis” and “deliberation,” creating “archives from lived experience” in order to 
“freeze time” and “examine choices.”
7 Significantly, Bain encouraged the use of a 
diary to separate thoughts from emotions in order to make rational decisions. The 
diarists  I  focus on similarly  used their  records to draw lessons from the past and 
strengthen their willpower rather than for venting emotional turmoil.  
An examination of the similarities between the portrayal of emotion in Bain’s 
psychological  discourse  and  Eastlake  and  Crabb  Robinson’s  texts  can  give  us  an 
understanding of how cultural ideas of the emotional and physical constitution of  the 
                                                 
4 Philippe Lejeune, “How Do Diaries End?” Victoria Lodewick, trans., Biography, vol. 24, no. 1 (2001), 
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6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 96.    40 
human  being  conditioned  individual  behaviour.  In  its  effort  to  objectivise  and 
catalogue the motions of the mental apparatus through scientific inquiry, psychology 
assumed  an  almost  factual  knowledge  of  the  mind.  Psychological  textbooks  thus 
propagated an image of the human being that claimed the unquestionable accuracy of 
anatomical analysis. Psychology manuals, such as the work of Alexander Bain, W.B. 
Carpenter  (1813-1885)  and  T.S.  Clouston  (1840-1915),  which  possessed  (some) 
scientific authority, tended to promulgate moral ideas under the cover of disinterested 
veracity.
8  They  can  therefore  be  viewed  as  prescriptive  texts,  in  some  ways 
comparable to the popular advice literature, such as Samuel Smiles’ Self-Help (1859), 
which I shall further discuss in Chapter Two.
9 
The diary is an important tool in the analysis of Victorian thought because the 
diarist’s choice of material and language can shed light on the cultural consciousness 
of the nineteenth century.  However, due to the methodological difficulties that the 
editors of Eastlake’s and Crabb Robinson’s diaries have caused, this chapter will not 
be able to investigate the diaries’ role in the latter’s emotional self-monitoring, but 
will limit itself to an analysis of the attitudes they expressed in regard to emotional 
control. Despite the textual tailoring of the editors, we can discern Eastlake’s and 
Crabb Robinson’s efforts to fulfil socio-cultural requirements and assess the impact of 
culture on self-fashioning. Eastlake lived to witness the impact of Bain’s work and, as 
                                                 
8 W.B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology with their Applications to the Training of the Mind 
and  the  Study  of  its  Morbid  Conditions  (Kessinger  Publishing,  2004);  T.S.  Clouston,  “The 
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I  shall  show,  her  1868  study  of  grief  entitled  Fellowship:  Letters  to  My  Sister 
Mourners  recalls  Bain’s  views  that  the  suffering  related  to  loss  must  initially  be 
tolerated, if not embraced, before the individual must resume rigorous emotional self-
discipline.
10 Because both Eastlake and Crabb Robinson, as much as the other diarists 
this thesis examines, discussed the necessity to repress emotion in their diaries, we 
can infer that they responded to the codes of conduct that their culture was suffused 
with. We may assume that Bain was himself influenced by cultural mores advocating 
repression which marked the moral didacticism of his studies. Neither of these authors 
can be considered a representative of the whole of Victorian society, but some of the 
conscious mechanisms at work in the regulation of their conduct can be seen to be 
characteristic of their historical and cultural context. 
Bain’s psychological studies, as much as the diaries and critical articles under 
consideration,  depict  emotional  self-indulgence  as  a  behaviour  needing  control, 
temperance  and  self-restraint.  Section  I  argues  that  secularisation,  religious  self-
abnegation and political uncertainty intensified  the culture’s focus on the self and 
heightened  the  individual’s  responsibility  towards  the  community.  I  will  trace  the 
motivation  for  emotional  restraint  to  the  self-negation  advocated  by  Evangelical 
doctrines  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  fear  of  revolution  and  social  upheaval  that 
pervaded Victorian culture on the other. I will show that psychologists and medical 
doctors of the nineteenth century, in accordance with the institutionalised enforcement 
of  altruism,  proposed  techniques  for  a  successful  repressive  adjustment  of 
unrespectable  emotions—particularly  those  relating  to  the  self—to  the  social 
requirements. I will situate Alexander Bain’s work within the discourse of Victorian 
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psychology  and  discuss  its  relevance  in  light  of  the  sociological  scholarship  of 
Norbert Elias and selected scholars of respectability, such as F.M.L. Thompson, and 
analyse the self-protective mechanisms at work within the individual that give rise to 
culturally  conditioned  behaviour.
11 Attempting  to  shed  light  on  the  practice  of 
silencing  the  self  that  can  be  observed  in  the  diaries  under  examination,  I  will 
investigate the conscious and unconscious processes inherent in the private ‘managing 
of feeling’ in the public persona’s moral appearance.
12  
Section II will present my methodological choice to compensate the severe 
editorial distortion of the diarists’ original records by reading Eastlake’s diary in light 
of her published texts and Crabb Robinson’s in view of biographical factors. I will 
then discuss the feminisation of emotion in Victorian culture; presenting Eastlake’s 
and Crabb Robinson’s praise of both the nurturing, motherly qualities of feminine 
emotion and the connection that they draw between self-effacement and respectability 
as an example of more general cultural tendencies. Despite their encouragement of 
repression, they considered specific emotions as wholesome and necessary, such as 
the comforting and caring emotions that parents felt towards their children and artists’ 
emotional enthusiasm towards their creations. The juxtaposition of Eastlake’s attitude 
to the grieving process and the advice Crabb Robinson was given after the death of 
his mother demonstrates the delicate balance between indulgence and self-control that 
he felt he was expected to find. Whereas the emotions were seen as the mortar that 
solidified  the  family  and  infused  art  with  its  greatness,  they  had  to  be  severely 
monitored in social interactions. In what ultimately can be seen as an effort to protect 
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the  other  and  the  community,  the  individual  had  to  abstain  from  emotional 
impetuosity  and  selfishness,  which  explains  the  instances  of  apologetic  self-
minimisation that are typical of the diaries under investigation.     
I  Psychology and the Repression of Emotion 
In the past twenty years a considerable body of criticism has questioned the extent of 
Victorian  repression  and  analysed  its  portrayal  in  nineteenth-century  texts.  Recent 
scholarship has interrogated and challenged the validity of accepted post-Victorian 
assessments  of  the  period’s  attitudes  to  ideas  of  propriety.  Matthew  Sweet,  for 
instance, has observed that traditional views of Victorian sexuality have tended to 
focus on the “practices drawn from the cranky margins of Victorian medical culture,” 
tailoring a picture of the Victorians that is based on extremely shocking exceptions.
13 
In reality, the Victorians were probably more lenient than Peter Cominos’ article on 
respectability and sexual behaviour can lead us to think. Cominos focused primarily 
on  extreme  anti-sexual  attitudes,  such  as  Dr.  William  Acton’s  belief  in  “absolute 
continence” in the respectable gentleman, or Archbishop Ireland’s equation of “sexual 
passion” with “animalism.”
14 Clitoridectomy, chastity belts, penis cages and veiled 
piano  legs  may  have  existed,  but  they  certainly  were  not  part  of  the  standard 
household. However, selective repression of emotion, even in its most basic forms, 
was, and still is, an undeniable cultural necessity. Like critic Gowan Dawson, who has 
drawn attention to the censorship that Victorian naturalistic texts faced, I would like 
to  expose  some  of  the  cultural  imperatives  that  encouraged  the  chosen  diarists  to 
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customise his or her self into a well-behaved, self-contained, modest and tirelessly 
industrious human being.
15  
The  idealisation  of  self-possession,  thrift  and  other-directed  behaviour  can 
partly be seen as an outcome of the Evangelical principles that were introduced in 
eighteenth-century Britain. Historian Lawrence Stone has noted that within the realm 
of  Evangelical  control,  sexual  repression  was  administered  concurrently  with  a 
general discouragement of openly displayed emotion.
 16 Max Weber (1864-1920), on 
whose study of the Protestant work ethic (1904-05) I shall elaborate in Chapter Two, 
attributes the Victorian obsession with proper conduct to the Puritan belief that “even 
though  a  man  himself  could  not,  others  could  know  his  state  of  grace  by  his 
conduct.”
17 The Puritan not only anticipated and monitored his or her perception by 
others,  but  in  order  to  do  so,  he  or  she  had  to  believe  whole-heartedly  in  the 
possibility  of  being  one  of  the  elect  for  whom  salvation  was  assured.  Not  all 
Victorians were extreme Puritans, of course, but Evangelicalism had an impact on the 
culture’s perception of ardent emotion as undesirable.  
The fear of excessive emotion can also be traced to the political reality of 
nineteenth-century  Europe.  Britain  witnessed  the  political  turmoil  of  the  French 
Revolution, and, eager to avoid such uproar within its own confines, created countless 
institutions that attempted to regularise conduct by establishing norms for individual 
behaviour.  These organisations, such as the Society for the Suppression of Vice of 
1803, the Association Securing a Better Observance of Sunday, the Society for the 
Prevention of Female Prostitution, the Religious Tract Society and the 1824 Vagrancy 
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Act, aimed to combat the forces that constituted a menace to the existing political and 
ideological system, such as revolutionary tendencies, decreasing religious zeal and the 
intrusion  of  science  into  the  traditional  value  system.
18  This  progressive 
institutionalisation of the Victorian state demonstrates that Henry Crabb Robinson, 
although born in the eighteenth century, was influenced by the increasingly restrictive 
culture of the nineteenth.  
Public and private fears of the disorderly fed into each other to form a culture 
of state control, which encouraged personal vigilance.  Walter J. Houghton, in his 
influential work The Victorian Frame of Mind (1957) has noted that the Victorians’ 
“excessive censorship [was] intended to protect and support the code of chastity, or to 
prevent  the  embarrassment  of  looking  at  what  was  felt  to  be  shameful.”
19 This 
censorship manifested itself both on a private and on a state level. The necessity of 
controlling feeling sprang from a general fear of revolutionary chaos and cannot be 
reduced to mere prudish tastes. Gesa Stegman has emphasised the political aspect of 
uncontrolled emotion, which, for the Victorians, echoed the breakdown of the social 
system of 1789 France:    
The  spectre  of  the  body  politic  as  a  mass  of  powerful,  passionate  bodies 
overthrowing traditional values and institutions—Spencer’s ‘sanguinary chaos 
of  the  [French]  Revolution’  still  very  much  preyed  on  people’s  minds—was 
another obsessive fear expressed by leading intellectuals, particularly during the 
first part of the century.
20 
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This implied belief that human beings, when unleashed, could muster extraordinary 
force,  capable  of  “overthrowing”  the  structures  imposed  by  social  control, 
demonstrates  an  acute  fear  of  animalistic  violence  that  defied  all  attempts  of 
restraining discipline. In reaction, as social historian F.M.L. Thompson has explained, 
strict regulations became “[devised] mechanisms of social control which conditioned 
and manipulated the propertyless masses into accepting and operating the forms and 
functions of behaviour necessary to sustain the social order of an industrial society.”
21 
Financially  challenged  groups  such  as  the  working-classes,  prostitutes  and  Irish 
migrants,  among  others,  were  stigmatised  as  likely  to  “behave  badly,”  and  thus 
represented a particular menace to an orderly society.
22 
Since  the  introduction  of  a  regularised  police  force  in  London  in  1829, 
discussions  about  the  nature  of  the  criminal  and  of  unlawful  behaviour  increased 
significantly and over the course of the nineteenth century led to the formation of “the 
policeman-state.”
23 Such a state, according to Foucauldian critics Patrick Brantlinger 
and  Donald  Ulin,  provoked  “guilty  consciences”  in  individuals,  pushing  them  to 
behave in non-deviant, respectable ways. “The soul [being] the prison of the body,” as 
Foucault  wrote  in  Discipline  and  Punish  (1975),  the  self-monitoring  individual 
became his or her own panopticon, as this “discipline [came to be] internalised in 
every well-behaved, ‘normal’ good citizen.”
24 This approach implied that the human 
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being was seen as an unruly, wild and possibly riotous creature, who needed control 
and correction by a powerful, omnipresent authority.
25  
Nineteenth-century psychological studies on the emotions can reveal cultural 
signifiers that  reflect some of the concerns that preoccupied society and therefore 
represent valuable historical sources.  In her analysis of the emotions in nineteenth-
century  psychological  discourse,  critic  Gesa  Stegman  has  attributed  the  increased 
focus on the emotions to a general decrease in religious devotion, which constituted 
“a threat to social cohesion and morality which had to be counteracted by desperate 
measures, all of which can be found in the discourse on the emotions.”
26 However, it 
seems that religious zeal, as much as secularisation and the fears that accompanied 
this phenomenon, affected Victorian attitudes to the emotions with similar results. 
Gertrude  Himmelfarb’s  assertion  that  the  “Victorian  ethic”  of  moral  reform  was 
inspired by the Methodism which John Wesley had promoted, echoes Max Weber’s 
allegation  that  capitalism  rose  out  of  the  disembodied  behavioural  framework  of 
Protestantism: 
Even as religion became progressively more attenuated, as the public became 
more relaxed in its faith and the intellectuals more openly sceptical, the social 
ethic did not become correspondingly attenuated or relaxed. Indeed the ethic 
acquired some of the stigmata of old religion—the gloom and fierceness that 
Newman yearned for.
27 
 
George  Eliot’s  diary,  in  particular,  confirms  Himmelfarb’s  observation  that  the 
diminution  of  religious  commitment  was  replaced  by  “an  intensification  of  moral 
zeal,” and did not bring about a collapse of the value system.
28 On the contrary, as 
Himmelfarb  has  argued,  the  focus  shifted  from  religious  concerns  to  social 
compassion, with the Victorians now “giving to mankind what they could no longer 
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give  to  God.”
29 This  turn  towards  altruism,  I  propose,  can  be  associated  with  the 
general mockery and dismissal of vanity and of the preoccupation with the self which 
can  be  witnessed  in  the  work  of  Bain,  Eastlake  and  Crabb  Robinson,  as  well  as 
George Eliot, Ruskin and Hopkins (Gissing to a lesser extent).  
I shall now investigate the ways in which Alexander Bain’s psychology was 
other-directed  and  indicate  its  parallels  to  state  control.  For  Bain,  the  function  of 
education consisted in shaping the individual’s “half-organic and half-mental” will, to 
use Rick Rylance’s words, and in directing it towards respectable behaviour; namely 
selfless altruism: “the good of the community becomes the end and aim of our moral 
nature.”
30 A very influential psychologist and academic, Bain epitomises the dualism 
“emotion”  and  “will,”  which  can  be  seen  as  the  fundamental  dynamic  that 
characterises the diaries under examination as well as the diary as a genre. The self-
objectifying function of the diary facilitates the monitoring and the improvement of 
the written (past) self’s emotions through the writing (present) self’s will. The diary 
genre thus reflects the Victorian preoccupation with knowing and moulding the self.  
 
Alexander Bain (1818-1903) 
Alexander  Bain  was  a  psychologist  and  professor  of  Logic  and  English  at  the 
University of Aberdeen. His work, which elevated self-control to a moral level, brings 
to light the ways in which Victorian culture influenced the science of psychology and 
vice-versa. Rylance has argued that: “Bain  was a man  reacting to close historical 
events and tendencies [and] his conception of the will is not immune from some of the 
prevailing  beliefs.”
31  Bain  was  not  affiliated  with  any  religious  group  and 
demonstrated a classical humanist belief in the malleability of human character and 
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the agency of the human being, as he was convinced that “men and women could 
become virtuous by their own effort of will.”
32 The Emotions and the Will presents 
actual techniques by which the individual could condition the emotions by the power 
of the will and thus achieve professional productivity and respectability. Like Gesa 
Stedman,  I  believe  that  the  “strict  moral  framework,”  which  Bain  constructed  to 
explain the emotions, was designed to “safeguard the individual as well as society 
from immoral behaviour and therefore from ill-health.”
33 The will was seen to control 
the body’s “subversive potential,” and to prevent the individual from regressing, as 
my section on Bain’s stance on education will show.
34 I would, however, like to go 
beyond  Stedman’s  argument,  showing  that  Bain  specifically  encouraged  the 
repression of emotions associated with the self, such as vanity and self-indulgence 
and  encouraged  the  use  of  a  diary  to  invalidate  the  misleading  influence  of  the 
emotions.  
Bain, like Herbert Spencer, was a friend of George Eliot and George Henry 
Lewes and shared their admiration for the work of Auguste Comte. Because of their 
belief in the interdependence of mind and body, John Stuart Mill explicitly termed 
Bain and Spencer the “successors” of Comte, “who duly placed themselves at the 
twofold point between psychology and physiology.”
35 Gustav Jahoda, in his book on 
social psychology, has acknowledged that although Bain was “not a central figure” in 
positivism, he, like Mill and Lewes, played an important role in introducing Comte’s 
ideas to Britain.
36 Although, as Thomas Dixon has explained, Comte had not included 
psychology in his classification of the sciences, Bain approached the subject from a 
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scientific angle: “As Brown and other Scottish mental scientists had done before him, 
Bain  turned  to  the  physical  sciences  in  his  search  for  a  preferable  alternative  to 
theological  methodology.”
37 Using  the  “Natural  History  Method,”  he  viewed  the 
emotions as bodily products which could be controlled by the rational command of 
volition.
38 As Andrea A. Lunsford has explicated, “to Bain the emotive, cognitive, 
and volitional aspects are not ‘compartments’ of the mind; on the contrary, the mind 
is unified.”
39 For him, mental states  affected bodily functions and vice-versa—the 
body and the mind were inseparably intertwined as constituents of a unified human 
being and acted upon each other. 
Bain’s The Emotions and the Will starts out with an outline of the elements 
comprising the human mind: “Feeling, Volition and Intellect.”
40 Although, as Rylance 
has noted, Bain “rejected the notion that personality and human agency [were] only 
reward  stimulated,”  he  viewed  “Pleasures”  and  “Pains”  as  essential  tools  for 
conditioning  the  emotions,  which  were  termed  “Feelings.”
41  Feelings  were 
distinguished  from  Emotions,  because  they  were  “characterised  simply  as 
excitement.”
42 An  “Emotion”  was  a  complex  phenomenon,  which  was  activated 
through the energies generated by a combination of mental and physical factors:
43 
Under the MUSCULAR FEELINGS and the SENSATIONS of the SENSES, 
[are] detailed all the susceptibilities of a primary character, due, on the one 
hand, to the putting forth of the muscular energy, and, on the other, to the 
operation of the outer world on the organs of sense. There remains a large 
department  of  secondary,  derived,  or  complicated  feelings,  termed  the 
EMOTIONS.
44 
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The emotions were thus seen as complex derivatives of the body.
45 The movements of 
the body could be refined and trained to perform high-precision skills through specific 
conditioning of the emotions. Similarly, in Bain’s view, intense emotions could be 
tamed, as it were, by the physical and mental control of the will. Through consistent 
efforts at habituation, the individual could achieve command over the shapeless mess 
that were the feelings and gear them towards the sophistication of the intellect. 
Like the diarists this thesis studies, Bain deemed an appropriate dosage of 
repression  to  be  necessary  for  the  individual  to  become  a  valuable  contributor  to 
society. In the fashion of classical humanism, Bain “reject[ed] the ethic of egoism in 
favour of altruism,” insisting that the individual was answerable to society and had to 
direct his or her actions towards the good of the social community.
46 His scientific 
work thus  reflects his personal moral ideals as  well as  a strong awareness of the 
expectations that society imposed on the individual. 
   I will not discuss the Victorian controversy relating to free will in this chapter, 
but I will attempt to highlight how, in Bain’s work, the will can be seen as socially 
constructed. Bain viewed the will as an emotion, which, once duly trained, could take 
the  shape  of  what  Freud  later  called  the  “superego”—a  control  mechanism 
maintaining the respectable conduct of the individual.
47 William George Ward (1812-
1882),  the  Roman  Catholic  theologian,  contested  that  Bain  and  his  fellow 
“Determinists” believed in the existence of an “anti-impulsive effort,” by which to 
manage the emotions: “the whole Deterministic controversy […] turns on this one 
question: Do I, or do I not, at various times exercise self-restraint? Do I, or do I not, at 
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47 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Walter John Herbert Sprott, trans. 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1933).    52 
various times act in resistance to my strongest present desire?”
48 Ward insisted that 
Bain had “omit[ted] all reference to that most important factor in the formation of a 
moral  habit,  the  will’s  repeated  anti-impulsive  efforts.”
49  Bain’s  own  partial 
confirmation of this accusation in his reply in the third edition of The Emotions and 
the  Will  is  completely  misleading,  as  his  Chapter  IX  on  “The  Moral  Habits,”  for 
instance,  comprises  subchapters  such  as  “Control  of  Sense  and  Appetite,” 
“Suppression of Instinctive Movements,” and “Repression of Desire.”
50 Despite this 
incomprehensible denial of his belief in the power of will to control both the body and 
the mind, The Emotions and the Will portrays the will as the force that commands and 
corrects the individual’s thoughts and actions.   
Bain’s  anti-theistic  approach  to  the  emotions  represented  a  novel  current 
among nineteenth-century psychologists. Evidently, secularisation was a phenomenon 
that advanced gradually, and within the discipline of psychology, like everywhere else, 
the secular coexisted with the traditionally religious. Thomas Dixon, in his study of 
religious,  non-religious  and  anti-religious  approaches  to  the  emotions  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  has  explained  that  the  psychological  term  and  category  of 
“emotions” was introduced in Thomas Brown’s Lectures of 1820.  Because the term 
“emotion” belonged to a scientific terminology, as did words like “psychology, law, 
observation, evolution, organism, brain, nerves, expression, behaviour and viscera,” it 
represented a break with traditional religious typology from the start.
51 The words 
formerly  used  were  “passion”  and  “affection,”  which  were  associated  with  a  less 
rational approach to the mind: “soul, conscience, Fall, sin, grace, Spirit, Satan, will, 
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lower appetite and self love,” which are obviously suffused with religious morality.
52 
Alexander Bain had looked at Brown’s Lectures in 1837, but “did not fully peruse” 
them.
53 However, according to Dixon, Bain later acquainted himself with Brown’s 
work. Evidently, Bain adopted the secular term “emotion” which distinguished him 
from  the  group  of  conservative  psychological  writers  who  continued  to  use  the 
religious designations “passions” and “affections.” Among them were the evangelical 
Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847) and the Anglican William Whewell (1794-1866).
54  
According  to  the  adepts  of  a  “physiological  psychology,”  such  as  Bain, 
Spencer and the influential German Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), who insisted on a 
reciprocal  correlation  between  mental  and  physical  factors,  the  individual  was  to 
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54 Chalmers 
described the emotions as “mental phenomena,” “which occupy a kind of middle department in our 
nature, between the merely sensitive and the purely intellectual.” Thus, the emotions were seen to be in 
between the body and the mind, not fixedly attached to either. Chalmers maintained that the physical 
“appetites,” such as hunger and thirst could not be termed emotions because “they take their rise from 
the body” (p.88). They were also detached from the intellectual faculties, because phenomena such as 
joy, grief, desire, astonishment, respect, contempt and moral sensibility could not be seen as abstract 
constructions of the mind. Volitional control was essential in the “enjoyment” that emotions afforded, 
lest the individual took pleasure too far and became greedy: “One man more alive than his fellow to the 
pleasures of the appetite, will not only give himself over to their indulgence, but will prosecute a busy 
train  of  devices  and  doings  on  purpose  to  obtain  them”  (p.144).  The  appetites  being  the  most 
unsophisticated  category  of  the  physical  phenomena,  shared  by  humans  and  animals,  they  were 
contrasted  with  “the  very  love  the  Deity  has  to  moral  excellence  in  his  creatures”  (p.98).  Thus, 
Chalmers  discouraged  his  reader  from  pursuing  trivial  worldliness  such  as  wealth  and  actively 
promoted the adhesion to religious codes of conduct. Thomas Chalmers, Sketches in Moral and Mental 
Philosophy:  Their  Connections  With  Each  Other  and  Their  Bearings  on  Doctrinal  and  Practical 
Christianity (New York: Robert Carter, 1840). 
Whewell identified the emotions as the “Springs of Human Action,” classifying them into the 
“Appetites,” “Affections,” “Mental Desires,” “Desire of Civil Society,” “Moral Sentiments,” and the 
“Reflex  Sentiments.”  His  thoughts  on  the  will  differed  fundamentally  from  Bain’s,  Spencer’s  and 
Brown’s as he held that “it is through his Will that the Desires act” (p.98) “Reason” took the place of 
the “Will” as defined by the physiological psychologists. Besides relatively rational appreciations of 
Victorian society, Whewell maintained “Moral Law” to be “the Will of God,” and established “God [as] 
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attain respectability in the social sphere, rather than religious salvation, through the 
regulative function of the will.
55 
 
Respectability and Self-Monitoring 
Although the codes of respectability varied greatly depending on the class context, 
this chapter will take the concept to designate the degree to which the individual was 
able to meet the social requirements of proper behaviour. The respectable individual 
closely  monitored  his  or  her  emotions,  always  anticipating  the  judgment  of  an 
imagined other. Avoiding others’ contempt was difficult as respectability could take 
infinite  shapes:  for  Henry  Crabb  Robinson  and  many  of  his  contemporaries,  for 
instance,  respectability  meant  being  well-to-do.  Twentieth-century  critical  views 
extend from Walter Houghton’s association of the concept with Church attendance, to 
Peter  Cominos,  who  has  related  it  to  the  postponement  of  marriage  and  its 
gratifications for the gentleman, to Richard Dellamora, who stressed the Victorian 
distinction  between  the  respectable  gentleman  and  the  homosexual  male.
56 
Significantly, Cornhill Magazine of 1863 defined respectability in the following terms:  
The approval of mankind, its causes and its effects, are all summed up in the one 
word ‘Respectable.’ To be respectable, whether the object of the feeling is man 
or woman, is to fall under the protection of public opinion—to come up to that 
most real, though very indefinite standard of goodness, the attainment of which 
is exacted of every one as a condition of being allowed to associate upon terms 
of ostensible equality with the rest of the human race.
57 
 
The unifying factor among the many faces of respectability seems to be the desire to 
be accepted by one’s peers; cradled in security through a comfortable integration in 
society. The absence of objectionable behaviour allowed the individual to reach “the 
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standard  of  goodness,”  which  included  value,  respect  and  authority.
58 Thus,  the 
esteem of society not only “protected” the individual from social ostracism, but also 
gave  weight  to  his  or  her  existence,  making  him  or  her  an  important  element  of 
society.
59  
Clearly,  respectability  came  at  a  price,  for  it  demanded  the  compliance  to 
specific, sometimes unspoken, rules of conduct. F.M.L. Thompson explains in his 
study of nineteenth-century views on the subject: “Respectability [was] a creed and a 
code  for  the  conduct  of  personal  and  family  life.”
60 This  control  was  largely  the 
product  of  “religious  teaching  and  the  conventions  of  acceptable  behaviour  of 
different  social  groups,  not  of  the  law  itself.”
61 We  can,  however,  object  that 
legislations such as the Contagious Diseases Acts (1864, 1867 and 1869) reinforced 
the societal consensus that the respectable individual was not to veer from the norm. 
Progress was encouraged, but only in as far as it remained “helpful to mankind,” in 
Thomas  Brown’s  terms.
62 The  consistent  efforts  of  this  thesis’s  diarists—Gissing 
functioning  as  an  example  of  dissidence—to  distance  themselves  from  egotistical 
behaviour  show  that  their  authors  perceived  selfishness  as  a  threat  to  the 
wholesomeness of society and therefore shunned it. 
This active avoidance of possibly objectionable behaviour is, according to the 
twentieth-century
  sociologist  Norbert  Elias  (1897-1990),  the  product  of  “The 
Civilizing Process.”
63 In this context, Bain’s writings on the emotions can partly be 
seen as active efforts to modify or facilitate the “psychological changes [inherent] in 
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the  course  of  civilization.”
64 Bain  encouraged  adherence  to  the  dominant  cultural 
codes by contributing to what Elias describes as a partially conscious indoctrination: 
The more complex and stable control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the 
individual from his or her earliest years as an automatism, a self-compulsion 
that he or she cannot resist even if he or she consciously wishes to. The web of 
actions  grows  so  complex  and  extensive,  the  effort  required  to  behave 
“correctly” within it becomes so great, that beside the individual’s conscious 
self-control  an  automatic,  blindly  functioning  apparatus  of  self-control  is 
firmly established.
65 
 
Because the individual is subjected to the cultural indoctrination of social values from 
the  minute  he  or  she  is  born,  conforming  to  the  cultural  imperatives  becomes  an 
irresistible, an often unquestioned, compulsion. Like Michel Foucault, Elias attributes 
the necessity to regulate the emotions to the hegemonic apparatus, which both dictates 
and reflectes the subjective experience of the individual. Critic Martin A. Danahay, 
who has investigated the relationship of the Victorian individual to state power, has 
argued that: “it is through subjected autonomy that Victorian texts embody a model of 
the State’s role in the regulation of subjectivity.”
66 Danahay contends that Victorian 
texts  were  dominated  by  the  State’s  “superego”  which  led  them  to  encourage 
“[repression of] violent and anti-social tendencies.”
67 Bain’s work, in its attempt to 
standardise respectable behaviour, can be seen to confirm this theory. 
For Bain, the function of education was to teach the individual how to exert 
self-control and to motivate him or her to adhere to the societal rules of behaviour. He 
developed techniques by which to civilise the newly born human being, which he saw 
as  a  bundle  of  inchoate  feelings.  In  order  to  become  a  successful  participant  in 
cultural reality, “the infant has yet to be indoctrinated betimes into the suppression of 
at least violent emotion, and is fit to be disciplined to this when very few volitional 
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links  are  as  yet  established.”
68 Bain’s  tone  was  detached  and  scientific  when  he 
described the educational process necessary to create a ‘proper’ human being; the 
infant seems to have been undeserving of respect due to the raw immediacy of his or 
her emotional responses. Bain repeatedly equated the human infant to an animal: “The 
treatment adapted for the young restive horse would apply to the beginnings of self-
control in the infant.”
69 The impatient and instinct-driven infant was portrayed as a 
nuisance,  necessitating  harsh  correction:  “Pain  is  a  surprising  quickener  of  the 
intellectual process.”
70 This approach clearly emphasises the similarities between the 
taming of animals, the “domestications of the animal tribe,” and the introduction of an 
infant  to  self-control.
71 Pain  was  an  appropriate  motivational  measure:  “The  first 
lessons in the control of passionate outbursts are unavoidably severe.”
72 In order to 
produce a respectable human being, the individual’s emotional foundation needed to 
be established through uncompromising adjustment. 
Bain  viewed  obedience  as  unnatural,  yet  necessary;  in  the  same  way  that 
strong emotion was natural but undesirable: “the habits of Obedience are created in 
opposition to self-will.”
73 These habits were needed to protect the community from 
the fervour of uncontrolled emotions: “an artificial system of controlling the actions is 
contrived—the  system  of  using  pain  to  deter  from  particular  sorts  of  conduct.”
74 
Punishment was initially experienced directly and was then replaced by its threat. The 
fear of pain, penalty and ridicule motivated the individual to abide by the rules and 
respect the norms of the community, as Elias has argued. My aim is not to point out 
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the strictness of the pedagogical method, but to draw attention to Bain’s portrayal of 
intense, uncultivated and unrestrained emotion as impermissibly childish.  
Self-control, in Bain’s eyes, was the mechanism by which the force of habit 
achieved  “control  [over]  the  volitions  and  the  appetites.”
75 The  unruly  emotional 
features of the human being were cultivated through manners, for instance, which 
drilled  the  individual  to  behave  “correctly,”  to  use  Elias’s  phrasing,  as  they  were 
“directed  against the primitive or instinctive movements of the body.”
76 Thus, the 
actions of the body needed to be in line with socially accepted behaviour, already in 
the infant. Starting with bodily reactions, the human being had to learn to overcome 
emotional “difficulties,” such as “the power of the appetite itself, the inadequacy of 
the initiative” and “the want of any strong inclination in the mind towards the points 
to be gained by a complete control.”
77 The failure to wield complete self-control was 
thus perceived as moral weakness. The individual was only in complete possession of 
his or her powers after having gained “superiority” over “flurry, excitement, needless 
fears,  and  extravagant  ebullitions,”  which  constituted  obstacles  to  the  respectable 
person.
78   
Bain’s work is enlightening in that it exposes some of the silently accepted 
and  implicitly  transferred  conduct  rules  and  portrays  them  as  necessary 
implementations  that  help  the  community  function.  In  his  detailed  analysis  of  the 
emotions, he, much like Elias, identified the process of civilisation as the obligatory 
“suppression of the more prominent manifestations of feeling,” and gave advice as to 
the successful management of emotional reactions according to social standards:
79  
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The major part of every community adopt certain rules of conduct necessary 
for the common preservation, or ministering to the common well-being. They 
find it not merely their interest, but the very condition of their existence, to 
observe a number of maxims of individual restraint, and of respect to one 
another’s feelings in regard to person, property, and good name.
80 
 
Bain clearly portrayed respectability as a motivation for engaging in this socialising 
process. As opposed to Elias, he believed this process of civilisation to be conscious, 
with the individual voluntarily renouncing some of his or her freedoms for the greater 
good. For Elias, this process of adaptation could not be equalled to a contract, because 
the “inculcation” necessary to instil social codes in the individual was only partly 
based on intention.  
Self-monitoring  could  be  seen  as  a  response  to  social  scrutiny.  As  I  have 
mentioned, the Victorian police-state can be seen as a giant metaphorical panopticon 
in which the individual both adopted the position of the guard monitoring and judging 
others’ behaviour from the control tower. The prisoner in the cell, always conscious 
of being surveilled, imagined and thus anticipated societal judgment and altered his or 
her  behaviour  in  relation  to  this  assumed  criticism,  as  sociologist  Charles  Cooley 
(1864-1929) has held: “We always imagine and in imagining share, the judgments of 
the  other  mind.”
81 The  other’s  expected  judgment  became  real  because  of  the 
persistence of this anticipatory attitude. Reprimands for self-important behaviour were 
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likely to remain unspoken, but provoked the shrinking of the self that abided by the 
rules  at  the  expense,  perhaps,  of  personal  development.  As  we  shall  see,  Crabb 
Robinson  renounced  his  literary  career  partly  because  the  idea  of  social  ridicule 
terrified him.  
  For Bain, the adult human being had to derive intimate self-knowledge from 
“self-examination,” which was a crucial premise of the acquisition and maintenance 
of  complete  self-control.
82 Bain  viewed  the  individual’s  questioning  of  his  or  her 
“motives, merits, guilt, or innocence” as a fundamental constituent of personal rigour. 
Self-reflection, which Bain called “the most special occupation of the mind,” added a 
more complex dimension to merely impulsive behaviour and allowed the individual to 
double  his  or  her  consciousness  and  thus  monitor  his  or  her  own  conduct.
83 By 
establishing  a  “study  of  his  [or  her]  actions  and  motives,”  the  individual  could 
“[compare] them with such and such examples, standards or rules.”
84 To Bain, self-
monitoring contributed to emotional sophistication, because it raised the individual’s 
awareness  of  his  or  her  position  in  the  world  and  thus  heightened  the  desire  for 
respectability. 
  Significantly, Bain recommended the use of a diary as a vital tool in rational 
decision-making. Due to its objectifying capacity, which separates the writing self 
from  the  reading  self,  the  diary  constituted  a  well-suited  medium  for  “self-
examination.”
85 Bain essentially viewed the diaristic process as conducive to rational, 
self-protective behaviour. The lessons drawn from the experiences recorded in the 
diary could help the individual avoid painful mistakes:  
we need to recall past delights, according to their measure, with a view of 
securing them in full actuality, and to as great an extent as possible. We need 
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to recall previous suffering, in order that the reality, so much worse than the 
idea, may not be again be reproduced.
86  
 
Although the individual could glean valuable insight from his or her experience, these 
lessons were not necessarily remembered, because, as the memory of the event and its 
circumstances vanished, the conclusions drawn  from them weakened as well. The 
diary’s immediacy could physically compensate for memory’s ineptitude:  
the mind may be untrustworthy in recording the successive impressions, and 
may thus leave us at the mercy of those occurring last; it is to counteract such 
a danger that the method of recording and summing up the separate decisions 
is here recommended.
87 
 
The latest impression was likely to be disproportionately strong and could mislead the 
individual into thinking that its impact was the greatest. Keeping a diary to document 
the  decision-making  process  could  give  the  individual  a  clearer  grasp  of  the 
components that influenced the decision.  
Bain mostly recommended a diary to make educated decisions in times of 
crisis, in order to “record [every evening] the impression of the day, or put down the 
side which preponderates according to the balance of motives passing through the 
mind  in  the  course  of  that  day.”
88 He  approached  the  solving  of  the  crisis  like  a 
scientific problem and was eager to avoid partiality caused by emotional investment. 
It  seems  that  his  technique  was  aimed  at  the  separation  of  rational  thought  and 
emotional impulses. The “lapse of time” between entries, Bain hoped, “should reduce 
the casual or accidental biases to a general average.”
89  At the end of the “period that 
the deliberation lasts,” the individual should “sum up the records of the days and see 
which side has the majority.”
90 The purpose of weighing “all the states of mind that 
we  pass  through”  against  “the  opposing  questions”  was  to  produce  a  logical 
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synthesis.
91 Over the delineated duration of time, the diarist was to monitor his or her 
motives with attempted disinterestedness, trying to remove emotional inclinations that 
might spoil the superior decision reached by rational consideration. 
  We see that Bain viewed the diary as a logical consequence of the cultural 
imperative to monitor and improve the self. By adopting the gaze of the other, the 
diarist attempted to forestall external judgment and resolve the conflicts inherent in 
the civilising process without exposing him- or herself to potential ridicule or scorn. 
In  this  sense,  keeping  a  diary  can  be  seen  as  a  self-protective  activity  of  private 
socialisation which could help the diarist fashion a respectable persona for the public 
sphere. The following section illustrates both the pressure to observe and regulate 
possibly  disruptive  emotions,  as  exerted  by  cultural  critic  Lady  Eastlake,  and  the 
demotivation and self-doubt that such demands inflicted on Crabb Robinson. 
 
II  Self-control  in  the  Edited  Diary:  Elizabeth  Eastlake  (1809-1893)  and 
Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) 
This section reads the diaries and work of Lady Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake, as well as 
Henry Crabb Robinson’s diary in light of Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the 
Will. Despite the differences in generic medium and historical moment, these texts 
reflect  common  attitudes  towards  the  respectability  of  the  emotions.  Both  diarists 
exerted  a  great  influence  on  Victorian  society  through  their  publications, 
acquaintances  and  financial  affluence.  Eastlake’s  response  to  society’s  codes  of 
respectability  differed  drastically  from  Crabb  Robinson’s:  whereas  she  was 
empowered by elitist politics, he failed to realise his full intellectual potential for fear 
of social ridicule.  Although Eastlake’s work exemplified the cultural need for the 
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repression  of  passionate  emotion  in  social  interactions,  art,  in  her  opinion, 
necessitated the enthusiasm and emotional receptiveness of both the artist and the 
critic. Crabb Robinson was less intent on maintaining or reinforcing codes of conduct 
but  obsessively  monitored  his  emotions.  Generally,  both  Eastlake  and  Crabb 
Robinson believed that moral, family-oriented emotions were essential to a healthy 
society and that emotional enthusiasm was a necessary premise of the successful work 
of art. Whereas Eastlake and Bain tended to condemn pride, vanity and emotional 
excess  as  unrespectable  behaviour,  Crabb  Robinson  remained  relatively  silent  on 
these subjects.  
The pressure to live up to social expectations and the societal judgment he 
imagined inhibited Crabb Robinson’s creative and critical output to the point that he 
renounced  his  literary  ambitions.  Although  he  enjoyed  the  respect  of  his  famous 
friends and clients, Crabb Robinson suffered from low self-esteem which was caused 
by excessive self-monitoring. This necessity to anticipate judgment was integrated in 
Crabb Robinson’s consciousness through the definitions of respectability given by the 
media, literature and psychology, some of which I have illustrated in my previous 
section. Crabb Robinson’s self was constructed by the other; a notion which recalls 
Bentham’s  Panopticon  and  the  theories  of  M.M.  Bakhtin,  whose  “attitudinizing” 
individual has incorporated the public gaze: “I am not alone when I look at myself in 
the  mirror:  I  am  possessed  with  someone  else’s  soul.”
92  Crabb  Robinson  had 
internalised  social  reprobation  and  adapted  his  behaviour  to  circumvent  silent  or 
explicit criticism from his peers. 
Both Eastlake’s and Crabb Robinson’s diaries were severely mutilated by their 
Victorian  editors’  interference.  By  ripping  selected  extracts  out  of  their  context, 
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Charles  Eastlake  Smith  and  Dr.  Thomas  Sadler  manipulated  the  text  of  their 
respective  subject  to  a  degree  that  prevents  the  reader  from  engaging  with  these 
diaries in a truly meaningful fashion.
93 Crabb Robinson’s biographer Edith J. Morley 
was right when she wrote that Sadler had accomplished the immense task of “[sifting] 
and [condensing]” the thirty-five volumes of his subject’s diary, but she erred when 
stating that: “Sadler allowed Crabb Robinson to speak for himself.”
94 That an editor 
would “select, re-word, and arrange” his or her material seems understandable, but 
Sadler’s  practice  to  skip  and  re-phrase  passages  without  indication  “no  scholarly 
editor  or  publisher  today  would  countenance,”  as  Eugene  Stelzig  has  rightly 
observed.
95  Sadler  reduced  Crabb  Robinson  to  his  friendships  with  Coleridge, 
Wordsworth and Carlyle, which may allow an interesting glimpse into the interactions 
between the thinkers of the nineteenth century, but the subject’s voice is ultimately 
portrayed inadequately. This editorial practice removes the immediacy and emotional 
spontaneity that is typical of the diary genre almost entirely. Instead, it creates the 
impression that Crabb Robinson is taking his reader through the text, stressing only 
the  most  memorable  moments  and  name-dropping.  Despite  Sadler’s  unfortunate 
editorial choices, we can still discern Crabb Robinson’s construction of self against 
the backdrop of societal judgment and emotional control. In order to fill in some of 
the gaps left by Sadler, I shall consult Crabb Robinson’s biographers Edith J. Morley 
and John Milton Baker, as well as more recent critics, such as Eugene Stelzig and 
Diana I. Behler.
96  
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Eastlake’s diaries were heavily edited by her nephew Charles Eastlake Smith, 
who  composed  a  text  based  on  a  patchwork  of  personal  recollections,  letters  and 
diaries,  rarely  giving  the  full  context  of  the  entries.  In  fact,  he  tended  to  present 
Elizabeth’s manuscripts as a series of aphorisms, often accentuating her self-control. 
This fashioning of the text reflects Charles’s own appraisal of propriety, which led 
him to extend and perpetuate Elizabeth’s opinions, parading her as a model critic. 
Despite  the  maiming  by  her  nephew’s  editing,  Elizabeth’s  conflict  between  the 
desirability of emotion and its resolute repression can be retrieved in the diary. I shall 
attempt  to  complete  and  correct  the  distorted  picture  of  Eastlake  that  her  nephew 
created by reading the fragments of her diary entries in light of her critical work, such 
as her 1845 review article on travel literature written by women, her 1849 review of 
Jane Eyre, her 1856 review of Ruskin’s Modern Painters, and her 1868 Fellowship: 
Letters to My Sister Mourners. 
 
A Woman’s Role: Self-Effacement and Respectability 
Both Eastlake and Crabb Robinson strove to maintain a respectable image. Eastlake 
did so by upholding strict distinctions of gender and class which elevated her own 
status and shamed those who did not interpret and respond to the cultural rules of 
propriety in the same way that she did. Crabb Robinson sought to protect himself 
from the shame of unsuccessful attempts at literary creation by becoming a lawyer 
although he “hated the law,” because it was the only way of “[attaining] any social 
station.”
97 Thus, his need to be respectable determined his entire life.  
Crabb  Robinson  struggled  to  overcome  the  painful  “feeling  of  loss  of  not 
having attended [an English] university” all his life, as his biographer John Milton 
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Baker  has  explained.
98  Instead  of  savouring  his  feelings  of  inferiority,  Crabb 
Robinson went to Germany for five years, during which he made the acquaintance of 
many of the prominent Romantic figures, such as Goethe, Schiller, Kotzebue, Herder 
and the Schlegel brothers, among many others. According to Diana I. Behler, Crabb 
Robinson was the “first foreigner to make a thorough investigation” of early German 
Romantic ideas, which he translated for and explained to his countrymen.
99 Behler has 
observed  that  Crabb  Robinson  adjusted  many  of  his  translations  to  the  English 
tradition of “common sense,” and “[toned] down” the revolutionary aspect of early-
nineteenth-century German thought.
100 Significantly, Crabb Robinson discerned his 
culture’s fear of revolution and modified his work to fit the taste and needs of his 
fellow Englishmen.  
  Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake hardly represented the typical Victorian female. She 
was  educated,  well-travelled  and  had  many  literary  contacts  who  published  and 
celebrated  her  work.  According  to  her  biographer  Marion  Lochhead,  Elizabeth’s 
marriage to the prominent art gallery director Charles Eastlake “meant the best of 
both worlds” as she could maintain her life as an “independent woman of letters, 
secure in her reputation [and as] a specialist and authority.”
 101 Through her influential 
husband she permanently gained “the entrée to the inmost sanctuary of society.”
102 
Although Eastlake herself did not adopt the traditional role of housewife and mother, 
she insisted on a strict separation of the male and female spheres and, through her 
work, reinforced cultural norms of propriety.  
Eastlake  and  Crabb  Robinson  tended  to  define  respectable  emotion  as  that 
which was altruistic, caring and beneficial for the community. Both gendered this 
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constructive, nourishing emotion as female. While Eastlake consistently stressed the 
virtues of domesticity, she also regarded excessive emotion as integral to the nature of 
femininity. As I shall show in my section on gendered grief, Eastlake’s contradictory 
attitudes  to  feminine  behaviour  reflect  more  general  Victorian  views  on  the 
subversive potential of women’s emotion and confirm what critic Ann Cvetkovich has 
identified as the simultaneous exemplification of “the domestic ideal [and] the threat 
of transgression.”
103 Eastlake reproduced the cultural perception of female emotion as 
absolutely  necessary  for  mothering  future  generations  of  intact  family  units.  She 
viewed this emotional side—“affect”—as innate to the female sex, which, according 
to Cvetkovich, “meant that it might be uncontrollable.”
104 This possibly uncontainable 
emotional energy, which could take the face of promiscuity, positioned the female, 
like the child and the criminal, outside of respectability and reason. Eastlake can be 
seen  to  establish  her  own  superiority  by  setting  the  standards  for  her  female 
contemporaries, whom she considered in need of her guidance to keep unrespectable 
emotions in check and develop their domestic skills.  Crabb Robinson’s idealisation 
of his mother’s moral education corresponded to Eastlake’s glorification of the ideal 
Englishwoman. 
Like many of her contemporaries, Eastlake despised women who gave in to 
their emotions, as can be seen in her commentary on German society of the 1830s; 
Some Biographies of German Ladies: “the German woman is feminine but nothing 
else; and herein lies the nullity of her influence.”
105 German women, according to 
Eastlake, were indirectly responsible for the “[disgusting] social structure of morals 
and  religion”  she  witnessed  in  Germany.  Their  “excess  of  devotion  and  self-
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abandonment,” for Eastlake, was natural and therefore somewhat acceptable, but she 
firmly  condemned  these  women’s  “unrestrained  indulgence  in  these  impulses.”
106 
According to Eastlake, German women failed to counter their country’s moral laxity 
through  their  own  intellectual  and  behavioural  rigour  and  thus  neglected  their 
educational function in society.  
The Englishwoman, as portrayed in Eastlake’s 1845 article “Lady Travellers,” 
which appeared in the Quarterly Review, represented the opposite of the dramatic and 
ineffectual  German  woman.
107 Eastlake  praised  the  Middle-class  Englishwoman’s 
“four cardinal virtues,” namely “activity, punctuality, courage, and independence,” 
which  made  her  a  far  superior  traveller  to  the  woman  of  any  other  country.  Her 
principal quality consisted in the strict discipline with which she trained both body 
and mind. Unlike women of other nationalities, the Englishwoman was seen as  a 
“well-read,  solid  thinking,  –early  rising—sketch-loving—light-footed—trim-
waisted—strawhatted  specimen,”  who  combined  the  “refinement  of  the  highest 
classes”  with  the  “usefulness  of  the  lowest.”
108 Significantly,  the  Englishwoman 
excelled at travelling because her domesticity had equipped her with the “habits of 
order  and regularity”  which furthered both her  mental and physical agility.
109 Her 
mind, hand and appearance were cultivated and geared towards useful actions rather 
than sensual excesses.  
This unreachable standard of respectability surely created a lot of pressure for 
Eastlake’s female readers. Her ideal woman was open to the world and diligently 
recorded  the  exotic  sights  she  encountered  on  her  journeys.  Her  role  as  wife  and 
mother had taught her the “reserved” attitude which made her respectable, but her 
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horizon  was  not  limited  to  domestic  affairs.
110 Her  personal  reticence  allowed  the 
necessary space for an intense interest in the external world and the simultaneous 
inquisitiveness and receptiveness of her mind. Eastlake contrasted this virtuous expert 
at  self-effacement  with  a  different  type  of  woman,  who,  despite  the  proximity  of 
fascinating  new  sights,  was  unable  to  fix  her  mind  on  anything  but  her  personal 
domestic circumstances and therefore was a tedious travel companion: 
[She] pauses every moment to tell you not only her own particular thoughts 
and feelings, but also those habits, particularities, preferences and antipathies, 
which one would have thought even she herself on such an occasion would 
have forgotten, we feel tied to one who at home would be rather tiresome, but 
abroad becomes insufferable—to one who never leaves self behind.
111  
 
The self-obsessed woman was not responsive to external beauty because her need to 
share  her  private  thoughts  deprived  her  of  the  delights  of  both  travelling  and 
companionship. This woman’s constant preoccupation with the self and her narrow-
minded naivety were shameful because she disregarded the customs of both observant 
travelling and polite conversation. Her lack of self-monitoring made her unrespectable 
because she failed to redress her self-indulgent behaviour and neglected to actively 
please her companion. We see that Eastlake’s objective was to keep the behaviour of 
her fellow females under observation and, by elevating the ideal Englishwoman, to 
prescribe codes of propriety to which her readers could adhere. The “affect” that was 
natural in women had to be counteracted by a focus on the virtues of diligent order.  
Emotional control was thus an intrinsic characteristic of the respectable female.  
In his diary, Crabb Robinson praised the formative influence of his mother 
who, as his primary caregiver, had a major impact on his moral development. As we 
shall see, Crabb Robinson accused his father of neglecting his son’s moral, creative 
and spiritual life, which shows that he insisted on the parents’ responsibility to mould 
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their  child’s  character,  maintaining  the  eighteenth-century  view  that  it  was  the 
“primary duty” of “every educator [...] to gain mastery over a child’s emotions and 
shape them in a positive way,” as critics Anke te Heesen and Ann M. Hentschel have 
observed.
112 Like Alexander Bain, who viewed the young child as an uncultivated 
animal, in need of emotional guidance, Crabb Robinson attributed his character to the 
formative  influence  of  his  parents.  Bain  believed  that  the  child  mirrored  and 
internalised  parental  behaviour:  “the  child  falls  into  the  tones,  movements,  and 
peculiarities of action of the parent, through the circumstance of their being constantly 
presented to its imitation.”
113 Deriving gratification from mimicking his or her parents, 
the child directed his or her will towards replicating their behaviour, which attributed 
an immense responsibility to the mother in particular. 
Crabb  Robinson  idealised  his  mother’s  moral  excellence  which  she 
successfully infused in her son: “in my childhood my mother was to me everything, 
and I have no hesitation in ascribing to her every good moral or religious feeling I had 
in  my  childhood  or  youth.”
114 His  mother  was  the  key  figure  introducing  him  to 
proper, morally sound conduct; not through harsh discipline but through acting as an 
example of diligence: “I was an unruly boy and my mother had no strength to keep 
me in order.”
115 Young and unsocialised, Crabb Robinson could not yet recognise the 
significance  of  “order”  and  only  gradually  learned  to  regulate  his  behaviour.  His 
mother,  through  her  moral  guidelines,  attempted  to  eradicate  her  son’s  selfish 
behaviour by raising his concern for others. Robinson seems immensely grateful for 
her efforts, which can be seen in this remembrance: 
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I recollect a practice of hers, which had the best effect on my mind. She never 
would permit me (like all children, a glutton) to empty the dish at table if there 
was anything particularly nice, such as pudding or pie. “Henry, don’t take any 
more; do you not suppose the maids like to have some?”
116 
 
Gluttony was natural, yet unacceptable behaviour for the young human being. Instead 
of letting her son selfishly indulge in the pleasures of the palate, Mrs Robinson shifted 
Henry’s  perspective  from  the  self  to  the  other  and  heightened  his  awareness  of 
egotistical transgression.  
Crabb Robinson, like Eastlake, cherished the moral rigour of the mother figure, 
who, through her own “reserve,” love of order and sense of propriety, taught her child 
the  rules  of  respectability.
117  This  ideal  Englishwoman  provided  wholesome 
nourishment  to  her  family  because  she  was  able  to  repress  the  passionate,  selfish 
aspect of her emotions—“leave self behind”—and devote her emotional energies to 
care for the well-being of others.
118 In the case of emotional shock, such as the death 
of a loved one, Eastlake and Bain allowed the individual to yield to the weakening 
blow temporarily but then encouraged him or her to regain strength and “reserve” 
through work and distraction. Because in this case, emotion was “natural,” it was 
acceptable, but interestingly, behavioural guidelines seemed necessary even for such 
legitimated emotion. Crabb Robinson does not explicitly discuss grieving behaviour, 
but the advice he received when his mother died reveals the pressure that his peers 
exerted on him; inviting him to extract lessons from the life-shattering event rather 
than to indulge in suffering.   
 
Gendered Grief 
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The  discussions  of  proper  grieving  behaviour  that  this  section  considers  tend  to 
portray the female as particularly prone to emotional disintegration. As Laura Brown 
has  argued,  eighteenth-century  consciousness  was  pervaded  by  theories  such  as 
philosopher  Bernard  Mandeville’s  Treatise  of  the  Hypochondriack  and  Hysterick 
Passions  (1711)  which  viewed  the  female  body  as  having  a  “peculiar  relation  to 
fluctuation, irregularity, excess, passion and imagination.”
119 The female’s supposed 
inability to control the potentially overpowering impulses of the body and the mind 
set her on the same level as the child, who was unable to adopt a stance of posed 
serenity. These attitudes can still be observed in Catherine Buck’s legitimisation of 
Crabb Robinson’s grief as not that of “a silly girl,” as well as in Eastlake’s comments 
on strong emotion disabling the female mind. 
Eastlake  insisted  on  the  fundamental  difference  in  rationality  between  the 
sexes. She felt that due to their unpredictable emotional nature, women had to cling to 
the structured sphere of the household, as this entry from her 1840-42 diary shows:   
Why  do  men  invariably  judge  better  than  women?  Simply  because  their 
feelings have less interference. With us, our feelings often make the worse 
appear the better cause. It is well our duties are more confined and prescribed 
than theirs, or, with such rash monitors within us, what should we do? Our 
feelings  are  like  the  element  fire—most  excellent  servants  but  wretched 
mistresses.
120    
 
Women were thus seen as always on the verge of being victimised by their emotional 
nature and therefore fundamentally incapable of making decisions based on a rational 
process of deliberation. Because women’s will power was not considered sufficiently 
strong to keep the foolish impulses of the female mind in check, their duty to create 
order in the domestic and social sphere had to serve as a clearly defined structure to 
contain the subversive potential of passionate emotion.   
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On a personal level, Eastlake admitted that even minor indulgences made her 
feel weak-willed and guilty of feminine, pleasure-seeking behaviour, as this entry of 
July 5
th 1845 shows: “My pen has been too silent in every respect. The Siren Music 
has been the tempter […] with my strong love for music I have indulged myself far 
too  much.”  The  language  of  seduction  at  work  in  this  extract  demonstrates  that 
Eastlake felt that she had allowed her personal “indulgent” preferences to take over 
the time reserved for professional occupation. Her shame was caused by her neglect 
of  the  model  behaviour  of  the  restrained  Englishwoman  for  the  decadent  German 
woman’s.  
  This  association  of  femininity  with  excessive  emotion  can,  as  I  have 
announced, be seen as an inheritance of the eighteenth century, which, according to 
Baker “believed in restraint and self-discipline, rather than in the free expression of 
[…] personality.”
121 A letter by Crabb Robinson’s friend Catherine Buck of January 
8
th 1793, written upon the news of his mother’s death, demonstrates her contempt for 
the overemotional female:  
I am not writing to a silly girl whose reason is under control of passion & 
whose passion having nothing of intellect in it is the object of pity without 
tenderness & of commiseration the result of our compassion for degraded 
humanity—you have indeed lost your best friend.
122 
 
Buck  legitimised  Crabb  Robinson’s  grief  by  contrasting  it  with  the  improper 
emotional  excess  of  the  “silly  girl,”  unable  to  rationally  tame  her  emotions  and 
therefore less deserving of sympathy. In Buck’s eyes, Crabb Robinson was entitled to 
feel  horrendous  pain  of  loss  and  relinquish  emotional  control  because  he  did  not 
exaggerate and flaunt his grief over losing the most important person in his life.  
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  Unlike Eastlake, who believed that the widow was under the oppressive siege 
of  grief  and  was,  at  least  temporarily,  powerless  to  alleviate  her  suffering,  Buck 
advised Crabb Robinson to use his grief for self-improvement: “the hour of affliction 
is  the  hour  of  reflection—let  us  then  not  neglect  to  improve  it.”
123 Because  the 
emotional  shock  caused  by  the  death  of  a  loved  one  could  alter  the  individual’s 
outlook on life, Buck believed that he or she should take advantage of this temporary 
mental  clarity.  She  viewed  grief  as  a  “test”  of  the  individual’s  resilience  and 
discouraged  Crabb  Robinson  from  clouding  the  sharpness  of  his  heightened 
intellectual  vision  by  indulging  in  his  agony:  “shall  we  sacrifice  to  passion  the 
precious moments which dedicated to reason produce the most salutary effects?”
124 
Thus,  even  in  this  moment  of  utter  despair,  Crabb  Robinson’s  friend,  instead  of 
offering consolation, forced him to rationalise his grief and draw beneficial lessons 
from it. This would have put Crabb Robinson under considerable pressure to resist 
emotional expression and internalise his grief, lest he jeopardise his masculinity and 
give in to emotion like a “silly girl.”  
  However, emotional reactions to joyous and painful experiences marked the 
individual as human. Eastlake wrote Fellowship: Letters to My Sister Mourners to 
deal with the devastation she experienced after the death of her husband in 1865, 
when “the life of [her] life” left her, and her “own very identity […] departed with 
him [she] love[d].”
125 In this address to her fellow widows, Eastlake portrayed grief as 
an illness and invited her readers to accept their own powerlessness and give in to 
their affliction: “the only reasonable view you can take of your own state is as of one 
smitten with a sore sickness,—the sorest the heart can suffer.”
126 This surprisingly 
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mellow statement shows that Eastlake, in her unspeakable grief, had hit the limits of 
self-control. The will no longer had power over the diseased mind and any attempts to 
“repress  the  anguish—divert  the  spirits—change  the  scene,”  which  society 
recommended,  were  doomed.
127  Interestingly,  Eastlake  used  a  vocabulary  of 
criminality and insanity to illustrate the complete incapacitation of the will, which 
recalls  Victorian  culture’s  pathologisation  of  strong  emotion,  as  exemplified  in 
Section  I:  “the  question  […]  is  not  how  to  arrest  or  cure  the  evil,  for  that  is 
impossible.”
128 She  absolved  the  widow  from  the  societal  pressure  to  control  her 
emotions: “let not the cant reproach of ‘indulging your grief’ disturb you—the very 
words are an imbecile contradiction in terms; can we turn our sorrow off and on as we 
please?”
129 Despite  her  apparent  acceptance  of  emotional  turmoil  as  inevitable, 
Eastlake still incriminated the emotion itself: “sorrow” was an “illness,” which, like a 
sentence, had to be served: “[prayer] is not meant to remove our pain—we are to 
suffer it.”
130 The widow was seen as unable to thwart the emotional siege she was 
under and had to accept the acute pain of loss. 
The Letters explicitly evidence Eastlake’s perception of and reaction to the 
societal pressure to control the emotions. Although she appealed to her audience to 
“live in your sorrow; let the heart ache itself out,” she did not completely abandon her 
socially  conditioned  belief  in  the  virtues  of  industrious  behaviour,  which  I  shall 
discuss in detail in Chapter Two. Eastlake ensured that her readers did not take her 
Letters as an invitation to become lazy: “it is mockery to accuse us of indulging in our 
agony, yet, on the other hand, we must meet it with remedies as strong as itself. Of 
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these,  work  is  as  indispensable  as  prayer.”
131 In  a  typically  Protestant  fashion, 
Eastlake identified the “remedies” as useless, yet, the very composition of the Letters 
can be seen as an effort to counteract her debilitating grief through intellectual activity: 
“work we must in some shape in self-defence; if we are idle, our sorrow is doubly 
busy.”
132 Although  work  could  not  undo  the  pain  of  loss,  activity  could  keep  the 
individual from feeling at the mercy of strong emotion.  
Bain’s techniques for dealing with intense grief resembled Eastlake’s in that 
they stressed the importance of initially accepting the emotion and then consciously 
counteracting it by wilful industry. Eastlake’s suggestion to “let the heart ache itself 
out” was paralleled by Bain’s assertion that “under a shock of joy or grief, a burst of 
anger or fear, we are recommended to give way for a little to the torrent, as the safest 
way of making it subside.”
133 Convinced of the necessity to restrain emotion, Bain 
admitted that “an emotion may be too strong to be resisted” and gave advice for its 
successful repression.
134 After allowing a “free vent” to the emotions, the will could 
operate on the “voluntary muscles” and “[reach] the deep recesses of emotion.”
135 
Physical control was thus echoed by the emotions, which could be manipulated by a 
“resolute determination.”
136 
  The  diaries  this  thesis  examines  tend  to  omit  the  process  of  grieving.  For 
instance,  the  announcements  of  death  in  George  Eliot’s  diary  (Chapter  Two)  are 
usually  reduced  to  one  sentence,  such  as  her  entry  of  March  15
th  1859  shows: 
“Chrissey died this morning at quarter to 5.”
137 Although Eliot was extremely fond of 
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her elder sister, whose children she had cared for and whose consumptive illness had 
worried her immensely, her diary does not provide evidence of the severe pain she 
must have felt.
138 This silence in the face of emotional may be a consequence of the 
society’s  pressure  to  accept  what  could  not  be  changed  instead  of  lamenting  an 
irreplaceable loss. Peggy Fitzhugh Johnstone has argued that Eliot mourned her losses 
by fictionalising these traumatising events: “through a work of fiction, Eliot could, 
like the patient in a therapeutic transference, enter into a fantasy in which she could 
reenact  repressed  feelings  towards  prior  attachments.”
139 Thus,  Eliot,  rather  than 
directly and gratuitously expressing grief in the diary, used this emotional energy to 
benefit the community through the education she propagated in her novels. For her, 
emotional despair was thus to be borne internally; it was too private even for the diary 
and could only be verbalised through artistic sublimation. 
 
Emotion and Social Life 
For Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, intense emotions constituted a constant threat 
to the integrity and moral rigour of the individual, “affecting the judgement of true 
and false,” as Bain wrote.
140 Recalling the medical associations between “excitement 
of the brain” and insanity, they insisted on respectable conduct, which was defined by 
temperate  and  rational  other-oriented  behaviour,  disinterestedness  and  intellectual 
rigour.
141 The self-controlled individual aimed to prevent a rekindling of suppressed 
appetites through the efforts of the will in order to dominate the natural impulses of 
the  body  and  mind.  “Like  destroying  Vandals,”  Bain  wrote,  feelings  “pervert  our 
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convictions by smiting us with intellectual blindness, which we need not be under 
when committing great imprudence in action.”
142 The irrational, uncontrollable nature 
of the feelings was seen to make the individual vulnerable to thoughtless conduct and 
moral lassitude, by not only exposing him or her to public ridicule, but also leading 
him or her to regress morally and give in to substance abuse and promiscuity. 
Although Crabb Robinson wished for a less apathetic temperament to fuel his 
creative  output,  in  social  interactions,  he  still  felt  uneasy  and  distressed  when  he 
experienced others’ boundless emotional outbursts. In 1805, Crabb Robinson harshly 
criticised the display of powerful emotion and although he admired it to a degree, was 
grateful that he was less prone to such unrespectable disintegration. His friend Major 
von Knebel was extremely upset when he heard the news of Schiller’s death, but, in 
Crabb Robinson’s eyes, went too far in the demonstration of his emotions: “it was 
ridiculous and pathetic. Dear Knebel’s passions were always an odd combination of 
fury  and  tenderness.  He  loved  Schiller  and  gave  his  feelings  immediate  and 
unconsidered  expression.”
143 For  Crabb  Robinson,  the  emotions  were  not  to  be 
exhibited carelessly and had to remain within the spectrum of acceptable gestures.  
Deeply uncomfortable with displays of emotion, Crabb Robinson resented the 
overly sentimental individual. In 1810, he explained his discomfort, asserting that he 
felt awkward when confronted with arduous emotion. Excitability became his criteria 
for the categorisation of human character; he associated himself with more rational, 
sensible human beings, as opposed to those individuals capable of open fervour: “we 
of  colder  temperament  and  sober  minds  feel  ourselves  oppressed  by  the  stronger 
feelings of more passionate characters.”
144 Others’ powerful emotion was unpleasant 
and  unnerving  to  Crabb  Robinson  even  if  he  did  “fully  recognize  the  dignity  of 
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passion”  and  claimed  to  “admire  what  I  have  not  and  am  not.”
145 While  strong 
emotion could be desirable for the creation of art, Crabb Robinson validated his own 
personality by comparing himself to fanatical or overly fragile fellow humans, as can 
be seen in this entry of July 6
th 1816:  
Sometimes I regret a want of sensibility in my nature, but when such cases of 
perverted intensity of feeling are brought to my observation, I rejoice in my 
neutral  apathetic  character,  as  better  than  the  more  sanguine  and  choleric 
temperament, which is so dangerous at the same time that it is so popular and 
respectable.
146 
 
Crabb Robinson’s disappointment over his inability to experience an increased depth 
of emotion was outbalanced by his disgust with “dangerous,” inferior emotion. The 
fact that he attached the term “respectable” to such a temperament is very surprising, 
but could be explained by the imaginativeness and inspiration that passion brings to 
the  creative  process—a  dimension  that  Crabb  Robinson  felt  utterly  incapable  of 
entering.  He  viewed  his  exclusion  from  the  realm  of  emotionality  as  definite  but 
gradually came to terms with it as this same entry shows: 
The older I grow, the more I am satisfied, on prudential grounds, with the 
constitution of my sensitive nature. I am persuaded that there are very few 
persons who suffer so little pain of all kinds as I do; and if the absence of vice 
be the beginning of virtue, so the absence of suffering is the beginning of 
enjoyment.
147 
 
Crabb  Robinson  rejoiced  over  his  relative  insensitivity,  which  kept  him  from 
experiencing the peaks of excitement, but also spared him the experience and ridicule 
connected to intense mental pain. He convinced himself that his lack of excitability 
annulled  the  threat  of  dangerous  emotion  and  established  him  as  a  harmless  and 
therefore virtuous human being.  
When Eastlake insisted on personal reticence in social interactions, she aimed 
to establish a climate of mutual respect in which the individual was to refrain both 
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from  exhibiting  his  or  her  emotions  and  from  probing  into  other  people’s  private 
emotions. The politeness of “easy society,” which Eastlake mentioned in her 1848 
“Review  of  Vanity  Fair  and  Jane  Eyre,”  was  characterised  by  “awkwardness,” 
because  it  depended  on  the  restraint  of  any  emotion  that  could  cause  offence, 
embarrassment  or  boredom  in  the  interlocutor.
148 The  social  interactions  Eastlake 
described  were  highly  stylised  and  she  advised  her  readers  to  observe  the  “tacit 
understanding” to “go so far and no further; to be as polite as we ought to be, and as 
intellectual  as  we  can;  but  mutually  and  honourably  to  forbear  lifting  those  veils 
which each spreads over his inner sentiments and sympathies.”
149 Ultimately, such 
conventionalised behaviour was intended to protect all members of society from being 
overwhelmed by the other’s emotional burdens. 
In  her  personal  life,  Eastlake  was  very  careful  to  maintain  the  façade  of 
respectability by appearing humble and disciplined in her letters and even her diaries. 
Through  this  performance  of  the  respectable  correspondent,  Eastlake  consciously 
evaded the general association of vanity with low intellect, lack of refinement and 
taste. Eastlake’s conviction that emotional restraint was partly a response to societal 
expectations and partly a genuine concern for others can account for her apologetic 
attitude  to  her  reader,  which  forced  her  to  dutifully  express  regret  whenever  she 
provided information relating to the self, as this letter to Miss L. Browne shows:  
I find I have been writing in an egotistical strain, and am shocked to have to 
speak so much of myself; but while this insignificant person is made so much 
of, and while you are so kindly interested in hearing of what she does and sees, 
you must just take this as it comes.
150 
 
Calling herself “insignificant” undid the act of self-importance she felt she was liable 
to. Eastlake was “shocked” by the necessity to communicate facts relating to her life; 
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implying  that  if  it  were  possible,  she  would  omit  self-referencing  altogether.  She 
appealed to her reader’s kindness and understanding; making clear that she was aware 
that such behaviour was reproachable. 
  On March 20
th 1846, Eastlake encounters the embodiment of  perfect conduct:  
Professor  Wilson  is  the  only  person  I  ever  heard  who  can  speak  of  himself 
without being an egotist; but he talks of himself as the species man, not as the 
solitary individual; he talks of feelings and passions common to the race, and 
dissects himself to lay them bare to you. Whenever he talks as an individual, it is 
only drollery.
151 
 
Through portraying himself as the object of study rather than a person to be admired 
or  pitied,  Wilson  effaced  himself  while  speaking  of  himself.  His  deliberations 
remained impersonal as he presented himself as an example of “the species man,” 
giving the impression of “disinterestedness.”
152 Relying on conversational self-irony 
to  talk  about  himself  allowed  him  to  evade  accusations  of  self-indulgence  and 
boastfulness. 
Eager to imitate such selfless conversation, Eastlake, like Crabb Robinson and 
the other diarists this thesis examines, conscientiously apologised for references to 
personal feelings in her letters and can be seen to consistently monitor the intensity of 
her  emotional  reactions  generally.  For  instance,  in  a  letter  to  Miss  L.  Browne  of 
January  1843,  Eastlake  reported  a  scandalous  emotional  outburst:  “He  [Dean  of 
Faculty,  Mr  Peter  Robertson]  made  me  laugh,  till  I  was  almost  shocked  to  hear 
myself.”
153 The  intensity  of  her  laughter  embarrassed  Eastlake,  because  she  had 
evidently lost control over her emotions. The language of his extract suggests a self-
objectifying,  self-monitoring  attitude  in  Eastlake—she  listens  to  herself  from  the 
position of an external observer and judges herself accordingly.  
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Crabb  Robinson  similarly  minimised  himself  in  his  correspondence,  as  his 
letter to Wordsworth of March 19
th 1840 shows: “You ask me why I write so seldom. 
The answer is an obvious one, and you will give me credit for being quite sincere 
when I make it. It is but seldom that I dare to think that I have anything to say that is 
worth  your  reading.”
154 Crabb  Robinson  hoped  to  gain  Wordsworth’s  respect  by 
stressing his inferiority, which reflects his preference of self-effacement over self-
aggrandisement.    It  seems  that  the  willingness  to  denigrate  the  self  which  was 
frequent  in  the  nineteenth  century  can  be  traced  to  “the  moral  consecration  of 
sentiment,”  which,  as  Charles  Taylor  has  explained  “[became]  strong  and 
unmistakable  in  England  and  then  France  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century.”
155 In order to protect the family and friendships that now were cherished, 
but not felt, with increased fervour, the individual needed to fight the omnipresent 
currents of utilitarian thought that threatened the common good, the self necessarily 
needed to abstain from wanting, needing or being anything. This could explain why 
“self-explorations,” in which Romantic poets conducted “dialogues [not] with readers, 
but  solipsistically  with  [their]  own  psyche,”  became  more  self-conscious  and 
restricted in the Victorian era and why Crabb Robinson felt increased pressure to 
assure that his utterances were worthy of drawing others’ attention to.
 156   
For Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, vanity in social interactions, as well 
as art, was intolerable. They supported the idea that the creator of an object or the 
initiator of an action or event was not to be congratulated unless he or she was free of 
selfish motivations. Bain wrote that: “merit attaches itself only to something that is 
not our duty, that something being a valuable service rendered to other human beings. 
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Positive beneficence is a merit.”
157 Human actions could only be virtuous if devoid of 
self-serving purposes. For Bain, the accomplishment of duty was a behaviour that 
society expected and failure to do so resulted in social despise. Thus, doing his or her 
duty benefited the individual; it was a “self-regarding action and therefore […] not an 
adequate  foundation  of  morals.”
158 Bain  fervently  advocated  behaviour  that  was 
geared towards the benefit of society: “the inculcation of unbounded Self-denial is to 
be regarded as an extreme statement of the happiness value of reciprocal good offices. 
It is found that, to reap the precious fruit, disinterestedness must sow the seed.”
159 The 
individual was to renounce the self and work for the good of others, but, paradoxically, 
he or she should never claim any profit from his or her actions. “Inculcation” suggests 
the  indoctrination  of  the  individual  by  society,  constantly  rehearsing  the  rules  of 
propriety,  which  seems  to  contradict  the  possibility  of  a  truly  “disinterested” 
attitude— notably because further on Bain spoke of a “disinterested impulse,” which 
connotes spontaneous emotion.
 160  
  When Eastlake was confronted with others’ self-indulgence and boasting, she 
attempted to withhold judgment; stressing her moral superiority. In an entry of 1840, 
she  wrote:  “It  is  no  hypocrisy  to  be  courteous  and  kind  even  where  we  despise. 
Esteem or contempt is involuntary: judgment is controllable—and that is why the 
Scriptures, which prescribe nothing against the system of Nature, say ‘Judge not.’”
161 
Eastlake thus attempted to be completely selfless—not only did she abstain from the 
temptations of despicable behaviour, but she did not even let herself indulge in the 
condemnation of such disgrace. In reality, however, Eastlake was an impetuous critic 
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and did not live up to her resolution to quietly tolerate others’ behaviour, assuming a 
position of superior, almost godlike, virtue. 
  In an attempt to examine the shame associated with referring to the self in 
conversation, Bain called attention to the thin line between description of the self and 
boasting, which violated the “virtue of Self-Sufficingness.”
162 Ideal conduct should 
mirror that of Socrates, who represented the truly self-sufficient person “rendering a 
full share of help to others, and asking little in return.”
163 Bain and Eastlake, in tune 
with their culture’s glorification of altruism, applauded those who stood “alone and 
unsupported,” always giving, never taking.
164 Bain’s definition of virtuous behaviour 
emphasised the contemporary view of self-restraint as sophisticated mannerly conduct: 
Modern  society  has  thrown  a  certain  discredit  on  the  enjoyment  of  self-
gratulatory  pleasures,  and  hence  a  feeling  of  shame  is  apt  to  be  engendered 
when a person is marked out as the subject of formal applause. For all these 
reasons, the transformation of the open into the more covert modes of paying 
honour has been thought a refinement. Vanity and Vain-glory signify that the 
individual is active in the cultivation of self-importance, canvassing as it were, 
for distinction. The open boaster, not satisfied with his own feelings of esteem, 
insists on the concurrence of others, and, if people do not choose their own 
accord  to  pay  him  regard,  he  detains  them  on  every  opportunity  with  the 
circumstantials of his own glorification.
165 
 
“Self-importance” was obviously unacceptable behaviour. Any kind of “open” excess 
violated the codes of “refinement,” and was identified as moral weakness. The boaster 
was unable to abstain from insisting on his or her own value or to give value to 
himself  in  a  Socratic  fashion,  and  thus  heavily  relied  on  the  other  to  bequeath 
meaning upon him or her. This dependency was the opposite of the virtue of “self-
sufficingness,” and thus constituted a behaviour that discredited the boaster. He or she 
was  the  object  of  ridicule  and  never  of  respect,  as  he  or  she  blatantly  performed 
respectability instead of embodying it. 
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Eastlake considered “selfishness” as the characteristic vice of the Victorian 
individual. She deemed modernisation, industrialisation and consumerism to be the 
dominant cultural forces feeding into the greedy and hectic lifestyle of modernity, as 
this diary entry of December 16
th 1842 shows: “What will future ages be? For we are 
really living awfully fast. […] selfishness is like the daughters of the horse-leech, that 
cry ‘Give, give!’”
166 Eastlake feared that individualism was taking over the culture’s 
sense  of  communality  and  that  mass  reproduction  was  spoiling  art.  The  capitalist 
mode  of  production  increased  the  number  of  commodities  available  for  purchase, 
which  arguably  stimulated  the  individual’s  desire  to  possess,  “shifting,”  as  social 
historian Thomas Richards has noted, “the axis of perception toward an objective 
phenomenology  of  property.”
167  The  early-Victorian  religious  moral  codes  that 
defined the “value of the individual,” were giving way, at least partly, to the fast-
paced  culture  of  consumerism  that  Richards  describes.
168 In  Eastlake’s  eyes,  the 
measureless  amassing  of  commodities  and  the  loosening  of  moral  values  were 
paralleled  by  the  individual  who  constantly  drew  attention  to  himself  or  herself, 
showing off personal merits, without any guise of humility. To both Eastlake and 
Bain, such individuals were disgusting. 
Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain believed that the artist especially was to 
control his or her vain cravings for recognition and produce art that benefited the 
viewer rather than the artist. According to the double standard by which the artist was 
judged, emotional energy constituted a vital part of the process of artistic creation, but 
vanity was an impermissible motivation. The ambiguous status that emotion occupied 
was the source of immense complication for many artists, as excess of emotion was 
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unrespectable, whereas lack of emotional enthusiasm made for a weak and boring 
work of art.  
Art and the Necessity of Emotion 
Eastlake  and  Crabb  Robinson  viewed  artistic  respectability  from  very  different 
perspectives.  Whereas  Eastlake  critically  monitored  others’  creative  output,  Crabb 
Robinson struggled to attain the status of respectability as an artist and critic. Both, 
however, believed that, in order to result in an artefact of lasting value, the creative 
process had to be fuelled by the artist’s emotional energies. This belief is reflected in 
Crabb Robinson’s frustration over his own lack of “sensibility” and in the disparaging 
comments on Ruskin’s “unfeeling heart” that Eastlake makes in her 1856 review of 
Modern Painters.
169 While embracing emotional energy, Eastlake, Bain and Crabb 
Robinson were in tune with their culture’s condemnation of self-indulgence in the 
artist. Victorian critics, such as John Keble, gave advice in regard to the productive 
channelling of the emotions in order to avoid unrespectable effeminate sentimentality.  
Elizabeth  Helsinger  has  argued  that  the  major  Victorian  writers,  such  as 
Tennyson, Browning, Arnold and Ruskin, regarded the artist’s preoccupation with the 
self as immoral and hence deliberately omitted traces of personal involvement from 
their  writings.  By  doing  so,  they  hoped  to  evade  accusations  of  excessive  self-
contemplation  that  resounded  Wordsworth’s  “sublime  egotism,”  which  was 
considered fruitless, and even “unhealthy:”
170  
The  strongest  reason  for  the  Victorian  objection  to  self-revealing  literature 
seems to be not that it fails to lead to identity and action, but that it is ‘the mere 
delirium of vanity,’ an act of selfish pride. Their objection is profoundly moral. 
It is an attitude which can be found throughout the literature of the period.
171 
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Self-indulgence was thus considered a faux pas in both a literary and a social context. 
Pride was never to be shown publicly, and praise ideally should only be given to 
others—never the self. In response to this necessary self-effacement, many writers 
performed  a  “deliberate  shift  in  focus  from  the  self  to  mutuality;”  an  increased 
concern with community, friendship and marriage.
172 
The influential Victorian literary critic John Keble (1792-1866) advocated a 
similar  attitude  of  restraint  in  poets—the  “law  of  modest  reticence.”
173 Poetry,  in 
order to be considered of “primary quality,” had to “hint at very many things, rather 
than [be] at pains to describe and define them,” thus leaving the reader with “an 
appetite whetted but not satisfied.”
174 This required reserve demanded that the poet’s 
self be left out; any deliberate, flashy, over-sentimentalised behaviour in poetry was 
considered  a  sign  of  low  quality:  “In  short,  they  [primary  poets]  more  willingly 
understate than exaggerate, while the common run of poets pride themselves most of 
all  in  outdoing  their  rivals  in  the  production  of  what  is  novel,  passionate  and 
startling.”
175 Although  Keble  applauded  enthusiasm,  such  as  Homer’s,  he  sternly 
advised  young poets to  have  “insight” and to realise that “a poet’s fine frenzy  is 
subject to law or control.”
176 Unconcealed, unsublimated emotion indicated the poet’s 
poor taste and connoted an immature lack of self-control, mistaking art for a means of 
self-glorification and confession. Significantly, “master-passion,” as in Virgil, could 
only be expressed through “significant ellipses.”
177  
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  Women’s  poetry  in  particular  tended  to  be  associated  with  the 
“uncontrollable” side of emotion and was often accused of effusive “affect,” as Isobel 
Armstrong and Virginia Blains have shown.
 178 Victorian culture presupposed women 
to  produce  literature  that  was  gushing  with  sentimentality  and  thus  intellectually 
inferior to men’s. In critical reviews, both women’s work and taste were portrayed as 
deficient in moral and artistic rigour, which is why, according to Kristen Drotner, 
melodrama’s  “excess  of  emotions  and  intensity  of  events”  was  seen  as  an 
“aesthetically and morally inferior ‘women’s genre.’”
179  
The reactions of Victorian critics to poet Felicia Hemans’s work (1793-1835) 
exemplify  the  connection  between  femininity  and  over-sentimentalised  art.  Kevin 
Eubanks has observed that, even in her lifetime, Hemans was considered to be “the 
quintessential  feminine  poet”  whose  “themes  of  heart  and  home”  dominated  her 
domestic  poetry.
180 Eubanks  convincingly  argues  that  Hemans  chose  her  subject 
matter to cater to the cultural demands for women’s poetry: “Hemans[’s] persona 
arose,  in  part,  out  of  the  interaction  of  her  texts  and  the  contemporary  critical 
texts.”
181 She depended on critical approval for her income and thus was forced to 
work  within  the  sphere  of  gender  stereotypes.  Elizabeth  Barrett  Browning,  who 
actively  attempted  to  overcome  the  “dissociation  of  [female]  sensibility  from  the 
affairs  of  the  world,”  which  Angela  Leighton  has  identified  as  the  “disabling 
inheritance”  that  women  poets  faced,  set  Hemans  up  as  her  “‘feminine’  female” 
counterpart in an effort to distance herself from “the superficial, emotional lyrics that 
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were considered women’s poetical sphere,” as Kay Moser has convincingly argued.
182 
Eager to establish herself as a “‘masculine’ female” poet, Barrett Browning chose to 
write about philosophical, social and political issues. Hemans’s work, according to 
Barrett Browning, was characterised by its “conventional excess of delicacy [which] 
was the flaw in her fine genius.”
183 Reacting against this sentimental tradition, Barrett 
Browning  did  not  write  “from,  but  against  the  heart,”  because  she  wanted  to  be 
perceived as an “intelligent, human thinker.”
184 She criticised the emotional overflow 
of female poets in order to impose her superiority on the producer of “second-rate” 
literature and to avoid the equation of her work with the popular genres such as the 
sensation novel and melodrama.
185 This suggests that the connection between emotion 
and femininity that Victorian culture tended to draw had to be counteracted by the 
explicit dismissal of sensualism.  
When critiquing art, Eastlake was as adamant as Keble and Barrett Browning 
in  her  insistence  on  self-control  as  an  indicator  of  quality.  Flaunted,  exaggerated 
emotion seemed vulgar to her, as her diary of 1840-42 shows: “There is no simplicity 
so simple as that which is refined, no sorrow so touching as that which is subdued, no 
art so beautiful as that which is concealed.”
186 Art, in order to be praiseworthy, had to 
capture  subtle  nuances  and  was  never  to  parade  the  overtly  sentimental.  Eastlake 
seemed to suggest that the more understated and hidden the artist’s intention, the more 
valuable and effective the work of art. Further on in her 1840-42 diary, she wrote: 
“there  is  more  moral  courage  in  refusing  than  in  accepting,  and  more  merit  in 
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restricting  genius  than  in  indulging  it.”
187 Here,  she  denounced  a  blatantly  visible 
desire to please on the side of the artist. How exactly genius can be restricted is not 
clear, due to Charles Eastlake Smith’s editing techniques, which omitted the context 
of many entries. We may speculate that the constraints set by altruism limited the 
artist’s freedom of expression and heightened the quality of his or her work.  
 Generally, Eastlake criticised art in which the self of the maker was not left 
out. When she met Turner at a dinner on March 4
th 1844, she was greatly displeased 
with his self-indulgent behaviour, as can be seen in this diary entry: “Turner, the artist, 
a queer little being, very knowing about all the castles he has drawn—a cynical kind 
of body, who seems to love his art for no other reason than because it is his own.”
188 
Clearly,  in  Eastlake’s  eyes,  a  great  artist  had  to  abstain  from  displaying  pride  or 
affection  in  relation  to  his  own  work.  This  self-aggrandising  performance  of  self 
catered to a taste for spectacle, and did not spring from a sincere concern for others. 
The other was forced to participate in this grandiose, absurd acclamation of the self.  
Bain attempted to explain self-centred behaviour from a psychological point of 
view, which reveals the strong cultural concern with the propriety of such conduct:  
There is a great pleasure in observing and contemplating our own excellence, 
power, grandeur, or other imposing characteristics. This is a very special mode 
of self-regarding emotion; the names used for it are Self-complacency, Self-
gratulation, Self-esteem, Self-conceit, Pride.
189 
 
“Self-regarding  emotion”  was  acceptable  when  it  meant  “self-monitoring,”  but 
became objectionable when the contemplation of the self was a source of pleasure. 
Bain  seemed  sympathetic  towards  the  “Desire  of  Fame  or  Glory”  and  “Love  of 
Approbation”  and  identified  them  as  common  pleasures,  shared  by  all  humans.
190 
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However, because these emotions led to egotistical and exploitative behaviour, he 
sided with Eastlake’s opinion that they had to be held in check. 
To  Eastlake,  the  artist’s  pride  was  immoral  because  she  viewed  art  as  the 
universal possession of all humankind; beyond any rewards to be hoped for him or her 
as a person. The self of the artist was never to be the object of the creative endeavour: 
“It is the business of the painter not to represent the individual, but the individuality—
not to copy a specimen, but to show forth a species.”
191 Providing accurate depictions 
of selected subjects did not make a great artist. He or she was meant to render an 
atmosphere; a sensitivity, rather than to present a perfect demonstration of stylistic 
skills. A work of art should never consciously promote the artist but instead benefit 
the  community.  Eastlake’s  general  advocacy  of  self-effacement  took  on  moral 
urgency when the artist was concerned, as her diary shows: “Self-forgetfulness and 
self-possession are the extremes which meet—they are essential to all excellence.”
192 
Excellence was annulled by the desire to be excellent—true greatness was the product 
of rigour and self-control. Self-realisation, according to Eastlake, had no place in art. 
It is crucial to note that emotional restraint was, however, not a guarantee for 
artistic  success.  Eastlake,  like  Keble  and  Crabb  Robinson,  deemed  controlled 
enthusiasm a primary factor in the creation of good art. As her review of Ruskin’s 
Modern Painters shows, Eastlake believed that “where a painter’s language has really 
given  no  delight  to  himself,  it  will  as  surely  give  no  delight  to  the  spectator.”
193 
Emotional enthusiasm and personal involvement were thus necessary for the artist to 
be “borne up on the wings of willing power,” rather than to have his art “held down 
[…]  to  the  grindstone  of  slavery.”
194 Hence,  Eastlake  found  the  laws  that  Ruskin 
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considered essential to the proper appreciation of art to achieve the contrary—they 
limited artistic expression for the worse and stood in the way of a greater truth. 
In Eastlake’s eyes, Ruskin did not possess the enthusiasm that the successful 
artist needed, which is why she thought him a dreadful art critic. She disapproved of 
Ruskin’s work as having the “qualities of premature old age” from the first volume, 
lacking  the  passionate  zest  and  vigour  an  art  critic  required.
195 His  “overbearing 
spirit,” had “nothing of the self-excusing insolence of youth” and she despised the 
“coldness, callousness and contraction” of his critical stance.
196 His opinions did not 
spring  from  a  youthful  emotional  whim,  but  were  completely  rational.
197  The 
paradoxes in his way of thinking could therefore not be excused by the “perverse, but 
often  charming,  conflict  between  the  arrogance  and  the  timidity  of  a  juvenile 
reasoner,”  but  established  Ruskin’s  judgments  as  unqualified.  Ruskin’s  lack  of 
emotion made him incapable of appreciating art, because “art is a thing which […] 
appeals more to the heart, the seat of emotion, than to the head, the seat of thought, 
and is, therefore, more dreamt and raved about than reasoned about.”
198 Art needed to 
be felt rather than thought and Eastlake condemned admiration or disapproval that 
was based on the rational critique of an “unfeeling heart” such as Ruskin’s.
199 The 
restraint that the strict etiquette of polite society demanded was less desirable in the 
art critic. Eastlake loathed Ruskin’s “cold and hardened habit, in which no enthusiasm 
involuntarily leads astray” and thus established the emotions as a vital part of the 
appreciation of art.  
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Ruskin’s  choice  to  “live  only  in  [art],  and  (how  generously!)  only  for  it,” 
seemed selfish to Eastlake and led her to question his humanity.
200 She condemned 
Ruskin’s unwavering focus on art and considered his complete disregard for human 
beings to be immoral:  
Mr.  Ruskin  may  talk  of  love  for  trees,  stones,  and  clouds,  and  profess  an 
impious horror for those who do not represent them according to his ideas of 
truth, but where, throughout his writings, do we find one spark of that love for 
man, woman, or child which is foremost among all the precepts and the fruits 
of religion and morality?
201 
 
In most of Eastlake’s writings, such as Fellowship: Letters to my Sister Mourners of 
1868, affection was seen as a woman’s “dearest duty.”
202 In this case, she blamed 
Ruskin for neglecting the care for his fellow humans that she deemed fundamental to 
moral behaviour. She was convinced that morals could not be aestheticised but were 
grounded  in  virtuous  human  interactions,  which  necessarily  had  to  be  fed  by 
affectionate emotions. 
Bain would have disapproved of Ruskin’s obsessive preoccupation with art 
because  it  negated  the  “vicarious  and  self-sacrificing  impulse  of  our  nature,  in 
opposition to the self-seeking or self-regarding impulse.”
203 Ruskin’s focus on art was 
reprehensible because it revealed a conscious decision to distance himself from his 
fellow humans, which made him guilty of the selfish behaviour he sought to avoid, as 
Chapter Three will show. Eastlake deemed Ruskin incapable of “admiration, love, and 
sympathy” which, for Bain, were the “powers that take us out of ourselves, and enable 
us to find pleasure in seeing, if not in adding to, the good that others possess.”
204 We 
see that Ruskin’s refusal to engage with humanity and limit his scope to his own 
passions violated Victorian morality  in two ways.  Firstly, his lack, not excess, of 
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amorous and paternal emotions identified him as a heartless monster and positioned 
him  outside  Eastlake’s  and  Bain’s  codes  of  acceptable  behaviour.  Secondly,  his 
choice to focus his energies on the subject he felt most passionately about was seen as 
immoral because it represented an act of self-assertion that disregarded the well-being 
of the community. Notwithstanding Ruskin’s socially conscious writing, such as “The 
Nature of Gothic” in The Stones of Venice II (1853), Fors Clavigera (1871-1878 and 
1880-1884)  and  his  unwavering  desire  to  share  his  observations  with  his  readers 
(Chapter Three), his association of morality with aesthetics instead of the family, as 
well as his “aged” narrative style, earned him Eastlake’s lifelong contempt.   
Hence,  Henry  Crabb  Robinson’s  lack  of  literary  confidence  could  have 
stemmed  from  his  fear  of  judgmental  critics,  who,  like  Eastlake,  created  and 
reinforced artistic and social standards of behaviour. He did not worry about over-
sentimentalising his creations, but feared that he did not possess the emotional energy 
to produce literature or criticism of lasting impact. His tendency to anticipate critical 
reprimands impeded him from pursuing his interest in literature and philosophy on a 
professional level and he never completely outgrew the dread of being annihilated by 
harsh criticism.  
In trying to isolate the factors responsible for his unemotional temperament, 
Crabb Robinson suspected that his father’s indifference might have played a role in 
the “want of sensibility in myself which I consider as a radical defect in my nature,” 
as his diary  entry of April 23
rd 1815 shows.
205 By  considering this neglect as his 
father’s “misfortune rather than his fault,” he pretended to absolve the latter for never 
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“excit[ing] in his children the best and most delightful emotions.”
206 Nevertheless, he 
questioned the formative impact of parental emotional instruction:  
Oh, how difficult, not to say impossible, to assign the boundaries between 
natural and moral evil, between the defects of character which proceed from 
natural imbecility, which no man considers a reproach and those errors of the 
will, about which metaphysicians may dispute forever!
207 
 
Crabb  Robinson  regretted  his  lack  of  “sensibility”  immensely,  which  led  him  to 
investigate who was to blame for the gross moral negligence that deprived him from 
the necessary emotional resources. He tried to absolve both himself and his father 
through considering the attenuating circumstance of their respective incapacity to feel 
and to nurture being innate. Crabb Robinson was unsure whether he could hold his 
father responsible for not instilling a poetic temperament in his son because he could 
not assess the deliberateness of the latter’s indifference.  
Evidently, Crabb Robinson investigated the limits of his will power when he 
questioned his personal guilt in neglecting his literary talent: “on what does sensibility 
depend? On constitution, or habits, or what? I cannot tell. I only know I was not my 
own  maker.  I  know  also  that  I  respect  others  more  than  I  do  myself.”
208 Crabb 
Robinson  attempted  to  weigh  the  predominance  of  external  circumstances  against 
internal factors in the formation of human character, but was unable to resolve this 
philosophical problem. Its solution would have determined whether Crabb Robinson 
was emotionally under-stimulated as a child, fundamentally lacking creative genius or 
whether he was too weak-willed to achieve literary greatness. The latter explanation 
presented  him  as  responsible  for  the  inferiority  he  felt  in  comparison  to  “those 
[individuals] I see around me [...] whom I believe of nobler and better nature than 
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myself.”
209 However, Crabb Robinson felt powerless to actively change his character: 
“I sincerely wish  I was other than  I  am.”
210 This suggests a belief in his father’s 
failure to mould his son’s moral and mental qualities when this was still possible.  
  Throughout his life, Crabb Robinson’s conviction that he lacked emotional 
resourcefulness made him feel insecure about the quality of his literary and critical 
work; to the point that he composed less and less. Despite his studies at the University 
of Jena and the empowering encounters with prominent thinkers that he made during 
his stay in Germany (1800-5) and afterwards in England, Crabb Robinson maintained 
a  sceptical  attitude  towards  his  talent  as  a  critic  and  writer.  Upon  his  arrival  in 
Germany, he deplored his lack of both the emotional enthusiasm and technical skill 
that successful literary and pictorial composition required:  
I can neither reason nor paint… Could I only with elegance & effect describe 
what  I  feel  and  see  (Which  I  call  painting)  I  sho
d  be  contented  but  I  am 
persuaded  every  day  more  confidently,  that  I  want  that  sensibility  of  the 
beautiful  in  Language  which  is  called  Taste  and  in  Compos
n.  Style  which 
alone  without  higher  qualities  enables  a  Man  to  become  a  respectable 
Author.
211 
 
Crabb Robinson felt that both his perceptive and descriptive powers were incapable of 
producing  sophisticated,  “respectable”  work.  Because  of  these  fundamental 
deficiencies, he was forced to clumsily represent his own experience, which made him 
vulnerable to attacks on the grounds of both self-indulgence and lack of talent. Crabb 
Robinson did not allow himself to fully develop his critical potential because he was 
intensely scared of public ridicule: “I believe I shall never expose myself by writing a 
very contemptible book, because if I did, I sho
d perhaps hang myself through shame at 
                                                 
209 Ibid.  
210 Ibid.  
211 Quoted in Baker, Henry Crabb Robinson, p. 108.    97 
being criticised.”
212 Crabb Robinson stifled his own desire for literary  and critical 
output by imagining destructive criticism for his potentially unworthy work.  
Constantly questioning his talent, Crabb Robinson gradually decided that it was 
more respectable to excel in his legal profession than to be an inadequate writer. Until 
1803,  Crabb  Robinson  published  several  articles  on  German  philosophy  in  the 
Monthly  Register  and  the  Monthly  Magazine,  but  when  he  saw  that  his  work 
“attracted no notice,” he stopped submitting it, as Behler has shown.
213 Morley has 
convincingly  argued  that  Crabb  Robinson  preferred  the  safety  of  obscurity  to  the 
threat of being ridiculed for his dishonouring mediocrity: “he gave up attempting to 
write because he was convinced that his powers were at best only second-rate.”
214 By 
March  3
rd  1811,  Crabb  Robinson  had  resolved  to  “not  waste  my  faculties  in 
attempting  to  acquire  what  is  not  within  my  reach,  viz.  pre-eminence  as  a 
metaphysical philosopher or critic.”
215 Instead of consistently trying and  failing to 
reach literary fame, Crabb Robinson determined to achieve respectability where it was 
possible. He recognised that his “moderately logical understanding” and his ability to 
“speak, when I know my subject, with some effect,” were “precisely the business 
talents  of  a  lawyer  and  advocate.”
216 Because  the  law  could  be  mastered,  Crabb 
Robinson was able to present a confident and competent persona to society, leaving 
little room for attack. 
Despite  his  function  as  a  foreign  editor,  or  war-correspondent,  from  August 
1808 until January 1809 during the Peninsular Wars (1807-1814), Crabb Robinson 
never acquired the confidence to confront a critical audience. Even thirty years later, 
when his editorial additions to Thomas Clarkson’s Strictures on a Life of William 
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Wilberforce were about to appear, Crabb Robinson expressed deep anxiety over the 
prospect of publishing his work in his letter to Wordsworth of August 10
th 1838.  He 
alluded to the legend of a woman who stood on the street with the purpose of selling 
muffins but would only utter the faint cry: “muffins to sell, muffins to sell! Oh! I hope 
nobody hears me.”
217 According to Sadler, Crabb Robinson was the epitome of the 
“shy author” who simultaneously desired and feared public recognition. Hence he 
identified with the saleswoman: 
This is just my feeling whenever I write anything. I think it a piece of capital 
luck when those whose opinion I most value never chance to hear of my writing. 
[…] I shall be out of the way when the book comes out. It is remarkable how 
differently  I  feel  as  to  talk  and  writing.  No  one  talks  with  more  ease  and 
confidence than I do; no one writes with more difficulty and distrust. I am aware, 
that  whatever  nonsense  is  spoken,  it  never  can  be  brought  against  me;  but 
writing, however concealed, like other sins, may any day rise up against one.
218 
 
From a young age, Crabb Robinson had been a confident orator and in 1803, in the 
presence of Bonaparte,  outdid his company  with his eloquent forthcomingness: “I 
alone talked freely, and I could see that people envied me my power of saying what I 
liked.”
219 The rules of polite society did not frighten Crabb Robinson, as he felt that 
the spoken word vanished after being pronounced, whereas publishing his work made 
him feel exposed and vulnerable because he could not control the reactions of his 
readers. His “distrust” stemmed from his anticipation of his audience’s destructive 
judgment. The cultural demand for self-effacement in the author may have affected 
his entry, as the pride that came with potential applause would have embarrassed a 
humble Crabb Robinson as much as the derision by his critics and friends. He was 
torn between the desire to be read and the need to be ignored. 
  In order to be respectable, the artist had to find the delicate balance between 
emotional  self-investment  and  the  insistence  on  his  talents.  Although  Eastlake 
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asserted  that  Ruskin’s  aesthetic  laws  detracted  from  the  correct  understanding  of 
artistic creations, she implied that creative joy had to be limited to the process of 
creation and that once the work of art was finished; the artist had to distance himself 
from  his  work  and  assume  a  position  of  neutral  modesty.  Her  rigid  opinions  of 
appropriate artistic behaviour were just as limiting to the creative spirit as the ideas 
she condemned in Ruskin. The Victorian art scene allowed little room for artistic 
experimentation as artists were either accused of too much or too little passion and 
Crabb Robinson consequently never had the courage to expose himself to this hostile 
audience.  
  This  chapter  has  drawn  attention  to  the  strict  parameters  of  acceptable 
behaviour within which the Victorian individual functioned. Respectability was as 
much determined by other-directedness as by the cultivation of personal talent and the 
diaries examined in the following chapters reflect this consistent tension between the 
individual and the community. As Chapter Two will show, George Eliot’s diary is 
characterised by her determination to improve the community through her literary 
production.  The  apologetic  attitude  that  Eastlake  and  Crabb  Robinson  displayed 
towards their correspondents is manifested in Eliot’s diary and takes the shape of 
frequent  expressions  of  gratitude  and  self-minimising  guilt  for  being  privileged. 
George Gissing’s diary is almost completely devoid of an authorial presence, but his 
letters and non-fiction reveal that his struggle for financial survival inspired him with 
a pessimistic egotistical outlook which thwarted other-directed behaviour and led him 
to despise the Religion of Humanity that George Eliot believed in. In accordance with 
the cultural pressure for self-improvement, Gissing monitored his professional output 
in his diary, which defined his sense of self-worth. His conviction that altruism was 
opposed to all forms of progress is unique among the diarists in this thesis, as George   100 
Eliot, John Ruskin and Gerard Manley Hopkins displayed a strong concern for the 
educational and spiritual well-being of others. This chapter has aimed to clarify the 
specific  societal  circumstances  that  induced  the  pressure  to  channel  the  emotions 
away from contemptible indulgence, towards the disciplined accomplishment of duty 
which dominates the following chapters.    101 
Chapter Two 
The Duty to Work: George Eliot and George Gissing 
This  chapter  investigates  George  Eliot’s  and  George  Gissing’s  responses  to 
ontological  void  created  by  their  secularising  culture’s  disbelief  in  an  afterlife.  In 
consequence, both viewed time as a substance that was to be turned into personal 
value by meeting the standards of respectability that Chapter One has described. For 
both Eliot and Gissing, the proper employment of time was their primary duty which 
defined their sense of self-worth. For both, material wealth was the welcome reward 
for assiduous work, but for Eliot money represented the source of the “guilt of the 
privileged” whereas for Gissing it was a means to purchase leisure time. This chapter 
will show that the prominence of the subjects of time and money in both novelists’ 
“professional” diaries is indicative of their wider philosophical outlook in that they 
encouraged  Eliot’s  pressure  to  be  optimistic  and  animated  Gissing’s  pessimistic 
reluctance to value life, which marks him as morally dissident compared to the other 
examined diarists.  
Because Eliot filled the ontological void of agnosticism with her beliefs in the 
social responsibility of the individual, she felt immensely guilty for being well-off, as 
her diary shows. This fuelled the “economic of compensation” which dominated her 
work ethic and commanded her to pay off her debt to the community.
1 In order to 
explain  the  consistent  self-minimisation  and  the  quasi-religious  desire  for  self-
improvement that characterise Eliot’s diary, I shall draw on Max Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic  and  the  Spirit  of Capitalism  (1904-1905).
2 Although  Eliot’s  work  ethic  was 
heavily  influenced  by  her  Evangelical  roots,  she  fought  the  Puritan  orientation 
towards the self that inspired the capitalist system. Eliot, who was an enthusiastic 
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student of the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857), held the positivistic 
belief that concern with the self was sinful—the individual had to invest in others as 
the self on its own was meaningless. Thus, in the absence of God, the signifying 
power could not rest entirely in the individual, because personal meaning had to be 
evaluated in relation to an “other.” The analysis of Eliot’s diary reveals that she used 
her  diary  to  create  a  self-conscious  inventory  of  productivity  by  which  to  perfect 
herself as a reformer of social circumstances. 
In his 1980 review of Pierre Coustillas’s 1978 edition of Gissing’s diary, critic 
Robin  Barrow  disapproved  of  the  “tedious”  nature  of  the  diary,  which  failed  to 
“endear the author to us.”
3 Barrow is right when he notes that the “diary gives a very 
restricted and limited view” of Gissing’s inner life.
4 I shall, however, argue that this 
professional  diary,  which  is  indeed  rarely  confessional  and  “remarkably  reticent,” 
speaks through its absences and does shed light on Gissing’s philosophical outlook.
5 
Because Gissing’s diary is decidedly reluctant to reveal personal detail, I am reading 
it in conjunction with the letters and the Commonplace Book. 
Gissing’s life was dominated by the compulsion to make money in order to 
overcome poverty and re-acquire social respectability after the Manchester episode, 
which designates his imprisonment after stealing money to keep the prostitute Nell 
Harrison, whom he later married. Biographer Paul Delany has argued that Gissing’s 
personality  and the “lower-middle-class instincts of frugality, order, self-discipline 
and constant work,” are at the root of the “exile” he “brought on himself.”
6 Gissing’s 
diary is indeed distinguished by an unwavering focus on professional progress and 
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self-discipline, but there is also a clear sense that Gissing had to produce literature in 
order to buy time for himself. Only during his travels to Italy and Greece, did the 
proximity  to  great  art  inspire  Gissing  to  develop  as  a  diarist,  but,  unlike  Eliot, 
“Gissing  was  not  privileged  enough”  to  adopt  this  ideal  lifestyle  permanently.
7 
Gissing’s pessimistic outlook can thus be traced to the limited space for personal 
development  and  enjoyment  that  his  life  afforded  and  explains  his  lack  of  other-
directed behaviour. Although Gissing’s work is primarily concerned with the social 
discontents of the nineteenth century, Delany has rightly noted that “his writing was a 
labour imposed from without rather than the expression of a creative self.”
8 Gissing 
did not seek to improve society but treated his work as an indicator of his own value. 
Both Eliot and Gissing were acutely aware of the fragility of their lives. With 
no  afterlife  to  hope  for  and  no  religious  authority  to  pray  to,  life  could  change 
drastically any minute and the individual was powerless to prevent or explain disaster. 
Eliot confronted the assurance of eternal death by optimistically cherishing life as 
much as she could. Gissing’s life on the other hand, had no such idealistic framework; 
he defined himself entirely by his work, as Paul Delany has said: “there was always a 
sense in which his true partner was not another person, but his writing-desk.”
9 Gissing 
found “immense satisfaction in a task accomplished,” as he wrote in a letter on 15
th of 
August 1885, and enormous despair if this was impossible.
10  
George Eliot and George Gissing are prominent figures of nineteenth-century 
literary  realism.  Eliot’s  realism  communicated  her  personal  desire  to  educate  her 
readers and was strongly other-directed, because art, for her, was “the nearest thing to 
life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow 
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men beyond the bounds of our personal lot.”
11 For Gissing, on the other hand, writing 
was  not  a  vehicle  for  social  change,  but  a  means  to  survive  poverty  and  rise  in 
respectability. Nor was writing a calling—Gissing had to resort to this type of work 
because his academic career had been terminated by the scandal of his imprisonment, 
and  W.  Van  Maanen  is  right  when  he  writes:  “Gissing  was  not  a  ‘born’  writer: 
circumstances  made  him  one.  If  they  had  been  different,  he  might  have  been  a 
professor  of  Greek  in  one  of  the  major  universities.”
12 Professionally,  Gissing’s 
destitution set the theme for his novels, as, through his misery, he had “acquired [his] 
intense  perception  of  the  characteristics  of  poor  life  in  London.”
13  Somewhat 
ironically, Gissing needed to be in proximity to London and the miseries he witnessed 
in order to find material for his short fiction and novels. As Delany has noted, Gissing 
“condemned  the  heartlessness  of  London,”  which  was  seen  as  a  “giant  battlefield 
where, every day, thousands died in silence.”
14Although Gissing’s work described 
these dreadful social conditions accurately, it was not intended to reform society, but 
rather for personal survival. In works such as The Unclassed (1884), Demos (1886) 
and  Thyrza  (1887),  Gissing  doubted  the  legitimacy  of  any  reformer’s  motives, 
because, as Daniel Born has suggested: “reform [could] be cast as activity carried out 
more for the psychological benefit of the reformers than for any positive outcome 
accruing  to  the  supposed  beneficiaries  of  such  activism.”
15  In  “The  Hope  of 
Pessimism”  (1882)  Gissing  criticised  the  selfishness  inherent  in  religious  and 
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positivist doctrines and proposed, along with Schopenhauer, that only the pessimistic 
rejection of the will to live could bring about sincere sympathy.  
  In the absence of a religious system of signification, Eliot and Gissing had to 
signify themselves in relation to their social context. Their diaries clearly foreground 
their professional lives, displaying the struggle to possess and validate their own lives 
in  the  battle  against  time/death.  After  investigating  the  creation  of  personal  value 
through work in both Eliot and Gissing, I will examine the meaning their diaries held 
in this process of signification. I will then present the impact of these biographical 
factors on their wider philosophies. 
 
Guilt and Gratitude in George Eliot 
Eliot’s  “strenuous  efforts  to  integrate  individualistic  and  communal  values  and  to 
transform  religious  ties  into  social  ones,”  were,  according  to  Suzanne  Graver, 
characteristic  of  many  enforcers  of  communitarianism  in  the  nineteenth  century.
16 
Eliot exhausted herself trying to fulfil her self-imposed duties which re-enacted the 
religious conventions of self-effacement, other-directedness and  extreme diligence. 
Like  Carolyn  W.  de  la  Oulton,  I  shall  argue  that  Eliot’s  “insistence  on  duty  and 
responsibility is the one point of reference taken from her youthful Evangelicalism.”
17 
Although Eliot had abandoned her Protestant roots, they had permanently shaped her 
mindset; a phenomenon which, according to Max Weber, had been carried over from 
pre-industrial  time  to  capitalist
 culture:  “the  magical  and  religious  forces,  and  the 
ethical ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most 
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important formative influences on conduct.”
18 Eliot retained the insistence on dutiful 
self-restraint inherent in religious practices, but it was now mere gesture, devoid of 
religious significance. This emptiness was repulsive to Eliot and she was eager to re-
invest the concept with meaning through an increased focus on duty (towards others), 
which,  in  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life  (1858),  she  defined  as  “that  recognition  of 
something to be lived for beyond the mere satisfaction of self.”
19 Without religious 
guidance, the individual was a “mere bundle of impressions, desires and impulses,” 
and  duty,  a  concept  that  stemmed  from  religion,  had  to  save  the  individual  from 
nihilism.
20 The individual could not subsist in isolation and had to live in relation to 
an authority, which forced him or her to “[rise] to a higher order of experience,” 
subjecting  himself  or  herself  to  a  “principle  of  subordination.”  For  Eliot,  divine 
veneration had been replaced by a work ethic to which she was extremely dedicated.  
  Eliot’s  work  for,  and  behaviour  towards,  others  justified  her  existence.  She 
substituted divine criteria for virtuous behaviour by self-set standards, which were no 
less strict. Like the Puritan, whose fate was predetermined, but nonetheless had to be 
as virtuous as possible in order to count as one of the elect, Eliot felt that all her 
actions had to satisfy  her duties towards others.  In neither the Protestant, nor the 
capitalist  work  ethic  did  intentions  suffice,  as  opposed  to  Catholicism where  “the 
absolution of [the] Church was a compensation for [the subject’s] own imperfection. 
The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who 
held the key to eternal life in his hand.”
21 Eternal life was questionable for the Puritan 
and  unthinkable  for  Eliot.  The  absence  of  an  absolving  power  handed  over  all 
responsibility to the individual, who was defined by his or her past behaviour and had 
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to bear the consequences of not meeting his or her standards in the form of shame and 
guilt.  
We must be careful, however, not to explain the necessity of self-control in the 
Victorian codes of respectability solely as a consequence of Protestantism. Trygve R. 
Tholfsen,  as  well  as  Niles  M.  Hansen  among  others,  has  pointed  out  that  Weber 
merely  identified  the  “‘elective  affinities’  between  evangelicalism  and  the  liberal-
rationalist-utilitarian  tradition.”
22 Tholfson  has  insisted  that  secular  forces,  such  as 
industrial progress, shaped mid-Victorian urban culture more than evangelicalism did. 
He does, however, like Gertrude Himmelfarb (see Chapter One), acknowledge the 
influence  of  the  Protestant  ethic  as  “the  chief  source  of  the  moral  intensity  that 
pervaded the culture” which “[strengthened] the ethic of improvement,” by focussing 
on the actions of the individual.
23 Moreover, evangelicalism “[softened] the astringent 
side  of  Enlightenment  rationalism  and  radicalism”  and  “[elevated]  the  masses.”
24 
Tholfson also explains that the ethic of improvement can be seen as the universal 
embracement  of  progress,  settling,  to  some  degree,  the  complicated  class  conflict 
between trade unions and middle-class employers. Workingmen “deradicalized” and 
joined  the  middle-classes  to  form  a  “cohesive  culture  given  to  a  quasi-religious 
celebration of the activity of the community.”
25 Thus, work became the ideological 
means  to  define  and  elevate  the  self  through  ambitious  efforts  at  ever-greater 
productivity in all social strata.  
George  Eliot’s  diary  and  fiction  are  characterised  by  an  intense  feeling  of 
responsibility—the  self  had  to  cultivate  its  strengths  for  the  benefit  of  others. 
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Seemingly embarrassed to reap the worldly fruits of her labour, Eliot consistently 
pushed herself to “make greater efforts against indolency and the despondency that 
comes  from  too  egoistic  a  dread  of  failure,”  and  thus  attempted  to  eliminate  any 
vanity from her drive towards success and fame.
26 She did long for the validation of 
her efforts by others but desired to make a difference to humanity rather than to enrich 
herself: “life would ever be made precious to me by the consciousness that I lived to 
some good purpose!”
27 Only when helping others did she consider her life worthwhile 
and only then could she fully enjoy her success. Despite Eliot’s evident agnosticism, 
these statements resemble religious pledges in their intensity and devotion.  
To Eliot, according to her friend F.W.H. Myers, literature represented “the 
means of self-expression by which she was best able to move mankind,” and changing 
her audience “for good” was her primary aim.
28 He further asserted that her fame 
“ever presented itself […] unmixedly as responsibility,” which was confirmed by the 
moral urgency with which she reached out to her readership.
29 When in the process of 
writing Daniel Deronda (1876), on January 13
th 1875, Eliot felt pressured by time and  
she  voiced  her  “fear  lest  I  may  not  be  able  to  complete  it  so  as  to  make  it  a 
contribution to literature and not a mere addition to the heap of books.”
30 Eliot strove 
to create a text of lasting value, employing her novels not only as “experiments in 
life” but as models for life.
31 As Graver has observed, Eliot’s work enabled her to 
mould her readers’ minds by encouraging them to mimic: 
characters who experienced such changes as those as she would ideally have her 
readers  undergo,  or  such  failings  as  might  bring  her  readers  to  a  fuller 
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understanding of the human limitations and social conditions that inhibit the 
fellowship she wanted her readers to experience as a felt need.
32  
 
Eliot measured her success in terms of the emotional and intellectual nourishment her 
work  provided  for  its  readers,  which  is  why  the  public  acclaim  of  Middlemarch 
(1871-72)  was  very  satisfying  to  her,  as  her  diary  entry  of  January  1
st  1873 
demonstrates: “No former book of mine has been received with more enthusiasm—
not even Adam Bede, and I have received many deeply affecting assurances of its 
influence  for  good  on  individual  minds.”
33 The  book  was  seen  to  cater  to  the 
audience’s need for the formative effects of wholesome fiction and Eliot hoped that 
her audience would internalise the virtuous behaviour she had depicted or learn to 
avoid the fictional errors of judgment in their lives. 
Reflecting the culture of zealous progressivity that Chapter One has described, 
George Eliot displayed an almost total identification with her work. She felt morally 
obligated to work and aimed to improve the whole of society through influencing the 
individual reader’s ethical choices. As Neil Hertz has observed, and this is obvious in 
her diary, Eliot portrayed her work as the “acquittal of a debt” she had to pay in order 
for her life to have “value” and meaning.
34 This idea of work as a sacrifice that should 
be offered joyfully without the affirmation of the self by pecuniary reward implies the 
annihilation of the author and the foregrounding of the literary text.  
Eliot’s desire to provide moral sustenance to others can be seen to rise out of 
an “economics of compensation,” to use Hertz’s term, which implied that she thought 
she deserved personal validation only if she had invested in others. Moreover, her 
compulsion  to  dutifully  acknowledge  her  “blessings”  and  to  never  indulge  in 
complaint was an attempt to absolve the guilt related to her enjoyment of worldly 
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possessions in the face of the deprivation of others. Christopher Herbert, in his study 
of money in the Victorian age, has emphasised the religious aspects of this guilt of the 
privileged:  “Christianity  idealizes  poverty  and  anathematizes  money;  it  teaches 
Christians  to  recoil  from  the  contaminating  uncleanness  of  worldly  riches.”
35 In  a 
similar fashion, Eliot strove to redeem her personal and material happiness through 
her literary output, along with her guilty expressions of gratitude, following the logic 
that Weber identified as specifically Wesleyan: “those who gain all they can and save 
all they can should also give all they can, so that they will grow in grace.”
36 This 
imperative  to  aggrandise  the  other  and  minimise  the  self  very  clearly  dominated 
Eliot’s mindset. 
Despite her agnosticism, Eliot had retained the orientation towards a higher 
being and seemed to look to an invisible authority to sanction her actions.  In her 
diary entry of December 30
th 1868, Eliot relativised her favourable review of that year 
by alluding to her disadvantaged contemporaries and appealing to a superior power to 
grant her the tools to equalise this unfair distribution of resources: 
We  have  had  no  real  trouble.  I  wish  we  were  not  in  a  minority  of  our 
fellowmen! I desire no added blessing for the coming year but these: that I 
may do some good, lasting work, and make both outward and inward habits 
less imperfect, that is, more directly tending to the best uses of life.
37  
 
The certainty that the Leweses were uniquely privileged spoiled Eliot’s enjoyment of 
her peaceful existence and hence she wished for the “added blessing” of remarkable 
work by which to benefit others. Eliot obviously retained the religious gesture of 
prayer, when she looked to a superior power to concede the “blessing,” in other words 
the ability to more productively use the time available to her, instead of employing 
increased will-power to effect change.  
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Eliot’s consistent de-emphasis of the monetary  reward for her work  was a 
crucial aspect of her tendency to self-minimise. Her attitudes can be seen to reflect the 
Victorian work ethic that was shaped by Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) and Samuel 
Smiles  (1812-1904).  Carlyle  exclaimed  in  “Labour”  that:  “Blessed  is  he  who  has 
found his work; let him ask no other blessedness. He has a work, a life-purpose; he 
has found it, and will follow it!”
38 Past and Present (1843) constitutes a eulogy of 
work in which Carlyle insisted that “there is a perennial nobleness, even sacredness, 
in Work.”
39 Carlyle was the son of Calvinist parents and a passionate social activist 
who asserted, like Eliot, that the worker’s intention should not be personal gain, but 
that work was necessary to extract the “god-given Force” and the “sacred celestial 
Life-essence” out of his or her existence.
40 Work was seen as an activity that ought to 
be  fundamentally  selfless;  the  “Reward”  of  professional  effort  being  strictly  non-
monetary: “The ‘wages’ of every noble Work do yet lie in Heaven or else Nowhere. 
Not  in  Bank-of-England  bills  [or]  in  Owen’s  Labour-bank.”
41 He  associated  work 
directly with religion and detached it from the worldly reality of financial necessity. 
Desirous to re-inspire England with energetic spiritualism, Carlyle uttered this deeply 
romantic declaration: “Thou wilt never sell thy Life, or any part of thy Life, in a 
satisfactory manner. Give it, like a royal heart; let the price be Nothing: thou hast then, 
in a certain sense, got All for it!”
42 The individual had to invest his or her physical and 
intellectual powers in what critic John Ulrich has identified as “a sacrificial economy 
of  energy,”  in  which  the  value  of  labour  was  equal  to  the  value  of  life.
43 In  this 
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economy,  God  was  maintained  as  the  “guarantor  of  meaningful  exchange,”  the 
signifying “anchor,” attributing value to creation.
44  
Samuel  Smiles  is  probably  the  best  known  author  of  Victorian  self-
improvement literature. His optimistic speeches and essays were delivered to crowds 
of workers to whom he sought to teach the moral value of consistent work, as this 
extract  from  Self-Help  (1859)  shows:  “if  a  working  man  have  high  ambition  and 
possess richness in spirit—a kind of wealth which far transcends all mere worldly 
possessions—he may not only help himself, but be a profitable helper of others in his 
path through life.”
45 Intelligence and selflessness were the qualities of the virtuous, 
respectable  individual.  Money  was  an  inadequate  reward  to  get  out  of  work—the 
individual should not invest time into work in the hope of material gain, but in order 
to improve him or herself. He too commented on the popular maxim that: 
Time is money; but it is more; the proper improvement of it is self-culture, self-
improvement, and growth of character. An hour wasted on daily trifles or in 
indolence would, if devoted to self-improvement, make an ignorant man wise in 
a few years, and employed in good works would make his life fruitful, and death 
a harvest of worthy deeds. Fifteen minutes a day devoted to self-improvement 
will be felt at the end of the year.
46 
 
Time was clearly treated as a precious substance that was to be used properly. The 
employment of time defined the value of the individual, as “wasting” it was a sin and 
using it as an opportunity to enhance the self was a virtue.  
  Eliot  greatly  admired  Carlyle  and  she  both  adopted  and  disseminated  the 
principles he had designed to teach order and industry to the working classes.
47 She 
shared Smiles’s progressive belief that the railway, and material progress generally, 
could  benefit  the  community  immensely  as  it  constituted  a  “binding force” and a 
“much-needed communication net,” which had the “endless potential to do good,” as 
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Laura Otis has argued.
48 All three thus believed in the necessary conjunction of thrift, 
self-abnegation and other-directedness in order to achieve social improvement. 
   Eliot’s  self-abnegation  was  never  complete,  as  she  derived  validation  and 
satisfaction from the act of giving. The great responsibility towards the community 
that Eliot obtruded upon herself was, however, not a source of pleasure because she 
not only sought to redeem the guilt of her present self, but also to make up for the 
shameful neglect of her past self. In a letter of January 2
nd 1858, having received 
much praise for her first novel, Scenes of Clerical Life (1858), Eliot wrote that: “[I am] 
hoping that my writing may succeed and so give value to my life [to] touch the hearts 
of my fellow men, and so sprinkle some precious grain as the result of the long years 
in which I have been inert and suffering.”
49 Eliot’s episodic inability to produce work 
of a high standard made her feel like she had neglected her duty of providing others 
with moral nourishment. Because she had not worked for “long years,” she had been 
useless  ballast  hindering  the  community  from  progressing.  Sowing  the  “precious 
grain”  of  wisdom  in  others  allowed  Eliot  to  justify  her  existence  and  receive 
absolution for her guilt.   
Eliot felt pressured to maximise her literary output because she was constantly 
aware that death would assuredly put an end to, or even annul, the lessons she was 
eager to teach. Having permanently distanced herself from Christianity, Eliot could 
not “believe in personal immortality,” as Bernard J. Paris has claimed and therefore 
                                                 
48 George Eliot’s attitude to material progress was divided as can be seen in The Mill on the Floss (New 
York: Harper Brothers and W.I. Pooley & Co., 1860),  in which the narrator embraces the “striving for 
something  better”  as  that  which  “distinguishes  man  from  the  brute,”  but  nonetheless  considers 
worriedly  “heaven  knows  where  this  striving  might  lead  us”  (p.  136);  Laura  Otis,  Networking: 
Communicating  with  Bodies  and  Machines  in  the  Nineteenth-Century  (Ann  Arbor:  University  of 
Michigan Press, 2001), p. 84.  
49 David Carroll, ed., George Eliot: The Critical Heritage (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 
p.64.    114 
feared that her time was running out.
50 Cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark 
Turner have explained that “our understanding of life and death is very much bound 
up with our understanding of time. This is because death is inevitable.”
51 Within this 
limited time span, the individual (“User”) must employ the amount of the available 
“Resource” efficiently to achieve a “Purpose,” which will create “Value” to be gained 
by the “User.”
52 The “Value” of the “Resource,” because exhausted, is lost in any 
case. The management of time is thus directly related to human agency, as human 
beings  must  hold  themselves  accountable  for  causing  waste  due  to  their 
disorganisation and inefficiency.  
This theory visualises that the prospect of death was terrifying to Eliot because 
it forever suspended her creative efforts and annulled the potential—“Resource”— 
from which to draw. She displayed an intense fear of mortality; a fear that Martin 
Heidegger attributed to death’s “character as a possibility […] which is certain and at 
the  same  time  indefinite—that  is  to  say,  possible  at  any  moment.”
53  The 
unpredictability and inevitability of death as the force that broke the bonds of human 
companionship  and  impeded  capable  human  beings  from  becoming  permanent 
carriers of wisdom unsettled Eliot. She wrote of her “perfect love” with George Henry 
Lewes: “our unspeakable joy in each other has no other alloy than the sense that it 
must  one  day  end  in  parting.”
54 When,  on  November  30
th  1878,  Lewes  died,  she 
bitterly regretted that his creative potential was not permitted to unfold completely; 
grief-stricken, she lamented “the beseechings of a mighty soul/ That left its work 
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unfinished.”
55 During her lifetime, the thought of looming extinction was omnipresent 
and could not be repressed; to the point that it determined her outlook on life and her 
self-image. According to Heidegger, the individual commits a mistake by “expecting” 
[Erwarten]  “possible”  events.  In  the  case  of  death,  “Expecting  is  not  just  an 
occasional  looking-away  from  the  possible  to  its  possible  actualization,  but  is 
essentially  a  waiting  for  that  actualization [ein Warten  auf  diese].”
56 The  definite 
assurance  that  death  would  strike  turned  life  into  a  priceless commodity that was 
threatened; an invaluable “Resource” that had to be utilised with utmost care, which 
meant  that  experience  had  to  be  maximised  during  this  waiting  time  that  was 
existence.
57 For Eliot too, the fear of death magnified the temporality of existence and 
created an oppressive obligation to maximise production. 
These cognitive linguistic mechanisms originated in the Protestant work ethic, 
as  the  model  of  “time  is  money”  relates  back  to  “the  exact  moment  when  the 
industrial  revolution  demanded  a  greater  synchronization  of  labour,”  as  E.P. 
Thompson  has  shown.
58 Thompson  has  observed  that  the  integral  elements  of 
“disciplined  industrial  capitalism,”  such  as  the  “time-sheet,  the  time-keeper,  the 
informers and the fines,” were in place as early as 1700.
59 He notes that the Puritan 
ethic did not introduce the concept of “industry” or “the moral critique of idleness,” 
but  that  it  emphasised  the  moral  character  of  laborious  discipline.
60 Even  before 
pocket watches were in common usage, Puritan clergymen were inculcating “interior 
moral  time-pieces”  into  their  subjects.
61  For  instance,  Richard  Baxter’s  1673 
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Christian Directory advised its readers to treat time as a valuable commodity, which 
was not to be wasted: “use every minute of [Time] as a most precious thing, and 
spend it wholly in the way of duty.”
62 The reason the Christian individual needed to 
be so conscious of time lies in the Calvinist belief in predetermination, according to 
which “some men and angels” were given everlasting life, while others were wiped 
out by death.
63 Max Weber explained that the knowledge of being one of the elect 
could be sustained by “intense worldly activity” in order to feel “self-confiden[t]” 
enough to “counteract religious anxiety.”
64 Although the Calvinist did not technically 
have the power to “create his own salvation,” he or she could create “the conviction of 
it.”
65  Thus—and  this  is  reflected  in  Eliot—the  individual  was  responsible  for 
constructing his or her self-image by establishing a certain set of standards to which 
he  or  she  had  to  live  up.  Compared  to  Protestantism,  Catholicism  offered  more 
guidance to the individual, who, as Henry Newman stated, had to “do God’s pleasure” 
in heaven and on earth, rather than to “choose and take his own pleasure.”
66  In the 
absence of an absolving God, the individual faced the grave pressure of having to live 
correctly at all times.
67 The diary, as Stuart Sherman has shown in his case study of 
Samuel Pepys (1633-1703), like the watch, provided “uses, pleasures and privileges 
as a medium of self-possession,” which exemplifies its early use as an aide-mémoire 
and tool for self-monitoring. 
68 
Despite  the  decreasing  importance  of  Judgment,  Heaven  and  Hell  in  her 
secularising culture, Eliot was acutely alert to the irreversibility of time and constantly 
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attempted to ensure that the products of her actions avoided “loss” and achieved a 
“Purpose.” In tune with her culture, Eliot viewed existence through what Lakoff and 
Turner  call  the  “life-as-a-possession-metaphor”  which  meant  that  individuals  were 
answerable to themselves as well as to the community they lived in.
69  
 
George Eliot’s Diary: Interactions Between Selves 
Eliot strove to “possess” life not only in terms of the proper employment of time but 
she also sought to materialise the lived moment in her diary. Like many diaries of the 
Victorian period, George Eliot’s diary was reluctant to unveil introspective detail. The 
scientifically inclined Eliot tended to “[make] herself the subject of study,” as diary 
critic Alain Girard would have it, rather than to employ her diary as an outlet for 
confessing her innermost thoughts.
 70  
As  we  have  seen,  Eliot’s  agnosticism  and  her  positivist  beliefs  led  her  to 
consider  life  as  a  valuable  resource  and  fuelled  her  desire  to  encapsulate  the 
immediacy of the present moment. Her diary allowed her to appropriate the temporal 
in several ways: she was able to retain her momentary self in a verbal shape, to record 
and preserve visual and emotional reality and, through a unified consciousness, to 
synthesise the experience she had gained. Frequent re-readings of previous entries 
permitted  a  reconnection  to  former  selves  from  whose  sadness,  love,  failures  and 
success Eliot drew lessons and comfort, which helped her to temporarily overcome 
the murderous linearity of time and to effectively use the past as a resource. Eliot’s 
immense respect for the limited time available to her reinforced the acute sense of 
responsibility with which she approached work.   
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The  double-consciousness  and  temporal  appropriation  inherent  in  the  diary 
genre were crucial factors in Eliot’s process of professional self-construction, because 
they   incited her to monitor and master her self and to diligently perform her duties. 
The personification of time at work in her diary suggests a strong unwillingness to 
lose her hold over the temporal resources available to her, which set the basis for her 
obstinate desire for uninterrupted diligence. Through her habit of re-reading her diary 
Eliot sought to improve her self by conducting what Mark Freeman has called the 
“hermeneutical project” of exploring and understanding the “narrative fabric of the 
self.”
71 Although the diary strengthened Eliot’s sense of self, the sections following 
this one will show that her self-assertion was subject to the self-effacement both her 
culture and her positivistic beliefs demanded.  
Eliot’s tendency to personify and objectify durations can be seen as both an 
extreme act of self-assertion and a gesture of appropriation, by which she elevated her 
own  experience  to  the  level  of  serious  history  writing.  According  to  Heidegger, 
time— in order to be graspable—had to be named or physically represented by “the 
clock [which made] the event explicit.”
72 Historian Arnaldo Momigliano has similarly 
suggested that any historical evidence, “in order to be evidence, must somehow be 
dated.”
73 The  practice  of  dating  events  raised  them  from  easily  forgotten  trivia to 
permanent elements integrated into a system of signification, which rendered their 
mastery less problematic.  
The diary, for Eliot, was thus an indispensable organisational and motivational 
tool that supported her mission to improve herself as well as others. It helped her to 
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unify and control her self as well as her past. Whenever she neglected her diary for 
more than a few days, she felt guilty; as if she had deserted a person in need of care. 
On June 22th 1857, she wrote apologetically: 
My mind has been too intensely agitated and occupied during the last three 
weeks, for me to have the energy left to make entries in my journal, though I 
have often been regretting that the days pass without registering the beauties 
we see on our walks.
74 
 
We see that Eliot, like Ruskin, felt the duty to prevent the loss of time (and visual 
beauty)  by  recording  her  experience  in  her  diary.  When  she  failed  to  do  so,  she 
blamed  herself  for  carelessly  handing  over  “days”  to  oblivion,  which,  in  Western 
thought, is considered to “devour” memory, snatching it to an “inaccessible location,” 
as linguists Lakoff and Turner have explained.
75  For Eliot, the consistency of the 
diary habit was a calming and reassuring practice and frequently, after a period of not 
writing, Eliot felt the duty, as it were, to catch up and merge with her former self, as 
can be seen in this entry of January 13
th 1875: “Here is a great gap since I last made a 
record! But the time has been filled full of happiness.”
76 Thus dutifully informing 
herself in an epistolary fashion (Introduction), she clearly exhibited a desire to fashion 
a completely unified record of her life.  
Eliot manifested a deep emotional attachment to her diary; both to the material 
object and to the experiences it housed. This is evident in her habit of composing an 
evaluation of sickness, work achievements and family news at the end of each year 
with festive finality. She shared this custom with Alfred Lord Tennyson, whose poem 
“Death of the Old Year” of 1833 honoured the year that was taking leave and with 
George Gissing, whose father introduced him to this ritual by reciting Tennyson’s 
poem  each  year.  Eliot  sought  closure  by  appraising  the  experienced  pains  and 
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pleasures; invariably expressing thankfulness for being privileged. In line with her 
efforts at self-improvement, she tended to acknowledge progress, as can be seen in 
this entry of December 26
th 1857: “So goodbye, dear 1857! May I be able to look 
back on 1858 with an equal consciousness of advancement in work and in heart.”
77 
Thus, through the chronological naming of time periods, “1857” and “1858” stand for 
the successes achieved during their duration. The tenderness with which Eliot spoke 
of  certain  years  was  derived  from  a  conceptualisation  of  experience  through 
metonymy: “The happy old year in which we have had constant enjoyment of life 
notwithstanding much bodily malaise, is gone from us forever” (January 1
st, 1874).
78 
Time, in the form of a year, was leaving as it were; “we” were staying and grieving 
over the “happy old year’s” departure. The flow of time, in the compact shape of a 
“year” was taking off like a train, having the “enjoyments” on board. The joys and 
accomplishments—“blessings”—were attributed to the year, which therefore had to 
be mourned. 
The  diary  as  a  physical  object  possessed  inestimable  value  because  it 
accommodated Eliot’s former selves and established a connection to past states of 
being through the daily practice of writing and re-reading entries: “Today I say a final 
farewell to this little book which is the only record I have made of my personal life 
for sixteen years and more.”
79 The regular use of this “little book” had bestowed an 
aura  of  familiarity  on  the  diary;  it  physically  embodied  the  cathartic  routine  of 
recording. When the diary’s “Resource” of space had been depleted, it had to be bid 
“farewell” in its function as an effective “utensil,” retaining, however, its ineffable 
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“Value”  as  the  lasting  representation  of  subjectivity  and  a  selectively  constructed 
past.
80 
Eliot’s diary represented a materialised act of self-assertion, as she insisted 
that her experience deserved to be recorded. Arguably, her diary helped her set the 
guidelines for the propagation of her ideals, as “this little book” embodied “human 
feeling,” which she considered to be “the proper source of social goals.”
81 The diary 
established  the  self  as  its  own  signifier  by  obliterating  God  as  the  authority  and 
catering to what Bernard J. Paris has called “man[‘s] powerful need for a response to 
his consciousness, for a humanized world.”
82 According to Paris, for Eliot, “the world 
of things [was] humanized by the individual’s identification of himself with objects 
and places, by associations and long familiarity.”
83 Through the long duration of its 
presence, the diary was among these objects that came to embody parts of the self, 
which could then defy death and outlive the mortal being.  
By the act of re-reading and by carrying the physical inscription of past states 
of  mind,  Eliot  obliterated  the  other  and  sought  to  provide  a  response  to  her  own 
subjectivity.  The  diary  enforced  Eliot’s  work  ethic  by  holding  her  to  her  duty  to 
diligently provide intellectual sustenance for her readers. The diaristic gesture allowed 
Eliot  to  save  time  in  the  present  through  preserving  the  past  and  establishing  a 
historical resource of experience, which, in Heidegger’s terms, represented “a way of 
viewing history arise in the present.”
84 Heidegger further asserted that “The past—
experienced as authentic historicity—is anything but what is past. It is something to 
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which I can return again and again.”
85 Through materialising experience, the diary 
was able to counteract time’s linearity and restore the past in a circular movement of 
return, which Bain considered to be conducive to mental health.  
Like the photograph, the diary is always in present tense, which is necessarily 
past at the moment of re-reading. The detachment produced by the act of writing and 
the subsequent passage of time have “eliminated the element of real time,” as Henri 
Bergson wrote, and leave historicised fact, thus creating a representation of a past 
moment.
86 Eliot’s  earlier  entries  constituted  invaluable  touchstones  and  she  was 
convinced that the diary was of great importance to her mental balance, as this entry 
of September 24
th 1869 shows: “It is worthwhile to record my great depression of 
spirits, that I may remember one more resurrection from the pit of melancholy.”
87 By 
registering  her  mental  states,  Eliot  provided  guidelines  that  her  future  self  could 
follow  and  either  avoid  mistakes  or  handle  crises  better.  Indeed,  her  entry  of 
December 31
st 1877 shows that her diary had permitted her to control her low moods 
and regain optimism by directing her attention to previous instances in which she had 
successfully tackled difficulty: 
I have often been helped by looking in [my diary] to compare former with actual 
states of despondency from a bad health or other apparent causes. In this way a 
past despondency has turned into present hopefulness. But of course as the years 
advance there is a new rational ground for the expectation that my life may 
become less fruitful.
88 
 
This  entry  acknowledges  the  therapeutic  value  of  re-reading  and  its  fundamental 
importance in self-formation. Through revisiting past states of mind, Eliot relativised 
the present, knowing that she had overcome hardship before, which gave her hope and 
confidence.  
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However, Eliot did not always succeed in therapising herself, and occasionally 
failed to regain self-control through deliberating her problems in a scientific manner, 
as Bain had proposed (Chapter One). When the distance between selves became too 
great for identification, re-motivation could not occur:  
The last day of the month! This evening I have been reading to G some entries 
in my note-book of past times in which I recorded my malaise and despair. But 
it is impossible to me to believe that I have ever been in so unpromising and 
despairing a state as I now feel (January 31
st 1862).
89 
 
We see that despite her intense emotional turmoil, Eliot first situated herself within 
the year’s chronological sequence, as she often did in the beginning of an entry. She 
then actively tried to relate to a former self but could not retrieve a self that resembled 
her current one in her past. The agony of the present seemed unmatched. Seeking for 
similar  states  of  being  in  the  past  was  an  effort  at  normalisation—an  attempt  to 
integrate the current self and its “malaise” into the realm of the knowable and hence 
remain in control: 
I have a distrust in myself, in my work, in others’ loving acceptance of it which 
robs my otherwise happy life of all joy. I ask myself, without being able to 
answer, whether I have ever before felt so chilled and oppressed (February 26
th 
1862).
90  
 
Re-reading a diary from the past could, thus, also enlarge the distance between the 
present self and the past ones and sharpen the contrast between them. Béatrice Didier 
has remarked that the diary can quadruple its author’s personality in the: “frequently 
arising situation in which the self who writes, the self-who-is-reading-the-journal-at-
present, the self-who-has written-the-journal and finally the self-who-was-the-object 
confront each other.”
91 George Eliot experienced acute despair when she could not 
retrieve her present self in the past, as she felt lost without the guidance of the “self-
                                                 
89 Ibid., p. 108. 
90 Ibid., p. 109. 
91 Beatrice Didier, Le Journal Intime (Presses Universitaires de France, 1976), p. 118 :  « Situation 
fréquente où s’affrontent cependant le moi qui écrit, le moi-au-présent-qui-lit, le moi-qui-a-écrit le 
journal et enfin le moi-qui-était-l’objet de ce journal passé. »   124 
who-has-written-the-journal.”  This  entry  also  displays  her  incessant  need  for 
validation by others; usually George Henry Lewes and her audience, as I shall show. 
  Eliot’s effort to “understand” the self can be seen to affirm the generic premise 
of  the  diary.  Mark  Freeman,  in  his  discussion  of  fiction’s  ability  to  restructure 
linear/historical  time,  has  argued  that  “the  project  of  self-understanding  is  to  be 
regarded as a hermeneutical project.”
92 By means of his or her personal records the 
diarist  is  able  to  interpret  present  events  in  light  of  past  occurrences  which  can 
facilitate self-retrieval. Although Freeman does not specifically write on the diary, his 
argument  on  the  function  of  narrative  sheds  light  on  the  diary’s  ontological 
mechanisms:  
In coming to terms with my past, I can only do so from the present, through 
the act of interpretation; I seek to ‘read’ the events of my life as episodes in an 
evolving  narrative,  the  parts  shaping  the  whole  and  the  whole  shaping  the 
parts, in an undivided movement of the creation of meaning.
93 
 
The recollection of isolated “parts,” such as the individual entries of the diary, can 
provide the re-reading self with the immediacy and precision necessary to bring about 
proximity  to  the  past.  The  “whole”  can  be  seen  to  represent  the  diary’s  generic 
enterprise  of  writing  the  self;  the  effort  of  creating  a  written  representation  of  a 
momentary self that arrests the passage of time. By connecting with her former selves, 
Eliot  got  the  chance  to  imitate  those  selves,  drawing  upon  them  as  models  for 
desirable behaviour. In this sense, the diary supplied a shortcut that was conducive to 
learning—the experience undergone in the past did not have to be endured over again. 
As  we  shall  see,  Eliot’s  attempts  at  self-sufficiency  were  only  partly  successful 
because she relied on Lewes, as well as her audience, to ultimately determine her 
value. 
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Self-Effacement and the Need for the Other 
The content, emotionally controlled self that Eliot aimed to construct in her diary was 
influenced by the criteria of respectability that Chapter One has presented in that it 
sought to silence emotions of vanity and pride to the point that Eliot became unable to 
evaluate the quality of her own work. Her behaviour can be seen to mimic the ideal 
Puritan that Max Weber described: 
[He]  avoids  ostentation  and  unnecessary  expenditure,  as  well  as  conscious 
enjoyment of his power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social 
recognition which he receives. His manner of life is [often] distinguished by a 
certain ascetic tendency. […] He gets nothing out of his wealth for himself, 
except the irrational sense of having done his job well.
94 
 
In an attempt at self-effacement, Eliot scolded herself when indulging in complaint or 
taking pleasure in her success. Her desire to be humble and altruistic compelled her to 
stress that she was profoundly grateful for her life’s “blessings;” namely, the financial 
security and intellectual stimulation she shared with her beloved mate. As a result of 
the economic culpability  she felt due to her privileged status, Eliot guiltily added 
grateful pendants to most negative remarks:  
Read little this morning—my mind dwindling with much depression on the 
probability or improbability of my achieving the work I wish to do. […] I am 
much afflicted with hopelessness and melancholy just now: and yet I feel the 
value of my blessings.
95 
 
Even when oppressed by depression, Eliot forced herself to keep a positive outlook, 
and  tried  to  prevent  herself  from  slipping  into  the  abyss  of  self-deprecation  and 
ingratitude through her will power. She clearly strove to maintain a balance between 
exhilarating happiness, physical frailty and an obsessive ambition that focused too 
much on the self. Thus, this balance was not just geared towards maintaining health 
but also aimed at sustaining moral faultlessness. 
                                                 
94 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 71.  
95 Harris and Johnston, eds., The Journals of George Eliot, pp. 98-99; 30
th July 1861. My italics.   126 
  Although  Eliot  used  her  diary  as  a  platform  to  learn  from  the  interactions 
between  her  selves,  it  did  not  help  her  develop  a  stronger  sense  of  self-esteem, 
because  she  heavily  depended  on  Lewes  to  break  the  circle  of  constant  self-
examination and dread of failure and to validate her work. Eliot needed Lewes to 
“assemble” herself “out of the other,” to draw on M.M. Bakhtin’s 1919 essay “Art 
and Answerability,” which argues that the self only exists in relation to the other.
96 
Although Eliot strove both for  control over her temporal  reality  and  attempted to 
signify herself through  her diary, these efforts at objectivity were doomed to fail, 
because she could only see herself through others’ responses to her being and her 
work. Bakhtin wrote that in order to gain self-knowledge,  
Something like a transparent screen has to be inserted between my inner self-
sensation (the function of my empty seeing) and my outwardly expressed image: 
the screen of the other’s possible emotional-volitional reaction to my outward 
manifestation—his possible enthusiasm, love, astonishment, or compassion for 
me.
 97 
 
The other is thus necessary for self-realisation because although we can conceptualise 
the world we perceive and develop strategies to survive in it, we cannot form an idea 
of ourselves functioning in our material surroundings. We cannot watch ourselves live; 
only  others  can.  It  seems  that  Eliot  did  not  manage  to  durably  internalise  the 
favourable appreciation of her work by those who admired her, such as Edith Simcox, 
George Henry Lewes and many of her readers. 
Eliot  relied  on  the  support,  opinions  and  knowledge  of  her  “second  self”  to 
comfort her persistent “distrust in myself, in my work, in others’ loving acceptance of 
it.”
 98 Whenever she was unsure of the quality of her work, Lewes was usually able to 
confirm its value, which made her look at it more objectively and more proudly. He 
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functioned as her alter ego, who signified her as a person and as a writer. When Eliot 
was in the process of writing Romola (1863), she noted in her diary that she was 
“extremely  spiritless—dead,  and  hopeless  about  my  writing.”
99  Then  however, 
Lewes’s appreciation of her writing helped her regain her spirits: “After this record, I 
read aloud what I had written of Part IX to George, and he to my surprise entirely 
approved  it.”
100 Similarly  when  working  on  her  drama  Brother  Jacob  (1864),  she 
reported to her diary that:  
During  the  last  week  I  have  been  worse  than  ever—with  continual  bilious 
headache. But yesterday and today I seem to be emerging from this swamp of 
miseries. I have written to the 16
th page of the Third Act. The other day I read to 
George and he approved it highly.
101 
 
We  see  that  Eliot  was  incapable  of  properly  judging  herself  and  needed  Lewes’s 
opinion to evaluate her work. Her first note of the year 1865 likewise demonstrates 
her reliance on Lewes’s appraisal of her experimentations in poetry: “for the first time 
in  my  serious  authorship  I  have  written  verse  and  George  declares  it  to  be 
triumphantly successful.”
102 Here, she neither stated what she thought of her poetic 
creations, nor the subject of her new line of work, but immediately substituted her 
own opinion for Lewes’s, which she deemed superior to her own.  
Eliot even went so far as to credit Lewes with her own virtuous self-control, 
attributing her own will power to him. It seems that Lewes acted as the super-ego who 
restored Eliot’s mental balance and self-esteem: “In each other, we are happier than 
ever: I am more grateful to my dear husband for his perfect love, which helps me in 
all good and checks me in all evil—more conscious that in him I have the greatest of 
blessings.”
103 Again, when she felt “much depressed in the morning, feeling my work 
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worth nothing,” Lewes was able to help: “talking over my fourth act with George, I 
recovered  some  hope.”
104 By  1875  her  reputation  as  a  writer  was  all  the  more 
established  after  having  published  Middlemarch  in  1872,  but  she  nonetheless  felt 
overwhelmed by the writer’s task: “the two first volumes of Daniel Deronda are in 
print and the first Book is to be published on February 1
st,— I have thought very 
poorly of it myself throughout, but George and the Blackwoods are full of satisfaction 
in it.”
105 This constant insecurity may have stemmed from the internalisation of the 
cultural beliefs in the inferiority of female writers, which I have discussed in Chapter 
One. Generally, Eliot can be seen to display both unorthodox and conventional gender 
politics. I agree with Shirley Foster, who has argued that Eliot’s open marriage and 
her acceptance as a woman within the masculine sphere of literary writers proved that 
she was a “rebel.”
106 On the other hand, Foster confirms, Eliot’s success very much 
depended  on  Lewes’s  motivational  support:  “She  was  positively  assisted  by  her 
consort; she would probably never have written fiction at all without Lewes’s initial 
encouragement and consequent dedication to her success, over-protective though it 
may seem.”
107 The diary shows that indeed, Lewes was the driving force that pushed 
Eliot towards progress and counteracted her ubiquitous lack of confidence.  
  In  conclusion,  we  find  that  Eliot  suffered  enormously  from  her  inability  to 
reconcile the numerous responsibilities she heaped upon herself. She expected herself 
to be a social reformer while at the same time effacing her presence. Although she 
needed  to  adhere  to  the  “Religion  of  Humanity”  to  compensate  for  her  loss  of 
religious faith, she did not have the energy or confidence of a resolute Carlyle or 
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Smiles.  The  fact  that  the  medium  through  which  she  hoped  to  bring  about  social 
change  was  crafted  fiction  greatly  added  to  her  difficulties  to live  up to  her  own 
expectations of other-directed behaviour. The creation of literature was a necessarily 
solitary activity that encouraged a focus on the self, which meant that Eliot critically 
examined her own work and was unable to find it of a high enough quality to translate 
her moral idealism. Her guilt of being privileged as well as the awkwardness of being 
successful can thus be seen to have represented an ideological problem for the self-
effacing Eliot, which only Lewes could solve for her. Eliot, like Gissing, struggled 
because she wanted to achieve too much.  
 
Money is Time: Gissing and Work 
George Gissing did not “possess” his life because it was dominated by his financial 
struggle and the consequent excruciating loneliness. Opposed to the worshippers of 
work and self-improvement, such as Smiles and Carlyle, Gissing reversed the maxim 
of “time is money” into “money is time.” Although Gissing himself tended to portray 
work as simply a painful necessity, Paul Delany has convincingly argued that Gissing 
made work his source of personal value; a “project […] to be productive at all costs, 
to live under a daily discipline and have something to show for it.”
108 Despite his 
personal  tendency  to  “subordinate  [his  life]  to  self-discipline,”  the  self-declared 
pessimist  seems  like  a  grumpy  dissenter  in  the  context  of  Victorian  culture’s 
glorification of work.
109 Gissing can indeed be seen as “the Victorians’ antidote to 
Samuel Smiles,” as Philip J. Waller has claimed, because he refused to cherish work 
as a “blessing,” in the fashion of George Eliot.
110 The unending anxiety about money 
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which  dictated  Gissing’s  reality  prevented  him  from  extending  his  personal  work 
ethic to a wider ideological construct. Although all his novels depict characters in 
desperate financial trouble, their struggle for survival represents merely the catalyst of 
the novels’ development and does not express the author’s desire for reform. Gissing 
lacked Eliot’s ideological vigour and took a stance of pessimistic determinism, and 
was,  as  Delany  has  convincingly  argued,  sure  of  his  personal  powerlessness  in 
confrontation with social grievances:  
Gissing’s politics were rooted in his immediate personal situation; he cared little 
for political philosophies beyond what he himself had seen and suffered. He 
firmly  believed  that  for  the  social  question  there  could  only  be  individual 
solutions; and he believed just as firmly that for most people there was not going 
to be any solution.
111 
 
We see that Simon J. James’s claim that “the subject of money preoccupies Gissing 
more than any other novelist in English literature” is true for Gissing’s personal life as 
well. In many ways, Gissing’s work was his life because he wrote novels in order to 
survive  and  to  fulfil  the  criteria  that  his  personal  standards  of  literary  quality 
demanded.
 112 
Gissing’s work ethic proposed that intellectual work of high standards could 
attribute  value  to  the  individual,  but  he  felt  that  ‘work  for  work’s  sake’  was  a 
meaningless  concept  as  the  necessity  to  work  subtracted  time  off  life,  instead  of 
validating it. Neither in his diary, nor in his other autobiographical records did he deal 
with this subject, but his semi-autobiographical character Henry Ryecroft comments 
on  the  irrelevance  of  hard  labour  for  moral  growth,  as  advocated  by  Carlyle  and 
Smiles: “Agriculture is one of the most exhausting forms of toil, and, in itself, by no 
means  conducive  to  spiritual  development;  that  it  played  a  civilizing  part  in  the 
history of the world is  merely due to the fact that, by  creating wealth, it freed  a 
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portion of mankind.”
113 Possibly in response to the culture of self-improvement, or 
Gissing’s shameful imprisonment, Ryecroft adopted a cynically materialistic attitude 
to hard labour, reducing it to a source of commercial profit and denying its spiritual 
nourishment. Gissing himself was as much afraid of a career as a clerk as he was of 
the prospect of ending up in a workhouse, which added enormous pressure to the 
literary process. 
The character Henry Ryecroft, who strongly reminds us of Gissing, tellingly 
comments on the harsh reality of the literary profession and openly derides the maxim 
of “time is money” by calling it “the vulgarest saw known to any age or people.”
114 
According to Ryecroft, who as a young man did not feel in possession of his life, 
“money is time” would be more accurate, because all the time available to him had to 
be invested in work:  
Have  I  not lost many  and many  a day  of my life for lack of the material 
comfort which was necessary to put my mind in tune? Money is time. With 
money I buy for cheerful use the hours which otherwise would not in any 
sense be mine; nay which would make me their bondsman. Money is time, and, 
heaven be thanked, there needs so little of it for this sort of purchase.
115 
 
Ryecroft, like Gissing, finds himself in a circular economy: he must sacrifice all his 
time to work, in order to have the money necessary to afford leisure time, from which 
then to draw the inspiration that is essential to his profession. His life is kept captive 
by the ceaseless pressure for material gain, which is the only means by which he can 
recover  control.  Arlene  Young  has  identified  the  same  dynamic  in  Eve’s  Ransom 
(1895),  in  which  money  purchases  “freedom.”
116 Hilliard  tells  his  friend  Robert 
Narramore: “Here’s four hundred pounds. It shall mean four hundred pounds’-worth 
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of life. While this money lasts, I’ll feel that I’m a human being.”
117 Money is thus 
seen as a humanising factor, allowing the individual not merely to survive, but to live 
in dignity.  
  As  we  shall  see,  for  Gissing,  the  enjoyment  of  life  consisted  of  reading, 
travelling and the contemplation of art. However, all of these depended on financial 
solvency. Annarita Del Nobile is right when she argues that “Gissing wrote in order to 
be able to travel […] and he travelled in order to write.”
118 Gissing’s 1888 trip to Italy 
starts off in Paris, with an excited life-affirming attitude, which stems from financial 
security: “Rose in astonishing health and spirits. The knowledge that I am safe from 
penury for a year has helped me wonderfully” (October 7
th 1888).
119 Indeed, money 
bought him the agency to manage his time at will and enabled him to pursue his 
passions. 
  Money also determined the way he perceived the territories he visited. Museums 
tended to charge entrance fees, which had a detrimental effect on his research and the 
enjoyment of the art on display. When in Naples on November 7
th 1888, he was only 
able to “glance at the Grotto of Sejanus, in passing,” because he “[could] not afford to 
pay every entrance fee.”
120  This financial imperative to choose his destinations with 
respect  to  their  cost  caused  him  great  inconvenience  because  the  ubiquitous  fees 
rendered a total immersion into the artistic patrimony of Italy impossible: “[I] must 
lose much that I should like to see.”
121  Gissing felt that this commodification of art 
discriminated against those whose movements were limited by financial want. On 
December  31
st  in  Florence,  the  museum’s  charges  all  but  ruined  his  experience: 
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“Went  to  the  Uffizi,  the  Pitti,  the  Museo  in  the  Bargello,  and  the  Belle  Arti. 
Something like despair is the result; it is cruel to have my opportunities of study 
curtailed by having to pay a lira each visit.”
122 Gissing was greatly distressed to find 
himself in such close proximity to his “favourites,” but still to be separated from his 
ideal because of financial reasons.
123 
Despite his financial struggles, Gissing maintained extremely high standards 
for both his novels and his short stories, which ultimately determined his self-worth. 
His letter of January 15
th 1899 to Fleury condenses his pride over his serious work 
ethic: “it has never been my habit to write flippantly, idly; I have never written only to 
gain money, to please the foolish. And my reward is that—however poor that I have 
done—I do not feel ignoble.”
124 Gissing deemed the constant re-writing, mental work 
and  self-discipline  that  he  invested  in  his  novels  to  be  superior  to  the  “debased 
hackwork,” which, according to Kevin Swafford, he criticises in Ryecroft.
125 Swafford 
has convincingly argued that for Ryecroft, “the practice of art and authentic writing 
should  be  beyond  the  fray  of  the  market  because  its  subject  is  truth.”
126 Artistic 
veracity elevated remarkable writing from commodified literature and “remove[d] the 
individual  from  the  mass  of  humanity.”
127   In  this  case,  Ryecroft  functioned  as 
Gissing’s  ventriloquist,  voicing  the  latter’s  satisfaction  of  having  maintained  his 
standards for artistic creation. The highest distinction was the respect Gissing had for 
himself; he possessed the dignity of an individual who had prioritised artistic quality 
over financial prosperity.  
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Although Gissing thought himself lucky to be a writer instead of a clerk, he 
refused to romanticise the daily toil that characterised literary production. I agree with 
critic Simon J. James who has argued that: 
In contrast to the valorisation of labour’s redemptive quality by most Victorian 
fiction, for Gissing the debilitating effects of labour, ‘the curse of curses,’ are 
such that it is only undertaken resentfully in order to continue existence, even 
intellectual labour, as New Grub Street shows.
128 
 
New  Grub  Street  (1891)  indeed  paints  a  uniquely  grim  picture  of  the  writer’s 
profession  as  it  disregards  the  rewards  that  literary  art  can  bring.  Although  it  is 
tempting, we cannot read Reardon as a purely autobiographical character, because he 
embodies solely the dissatisfying aspects of literary production. His despair, however, 
is comparable to Gissing’s, when the former “dipped his pen for the hundredth time, 
bent forward in feverish determination to work. Useless; he scarcely knew what he 
wished to put into words, and his brain refused to construct the simplest sentence.”
129 
This clearly recalls Gissing’s own obligation to be creative on command: “With what 
terrific reluctance I sit down to work every afternoon!”
130 Writing is pleasurable if it 
gives expression to narrative currents that have been damming up in the mind, but 
Gissing was under the torturous pressure to squeeze out an average of 3000 words per 
day in order to survive. 
  Like  Henry  Crabb  Robinson,  Gissing  struggled  to  (re)gain  the  status  of 
respectability  after  the  Manchester  episode.  His  financial  success  and  the  critical 
approval he received proved that he had risen above the status of poverty, which filled 
him  with  the  pride  of  having  overcome  material  difficulties  through  his  art.  Liz 
Hedgecock has identified “contradictions or at least incongruities in Gissing’s practice 
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of his profession, and an ambivalence in his ideological position within it.”
131 Despite 
the pressure to produce as abundantly and speedily as possible, Gissing insisted on the 
quality of his literary output, which is why he rejected many of his projects, even at an 
advanced  stage.  Hedgecock  is  indeed  correct  when  she  points  out  that  Gissing 
combined  “both  ‘artist’  and  ‘tradesman’  characteristics  in  labouring  over  his 
novels.”
132 Money, for Gissing, did not suffice to distinguish a respectable author. He 
produced  numerous  short  stories  for  “quick  cash,”  which  is  why,  according  to 
Emanuela Ettorre, they are generally considered to be “the inferior product[s] of an 
otherwise  talented  author.”
133 However,  Gissing  did  not  seem  to  make  a  major 
difference  between  the  types  of  story  he  produced.  On  December  31
st  1894,  he 
congratulated himself on having “earned by literature in 1894 no less a sum than 
£453-12-5.  Bravo!  I  see  that  my  total  expenses  were  £239-6-9.”
134 Gissing  was 
immensely proud of making a profit off his literary work because it meant that he had 
overcome  poverty  and  gained  respectability  without  compromising  his  intellectual 
standards.  
Gissing’s refusal to glorify the work process denoted his support for thinkers 
such as the socialists John Ruskin (1819-1900) and William Morris (1834-1896), who 
were  critical  of  Victorian  culture’s  glorification  of  work,  as  well  as  the  wider 
capitalist system, and insisted that work was only valuable if its content was. In “The 
Nature  of  Gothic,”  Ruskin  condemned  the  mechanical  and  repetitive  tasks  that 
construction workers had to execute as dehumanising. He insisted that unless they 
were posed an intellectual challenge which allowed them to develop their creativity 
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and integrate their own ideas into the architectural product, they were likely to focus 
only on their work’s monetary reward. Unlike Adam Bede, they would “throw away 
their tools” as soon as they could, because “they [had] no pleasure in the work by 
which they [made] their bread, and therefore [looked] at wealth as the only means of 
pleasure.”
135 The “thoughtful part” had to be cultivated, as the slavery  of modern 
human machinery was a waste of human life.
136 William Morris, in his essay “Useful 
Labour versus Useless Toil,” which was published by The Socialist Platform in 1885, 
similarly commented that “there is some labour which is so far from being a blessing 
that it is a curse.”
137 “Repulsive” work would always be a “burden” to the human 
being and it was “manly” to “refuse” work that was mechanical and degraded human 
intelligence.
138  
As his diary shows, Gissing’s work was, more often than not, utterly repulsive 
to him. However, he was resolved to live a strict “life of the mind” and excel at it, as 
Delany has argued, because, with the Manchester episode, he had “shut himself out of 
all  the  other  learned  professions.”
139 The  ideal  that  Gissing  envisaged  resembled 
Eliot’s  life:  academic  study,  frequent  travel  and  domestic  bliss.  His  diary 
demonstrates a constant bitterness which was caused by the stark contrast between the 
life Gissing felt he deserved and the one he was forced to lead.  
 
Working for the Ideal: Gissing’s Diary 
As we have seen, the necessity, as well as the ability to work determined Gissing’s 
fitness and value as a writer. Any disruption of his work routine both led him to 
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question his intellectual superiority to a clerk, and posed a practical threat to his own 
existence and his family’s. Gissing’s high standards dictated that he had to produce 
remarkable  literature  with  the  promptitude  of  a  machine,  which  complicated  the 
creative  process  by  introducing  the  binaries  of  success  and  failure  as  well  as 
aspiration and satisfaction. Unlike Eliot, Gissing tended to blame external factors as 
the cause of his perceived failure, rather than himself, as his metaphorical appraisal of 
creativity,  stress-related  illness  and  the  suffering  induced  by  perpetual  loneliness 
show. Gissing’s pessimism may have originated in his lack of freedom of movement. 
All his autobiographical writings show that Gissing longed for remote geographical 
places, especially Italy and Greece, and bygone centuries in which art flourished. He 
always underwent a change of mood when he managed to “escape” from “the wrong 
world” that was England into the “ideal world” in Italy, to use Del Nobile’s terms, 
and drew consolation from studying the classics and from decorating his domestic 
environment with portraits of his literary heroes.
 140 
Gissing’s  life  was  dominated  by  an  escapist  movement  towards  his  ideal. 
When he was travelling, the despair that distinguishes his diary was greatly alleviated 
and  he  reported  exhilarating  happiness.  Like  his  character  Reardon  in  New  Grub 
Street (1891), Gissing “loved the old writers with all his heart; they had been such a 
source of strength to him in days of misery.”
141 Literature and art provided spiritual 
nourishment to Gissing and he thought of their creators as his intellectual company. 
As Delany has observed, travelling dramatically changed the dynamic of Gissing’s 
life, because it “became one of receiving impressions, rather than actively pursuing 
any  of  his  desires.”
142 Indeed,  Gissing’s  professional  life  was  characterised  by 
observing society, adapting scenes for his novels and producing work that met his 
                                                 
140 Del Nobile, “Travel and Writing,” p. 20.  
141 Gissing, New Grub Street, p. 66.  
142 Delany, George Gissing: A Life, p. 150.    138 
standards; all of which involved active extraverted crafting. The “ideal world” that 
Gissing encountered on his journeys was there for him to internalise and possess. I 
shall first examine the portrayal of work and its obstacles in Gissing’s diary. I will 
then discuss the function of the ideal in Gissing’s mental life. 
 
Work and Hardship 
Gissing’s diary primarily presents work as the struggle to overcome the challenges of 
poverty and creative impotence and it constituted both the source of and the vent for 
intense  frustration  and  despair.  Gissing  suffered  intensely  under  the  pressure  to 
produce work of lasting quality under the constraints of time that his poverty imposed 
upon him. The combination of these factors can be seen to have caused Gissing’s 
writer’s block, which he perceived as a bodily dysfunction. He also tended to blame 
his loneliness and domestic troubles with Edith for his inability to work. Ultimately, 
however, his work did supply pride and self-affirmation.  
Although Roger Milbrandt has noted that only during the first years in London, 
Gissing was “starving,” effectively, his life was distinguished by recurring periods of 
extreme want, as in this entry of March 14
th 1890: “do not really have enough to eat, 
but  no  help  for  it.”
143  Hunger  was  a  highly  disconcerting  factor,  which,  in 
combination with publishers’ demands could be held accountable for “the familiar 
block of thought and fancy,” of which Gissing complained repeatedly; April 6
th 1890 
being one of many entries.
144  
The literary success of a completed novel was immediately undone by the 
necessity to produce more. Although within three weeks of the publication of The 
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Nether World on April 3
rd 1889, Gissing had worked on several short stories and 
written poetry, this did not suffice, as can be seen in his entry of April 5
th 1889: “Of 
course no work. By heaven, I must set to, to-morrow!”
145 Such periods devoid of 
literary yield seemed to coincide with a state of general inoperativeness in the author. 
He  reported  that  April  28
th  1889  was:  “a  very  unsatisfactory  day.  Nothing  done, 
nothing really read. […] These long breaks in my writing suit me very ill. […] Dull 
day until evening; heaviness upon me. Never am I well when I break off my work.”
146 
Work and a habitual work routine are here portrayed as the source of health; the 
absence of which resulted in an aggravation of the depressive episode.  
Although Gissing produced a surprising amount of work, a large part of it 
remained unfinished because it did not meet his standards, as his entry of April 7th 
1889 shows: “I shall have to abandon all I have written, and begin a new story. Am 
dissatisfied with the subject I have undertaken. And had finished 31 pp.! Always the 
same, each new book.—A vile day. Did nothing but rack my brains.”
147 The process 
of creating literature was thus characterised by a constant movement of conception 
and  termination.  Gissing’s  aspirations  to  excellence,  which  did  not  allow  him  to 
publish  work  he  thought  inadequate,  significantly  increased  his  frustration.  As  a 
consequence, Gissing at times felt “stupid,” when composition proved to be difficult, 
as the entry for June 24
th 1889 shows: “Have no confidence in this novel of mine, but 
must finish it, because I am all but penniless.”
148 Again, Gissing found himself in the 
“money is time”-circle where he had to invest the time he really needed to recover 
and gather his creative energies into new work that might buy him time.  
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Gissing tended to relate his professional success or lack thereof directly to his 
personal life. Only a week before meeting Edith Underwood, on September 16
th 1890, 
Gissing prophesised gloomily: “I know I shall never do any more good work until I 
am married!”
149 The hasty marriage to Edith was the result (and the cause) of years of 
unhappiness and loneliness, which led Gissing to ignore the signs that Edith might not 
be a suitable partner in the first place. Pierre Coustillas has claimed that “a certain 
masochism” and a desire to avoid “sexual frustration” were at the root of Gissing’s 
decision, but he also viewed Edith as a project, as Paul Delany has argued.
150 The 
union ended in disaster, as Edith, eager to get attention from hard-working Gissing, 
fought with her husband constantly.  
The  episodes  of  debilitating  loneliness  that  motivated  this  romantic  choice 
always coincided with professional unproductiveness. In a letter to Gabrielle Fleury of 
September 11
th 1898, looking back on his life, he explicitly stated that “I was made 
solitary by hard circumstances and the necessity of ceaseless work.”
151 With poverty 
forcing him to work constantly, he had neither the time nor the means to associate 
with  the  people  he  felt  were  worthy  of  him,  and  this  was  partly  because  Edith 
belonged to the “low-class Londoners,” whom Gissing despised.
152 By marrying Edith, 
Gissing increased rather than cured his loneliness, as his entry of April 21
st 1891, 
composed two months after his marriage, shows: “Wrote to Mrs. Harrison, telling her 
of my marriage, and that henceforth  I  am shut off from  educated people.”
153 The 
discontent triggered by Edith’s intellectual inequality, as well as her temper tantrums, 
frequently made work impossible. The “wrangling and uproar down in the kitchen,” 
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which Gissing described on October 4
th 1892, obliged him to separate the spheres of 
home and work: “Things going so badly in the house that I had to go and engage a 
sitting-room, at 7 Eaton Place, Heavitree Road, to use daily as a study.”
154 In order to 
concentrate, Gissing had to invest money in renting an office to buy his own time, 
repeating the circular economic of “money is time.” 
Gissing believed that the years of “ceaseless quarrel and wretchedness” with 
Edith permanently transformed his health.
155 In 1899, in a letter to Gabrielle Fleury of 
February  25th,  Gissing  displayed  extreme  relief  when  he  discovered  that  he  had 
rightly  blamed  his  health  troubles,  which  had  continuously  interfered  with  his 
productivity throughout his life, on his emotional despair: “I am so glad you have 
learned that emphysema can be produced by mental suffering. One reason why I think 
of my past life so bitterly, is because I know that my health was destroyed by the 
moral  torments  I  underwent.”
156  This  can  perhaps  be  seen  as  the  reason  and 
consequence for the environmental determinism that Gissing displays in his novels, 
which,  according  to  Stephen  D.  Arata,  “repeatedly  show  how,  over  time,  social 
injustice becomes immutable physical fact.”
157 More specifically, Ian J. Deary has 
argued,  Gissing’s  perpetual  financial  insecurity  and  the  pressure  to  use  his  time 
beneficently can account for the “somatopsychic distress,” which is Deary’s term for 
the  “self-limiting  factors,”  such  as  the  “bouts  of  anxiety”  and  “minor  [medical] 
ailments,” that Gissing frequently identified as the obstacles to literary emanation.
158 
For instance, Deary counts forty-one diary entries in which Gissing complained of 
                                                 
154 Ibid., p. 292; December 15
th 1892.  
155 Ibid., p. 432.  
156 Coustillas, ed., The Letters of George Gissing to Gabrielle Fleury, p. 109. 
157 Stephen D.  Arata,  “Realism, Sympathy and Gissing’s Fictions,” VIJ, vol. 23 (1995), pp. 27-49 
(p. 36).  
158 Ian J. Deary, “Somatospychic Distress in the Life and Novels of George Gissing,” Gissing Journal, 
vol. 35, no. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 1-17 (pp. 2, 3).    142 
headache, which is abnormally high in comparison to the “lifetime prevalence in the 
general population” of twenty-five.
159  
Gissing  metaphorised  his  powerlessness  to  be  creative  on  demand  by 
conceiving of contaminants located within his body that impeded coherent thoughts 
from forming. After his return from Italy and Greece in 1889, for instance, Gissing 
felt that his creativity was blocked. Despite his rigid work routine, he was unable to 
counteract  the  perceived  limitations  to  his  expressiveness.  He  wrote  on  July  24
th: 
“Worked 9 to 1 and 4.30 to 8.30, doing 4 pp. Had to rewrite last ½ p. of yesterday. 
Working with that miserable sense of clog on the brain which comes now and then; 
seems to be a physical obstruction to thought,—and no doubt is.”
160 Like Carlyle, 
Gissing viewed creativity as an illumination that could not wilfully be retained or 
regained even by the most zealous effort. The “clog” in the brain extinguished the 
inspirational spark, as it were, depriving Gissing of all control. Gissing reported a 
“slight relief” at “about 12 o’clock,” when he was surprised by “a sudden flow of 
composition for a few lines,” which then “[stopped] again.”
161 This “flow” of ideas 
represented  the  creative  energy  that  managed  to  circumvent  the  barricade  of  the 
“clog.”  
When  confronted  with  the  immense  undertaking  of  creating  a  new  literary 
work, Gissing did not blame the enormity of the task at hand for his lack of ideas, but 
rather held his neurological constitution responsible, as this entry of August 23
rd 1890 
shows: “made a beginning of a new novel […]. Wrote 3 pp., but in the evening saw 
that they are no good.—Am on the verge of despair and suffering more than ever in 
my whole life. My brain seems powerless, dried up.”
162 He thus portrayed creativity 
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as an essence the individual could produce by sheer effort of will, which means that 
he considered his brain as too feeble to exert itself sufficiently to generate creative 
output; it had used up its resources and there were none left to draw from. In New 
Grub Street, Reardon, who can be seen to reflect the unpleasant aspects of being a 
writer, reports a similar grievance: “I am at the mercy of my brain; it is dry and 
powerless. How I envy those clerks who go by to their offices in the morning!”
163 The 
unpredictability of the creative spark and the lack of control the writer possessed over 
the “trivial accidents” that might impede him from working, made writing for money 
an “insane thing.”
164 Both for Gissing and Reardon, it was impossible to be inventive 
on command, yet they both depended on forced creativity to make a living.              
However, work was not merely the tedious and worrisome activity of “fiction-
grinding”—it  also  determined  Gissing’s  prominence  as  an  intellectual  and  thus 
confirmed his status as an artist.
165 The comparatively few entries in which Gissing 
rejoiced over his intellectual and financial achievements appear in the later stages of 
his career. The Commonplace Book presents an aphorism on the dynamic between 
self-doubt and pride that characterises writing: “The pains of lit. composition. How 
easy  any  other  task  is  in  comparison.  Forcing  of  mind  in  a  certain  current,  the 
temptation of indolence with a book. Yet, the reward, when effort once made.”
166 
Gissing recorded several instances of praise in his diary that filled him with pride as 
others’ approval established him as a great writer. The entry of August 21
st 1893 
contains the most flattering praise that Gissing could have wished for: “letter […] of 
acknowledgment  from  P.  Bergson  who  says  that  he  takes  my  books  with  him 
everywhere,  and  that  they  continue  the  qualities  of  Shakespeare,  Marlowe  and 
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Euripides!”
167 Gissing’s aspiration to be equal to his literary heroes was affirmed by 
his direct association with their genius. He finally belonged amongst those he admired 
the most.   
 
Ideal and Escapism 
Ultimately, and in this I agree with Delany, the main source of Gissing’s perpetual 
discontent was his conviction that his miserable situation was undeserved, which was 
particularly accentuated when he taught his upper-middle-class students: “[Gissing’s] 
sense of poverty came from his relative position and what he considered due to a man 
of his education and talents.”
168 Gissing tended to escape from the frustrations of his 
reality by studying the classics and imagining himself among the great thinkers of the 
past. He underwent a healing change of identity whenever he delved into a world 
saturated  with  artistic  and  historical  monuments  and  was  able  to  leave  his  life  in 
England, which was dominated by work and financial pressure, behind. The diary 
displays  a  marked  change  in  mood,  attitude  and  openness  to  the  world  during 
Gissing’s travels.  
  Gissing’s diary conveys the sense of personal limitedness that he experienced 
in  England,  whereas  he  was  able  to  adopt  his  ‘real’  or  ‘ideal’  self  abroad.  Upon 
commencing his 1888 trip to Italy, on October 19
th, for instance, Gissing told his diary 
that he had switched identity and had laid off the role of the novelist who struggled to 
make a living: “on crossing the Channel, I have become a poet pure and simple, or 
perhaps it would be better to say an idealist student of art.”
169 Travelling was an act of 
self-assertion as time abroad could be used at leisure and Gissing went “abroad for 
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[his own] pleasure and profit.”
170 His letter to Edward Bertz (1887-1903) of 1890 
clearly shows the necessity to leave England and enter the geographical place that 
could host his ‘true’ self: “I work only in the hope of getting away very soon […] I 
am  in  the  wrong  world  […]  I  am  so  much  more  myself  when  abroad.”
171 In  the 
proximity to great art and architecture, Gissing felt at ease and inspired—the person 
he  could  have  been  if  he  had  not  been  constantly  preoccupied  with  professional 
matters. His entry of December 14
th 1888 proves that once the load of work was lifted, 
Gissing’s depression faded as well. 
Woke  early  this  morning  and  enjoyed  a  wonderful  happiness  of  mind.  It 
occurs to me—is not this partly due to the fact that I spend my days solely in 
consideration of beautiful things, wholly undisturbed by base necessities and 
considerations? In any case this experience is just remarkable.
172  
 
Gissing was finally able to break the exhausting cycle that perpetuated his depression, 
which David Grylls has identified as a product of the former’s simultaneous belief in 
determinism and determination: “he toiled on to counteract his dark depression, but 
excessive toil only made him more depressed.”
173 In the absence of the pressure to 
fight demotivation by increased will power, Gissing could invest all his energies into 
the  contemplation  of  art,  such  as  his  “favourites”  at  the  Capitoline  Museum,  or 
“[lounging] with delight in my favourite Sala Rotonda.”
174 
  Gissing’s  inner  world  changed  drastically  with  the  variation  of  scenery. 
Confronted with amazing artefacts, he was able to retrieve the passionate interest in 
art he had had as a child, when the future was not yet threatening. Whereas in England, 
he recurrently reported “frequent waking in the night with fears of the future,” in Italy, 
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his sleep was untroubled and he was able to connect with a truly inspired former 
self:
175 “I have had moments of strange peace lately. If I awake in the night, I lie 
thinking of only the pleasantest things, and experience a strange revival of the feelings 
of my boyhood—the peculiar love of art, etc.”
176 Incidentally, Gissing was able to 
reconnect to the enthusiasm for art that his father had instilled in him. When he went 
to the Loggia in Rome, the “Bible pictures” he saw filled him “with keenest joy,” 
because “they [brought] back the earliest longings of the days when I copied several 
of them from outline engravings that father possessed.”
177 In Italy, Gissing was able 
to contemplate the originals of works of art that had been in his consciousness since 
his childhood. So far, they had existed purely in the realm of the mind and the actual 
encounter provided deep reassurance.  
  The locations that Gissing visited during his travels to Italy and Greece had 
been  sanctified  by  their  occurrence  in  the  study  of  the  classics  and  had  come  to 
embody  the  associations  with  the  extraordinary  art  they  accommodated  or  the 
unforgettable historic events that happened within their confines. Gissing was thrilled 
to visit such sacred spots. In the Vatican, on December 10
th 1888, Gissing was awed 
by the tremendous significance of the place: “impossible to look at anything […] with 
the  excitement  of  being  on  such  ground.”
178 The  aura  of  the  Vatican  suffused 
Gissing’s entire being, overwhelming him with feeling, which made objective study 
impossible.  Similarly,  when  in  Athens,  a  place  which  his  studies  had  rendered 
familiar to him, he was filled with profound respect when he actually experienced its 
monuments: “went onto the Acropolis. So in truth I have trodden this sacred soil!”
179 
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The mental images of these spots that Gissing had been forming for years were now 
exchanged for tangible reality.  
  For  Gissing,  these  places  possessed  a  deeply  subjective  meaning  as  they 
embodied the literature in which they figured, which had offered Gissing emotional 
refuge in times of acute despair, as is apparent in his letter to Fleury of August 26
th 
1898: “but for Greek and Latin poets, I should perhaps have been brutalized in the 
long years of poverty. How many a time I have read Homer when I was living in a 
wretched garret, and had scarcely enough to eat!”
180 Classical literature seemed like 
the guarantor of civilisation, reminding Gissing that the human being was capable of 
creating sublime art, which constituted a source of pleasurable distraction for him.  
The physical proximity to the greatness of Rome and Athens, among other 
cities, enabled Gissing to realise his ideal. The complementation of mental images 
with  physical  reality  bequeathed  Gissing  with  a  deep  satisfaction  and  a  sense  of 
arrival. The Commonplace Book presents an entry in which Gissing described the 
perfection experienced in Rome as the high point of his life: 
Perhaps the supreme moment of my life was that when I woke one night in 
Rome, & lay with a sense of profound & peaceful possession of what for so 
many years I had desired. Before going to bed I had read Horace. Never have I 
been so free of temporal cares (in soul, that is to say) & so clearly face to face 
with the ideal of intellectual life.
181 
 
This  entry  exemplifies  the  deep  fulfilment  Gissing  drew  from  the  unification  of 
imagination  and  reality,  which  enabled  him  to  finally  “possess”  his  experience. 
Reading a classical Roman author in the very city in which he wrote gave Gissing a 
sense of presence, and he “possessed” the reassurance that this place was not a mere 
fabrication but that ancient Rome lived on through its literature and its monuments. 
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Gissing’s ideal had become real and he accomplished the appropriation of the lived 
moment by writing down his experience.  
  When  exploring  Rome  and  Athens,  Gissing  tended  to  identify  with  the 
imagined consciousness of the historical figures that inhabited these structures. He 
stepped out of his self and attempted to see the place with the eyes of personalities 
long dead. When on December 17
th, he contemplates Rome from a distant hill, he 
combines his knowledge of history and the sights in front of him to form a hypothesis 
of past conditions: “what a delightful view of the city there must have been from 
Tusculum,  which  was  up  by  Frascati!”
182 Gissing  tries  to  mentally  inhabit  a  past 
moment  by  adopting  the  perspective  of  now  fictionalised  humans.  In  Athens,  on 
November  24
th  1889,  Gissing  feels  connected  to  Socrates  because  of  the  shared 
location; the banks of the river Ilissus. He tries to imagine the conditions of 400 B.C., 
assuming Socrates’s viewpoint: “When Socrates sat on this spot, under the plane-tree, 
and discoursed the ‘Phoedrus,’ the conditions must have been very different. It was 
then, of course, outside the city.”
183 Again, his academic knowledge and the present 
place serve as a basis to imagine the past and Socrates’s reality.  
This  section  has  exemplified  the  striking  contrast  between  Gissing’s  and 
Eliot’s ideas of community. Eliot wrote in search of a response, but Gissing, at least 
until he met Fleury, orbited indefinitely in a life of the mind. As Graver has shown, by 
the time The Mill on the Floss (1860) was published, “[Eliot’s] audience had become 
extraordinarily  responsive  to  her  compassionate  realism.  It  seemed  that  she  was 
indeed having the effect she hoped to have.”
184 Both imagine an other, but whereas 
Eliot sought to extend her own “blessings” to the community, Gissing struggled to 
possess his own life. In his attempts to escape the pressures of writing for money, he 
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delved even deeper into the realm of the mind, which can perhaps account for an 
increased need for the diary as a signifying other to validate experience. 
 
Pessimism versus Optimism: Gissing and Eliot 
Despite  the  abundance  of  critical  readings  that  analyse  the  depiction  of  Gissing’s 
political stance in his novels, such as Workers in the Dawn (1880) and The Nether 
World (1889), Gissing’s writing was not motivated by the spirit of reform. In order to 
explain the ontological differences between Eliot’s and Gissing’s social consciousness, 
which  resulted  in  fiction  of  a  very  distinct  realism,  I  shall  recall  Eliot’s  personal 
motivations for turning to positivism and contrast them to Gissing’s refusal to believe 
in  the  individual’s  responsibility  towards  the  community.  Whereas  Eliot’s  self-
effacement  was  intended  to  increase  her  openness  to  others,  Gissing’s  pessimism 
demanded the paradoxical union between egotism and self-effacement.  
As  I  have  mentioned,  Eliot  envisaged  a  fundamentally  ascetic  self,  who 
believed in the “interconnectedness” of all human beings and felt morally obliged to 
work towards the improvement of society “in [her] day-to-day relationships,” as Tim 
Dolin  has  stressed  in  his  recent  biography.
185 Obliged  to  obey  her  “economic  of 
compensation,” Eliot minimised her self in order to empower her reader, which is 
evident in her compulsive desire to express her gratitude for her “blessings.”
186 Her 
altruistic utopia forbade her to indulge in pleasure as well as pain without redeeming 
artistic production. She was thus unwilling to accept physical and mental illness and 
forced herself to actively rebel against such weakness, with a vehemence that recalls 
Bain and Eastlake, as can be seen in the following entry of November 28
th 1860:  
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I am getting better now by the help of tonics, and I should be better still if I 
could  gather  more  bravery,  resignation  and  simplicity  of  striving.  In  the 
meantime my cup is full of blessings: my home is bright and warm with love 
and tenderness, and in more material vulgar matters we are very fortunate. I 
have invested £2000 in West Indies Stock.
187  
 
Eliot urges herself to convalesce by exerting optimistic self-control. Although Eliot 
ultimately  feels  unable  to  gather  the  mental  strength  to  improve  her  health,  it  is 
evident that she expects herself to do so. After complaining about her health and 
admitting this flaw in her willpower, Eliot feels obliged to restore her positive outlook 
by assuring herself of her gratitude over the affection and affluence in her life.  
Optimism, for Eliot, was a quality of character she had to actively cultivate by 
consciously  diverting  her  attention  towards  those  factors  of  her  life  that  gave  her 
satisfaction and blocking out those that could give rise to complaint, as this entry of 
December 30
th 1868 demonstrates: “I enjoy a more and more even cheerfulness, and 
continually encreasing [sic] power of dwelling  on the good that is given me, and 
dismissing the thought of small evils.”
188 She invariably relativised her own condition 
in relation to that of the under-privileged other when she reassured herself that she 
had not lost sight of her unique beatitude. In the reverse situation, she diminished her 
own happiness through expressing regret that her advantages were not universal, as 
can be seen in this entry of December 30
th 1870:  “Here is the last day of 1870. […] In 
my private lot I am unspeakably happy, loving and beloved. But I am doing little for 
others.”
189 As  George  Levine  has  observed,  Comte’s  philosophy  had  obviously 
shaped Eliot’s self-image, so that to her “every act, no matter how trivial, has a vast 
number of consequences, not all of them traceable [and she] felt that it [behoved] 
every human being to exercise the greatest care in his actions to avoid causing misery 
                                                 
187 Harris and Johnston, eds., The Journals of George Eliot, p. 87.  
188 Ibid., p. 133.  
189 Ibid., p. 142.    151 
to others.”
190 The individual thus had to exert strict self-control, as Chapter One has 
shown, in order to guarantee the sanctity of the common good. Levine confirms my 
point that “the mark of strong will, according to George Eliot, is the ability to avoid 
being influenced by merely selfish causes.”
191 Self-effacement and unbending other-
directedness were thus the necessary attitudes of the respectable individual. Eliot’s 
diary shows that her social aspirations had a direct impact on her personal life, which 
caused  her  “struggle  between  the  legitimate  claims  of  individualism  and  the 
imperative need for a ‘coherent social faith and order,’” which Dolin has accurately 
identified as the core of her fiction.
192 Gissing experienced no such moral struggle as 
he both lived and wrote for his personal benefit. He drew the material for his novels 
from his own experience, which returned to him in a circular economy as monetary 
value. As we have seen, the money he made from his literary production allowed him 
to  cultivate  his  self  through  travel  and  the  purchase  of  books.  Openly  egotistical, 
Gissing evidently abstained from supporting any political causes. 
After a brief flirtation with positivism, Gissing disapproved of its organised 
idealism and concluded that only disinterested sincerity, divorced from religious or 
ideological codes, could achieve true sympathy—an endeavour which strictly other-
directed  behaviour  was  incapable  of  achieving.  The  deterministic  message  of  his 
novels and his ambitions to be an acclaimed author—“I can’t endure to be nobody”—
demonstrate  an  egotistical  desire  for  personal  gratification  that  he  maintained 
throughout his life.
193 He retained the conviction that life in itself was meaningless 
and that the individual’s responsibility did not extend beyond the assurance of his or 
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her own survival, which in itself was not desirable—Gissing’s pessimism went as far 
as to question the legitimacy of human reproduction.  
Although Gissing’s oft-quoted essay “The Hope of Pessimism” (1882) was 
certainly  the  product  of  an  extremely  defiant  mood  and  can  by  no  means  be 
considered a manifesto of Gissing’s outlook on life, his personal despair led him to 
devalue human life consistently. He shared with Schopenhauer, as well as some of his 
literary heroes, the conviction that life was a sequence of unnecessary pain, toil and 
disappointment. Life began in misery and ended with the sorrow of others: “we enter 
the gates of life with wailing, and anguish to the womb which brings us forth; we pass 
again into the outer darkness through the valley of ghastly terrors, and leave cold 
misery  upon  the  lips  of  those  that  mourn  us.”
194 Reproduction  was  selfish  and 
unnecessary, because it could only lead to work, worry and mourning.  
 “The Hope of Pessimism” can be seen as an extreme expression of Gissing’s 
life-long, relentlessly deterministic doubt that led him to question the individual’s 
ability to rise socially.  The essay’s advocacy  of the complete “suppression of the 
Will”  denotes  the  influence  of  Arthur  Schopenhauer’s  (1788-1860)  philosophy  on 
Gissing’s ontological outlook.
195 Indeed, Gissing’s essay resembles Schopenhauer’s 
chapter “On the Vanity and Suffering of Life” (1819) to an astonishing degree.
196 
Pierre Coustillas has advised caution as to Schopenhauer’s influence on Gissing, and 
has warned that “these ideas were not common knowledge at the time” because the 
first English translation of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung did not appear until 
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1883.
197 Gissing did know German, so the possibility of influence cannot be ruled out. 
To me, the two essays present commonalities that seem too striking to be parallel 
developments.  
In  these  texts,  Schopenhauer  and  Gissing  contemptuously  reject  both 
positivism and religion and condemn the validation of life by the fear of death that 
characterises  these  creeds  as  the  foundation  for  “envy,  hatred,  malice  and  all 
uncharitableness.”
198 Gissing criticised the adepts of both Christianity and positivism, 
who  stressed  the  blessedness  of  humanity  and  encouraged  altruism,  for  their 
willingness to deceive and be deceived. Their optimistic determination to cherish life 
necessarily included the intense fear of death, which was seen as “the one dread foe,” 
who  “puts  an  end  to  our  joyful  labours.”
199  Gissing  strongly  agreed  with 
Schopenhauer’s view that optimism assumed the human being at the centre of the 
universe because it “[presented] life to us as a desirable condition and the happiness 
of man as the end of it.”
200 The reality, however, was bleak and had but desolation in 
store: “work, deprivation, misery and suffering,” which could only be alleviated by 
death.
201  
In this essay, Gissing mocked the naïveté of the positivist who attempted, as 
Eliot did, to signify an essentially empty universe and refused to recognise the futility 
of their endeavour. He derided the Religion of Humanity as a “creed” in which, 
the  unconscious  optimism  of  the  average  man  [was]  embraced  as  a 
philosophical sufficiency, the scientific doctrine of evolution [was] made to 
yield a principle of beatitude, and the very agonies of existence [were] turned 
to the service of an all-hoping, all-enduring faith.
202 
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Disregarding the “eternal truth that the world is synonymous with evil,” positivism, in 
its insistence on the brevity of life and the necessity to maximise altruistic work, was 
seen to “strengthen the natural forces of egotism.”
203 Precisely by basing the value of 
life in mortality, the optimistic doctrines of positivism and Protestantism imbued the 
individual “with [the] desperate determination to win what he [deemed] his just share 
in the enjoyments of life.”
204 The constant awareness that time was running out and 
that  every  moment  was  unique  in  its  irreversibility  was  the  source  of  malevolent 
selfishness, inevitably resulting in the opposite of Eliot’s aspirations. Altruism, for 
Gissing,  was  opposed  to  progress,  because  it  deprived  the  individual  of  personal 
agency. He ridiculed the positivistic “renunciative instinct,” which maintained that “it 
is more blessed to give than to receive” and attacked its “joys of self-forgetfulness” 
and  its  “worship  of  Humanity.”
205 Disparaging  these  “beautiful  ideas,”  Gissing 
commended  “the  competitive  system,”  for  its  absolute  sincerity  and  realistic 
practicality, deeming it “the grandest outcome of civilisation,” which put him at odds 
with Ruskin and Morris.
206  
In the absence of the mollycoddling inherent in the Religion of Humanity, the 
pessimist was solely responsible for his or her own life. He or she was “robust and 
self-reliant,”  and  “[expected]  no  mercy  in  the  battle,  and  accordingly  [gave]  no 
quarter.”
207  The  pessimist’s  acceptance  of  life  as  a  miserable  journey  and  the 
unashamed  self-centeredness  with  which  he  or  she  endured  life  until  death  came, 
constituted “the final triumph of mind, the highest reach of human morality, the only 
hope for the destruction of egotism.”
208 Optimistic selfishness, which was the product 
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of the desire to take full advantage of the human being’s allotted time, was contrasted 
with the pessimistic refusal to attribute value to life. Because the pessimist expected 
and wanted nothing from life, he or she was personally detached from the will to live 
through the anticipation of death.   
Pessimism was not only a theoretical idea that Gissing developed in his youth, 
but his passionate outcry against the will to live, which was summed up in his cruel 
conviction that: “our existence is something which should not be; the vehement desire 
of its continuance is sin,” durably determined his reluctant attitude to reproduction.
 209  
Gissing’s relationship to children was heavily influenced by his worry that their lives 
might be long and unhappy. In his Commonplace Book, he describes an (undated) 
instance in which he witnesses a playing puppy and “laughed with delight.”
210 He 
then ponders that “most people, I believe, derive the same pleasure from watching a 
child.”
211 Gissing  cannot  find  the  sight  of  a  baby  endearing  as  he  “cannot  take 
pleasure in its oddities & prettinesses because [he is] oppressed by the thought of 
anxiety it is costing in the present, & of the miseries that inevitably lies before it.”
212 
For Gissing, life is deplorable and the world “evil” and hence he sees no purpose in 
creating another human being.  
This  pessimistic  reluctance  to  embrace  life  became  obvious  when  his  son 
Walter was born. In his diary, he reports the birth in a very detached and matter-of-
factly manner as the entry of December 10
th 1891 demonstrates: “5.15. Went to the 
study door and heard the cry of the child. Nurse, speedily coming down, tells me it is 
a boy. Wind howling savagely. So, the poor girl’s misery is over, and she has what 
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she  so  earnestly  desired.”
213 Gissing,  unlike  most  Victorian  fathers,  according  to 
historian  K.  Theodore  Hoppen,  does  not  assist  the  birthing  process.
214 Occupying 
himself downstairs, Gissing puts himself deliberately at a distance and learns of the 
birth through the “study door” and through the excited nurse’s alert. The desire to 
have a child seems to have come from Edith, which, in combination with Gissing’s 
pessimism, explains his joyless entry, as well as his reluctance to associate with the 
child which lasted for several months.
215  
Yet,  Gissing’s  cynicism  did  allow  for  human  sympathy  and  mutual  care. 
However, unlike Eliot’s overbearing concern for others’ happiness, which forced her 
to sacrifice and belittle her own interests, Gissing believed that human companionship 
was possible because the despair over the human condition, devoid of an afterlife, 
affected  all  human  beings  equally.  If  humans  delved  into  the  “immense  self-pity 
[which] took possession of the imprisoned soul,” when contemplating their dreadful 
fate, then they could connect to their fellow humans who shared the same lot.
216 For 
Gissing,  self-pity  was  not  selfish,  as  Bain  and  Eastlake  claimed,  but  this  earnest 
capacity to feel sorry for oneself was the source of human kindness: “the compassion 
which each man first feels for himself, let him extend to his fellow-sufferers.”
217 In 
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order  to  care  about  others  and  establish  meaningful  connections  to  them,  Gissing 
believed, the individual had to tap into his or her emotions instead of silencing them.  
In  what  might  be  seen  as  a  response  to  the  gradual  secularisation  of 
nineteenth-century culture, Eliot combined the remnants of her religious heritage with 
her positivistic frame of mind, which inspired her with the duty to create literature 
that could accomplish social change. Gissing, on the other hand, resisted his culture’s 
push towards self-improvement and altruism and believed that material circumstances 
shaped  the  individual,  which  fiction  alone  was  powerless  to  alter.  Despite  this 
fundamental difference in outlook, for both writers, success and discipline in work 
were the principal factors that determined their sense of self-worth and defined the 
“value of the individual.” The differences in the perception of duty were informed by 
social status, which had a direct impact on the meaning that work had for both. Eliot 
felt the guilt of the privileged and used her work to redeem herself by giving to the 
other, whereas for Gissing literary success depended on his being given approval and 
subsistence. To both, however, the self and its allotted time became a project whose 
standards of quality and productivity were incredibly high.  
In conclusion I would like to emphasise that, both for Eliot and Gissing, the 
pressure caused by the unending, self-imposed, duty to work restricted the ripening of 
creative thought. Work became its own obstacle. The following chapter will show that 
for John Ruskin, the duty to observe his visual environment and to translate it for his 
readers  constituted  a  similar  source  of  frustration  and  guilt.  Gissing  had  to  be 
imaginative on command and likewise Ruskin expected himself to emotionally react 
to the visual splendour he encountered during his explorations of nature and art. When 
he was unable to feel amazed awe at the beauty that presented itself to him, he blamed 
himself  for  wasting  precious  time  and  experience.  Like  Eliot,  he  felt  culpable  of   158 
neglecting  his  readers,  who,  in  his  eyes,  depended  on  his  guidance  in  the  proper 
appreciation of art. Not only did Ruskin torture himself in order to produce critical 
observations with unfailing regularity like Gissing; but moreover he required himself 
to invest genuine emotion into his critical labour. Ruskin’s diary demonstrates that he 
worked  compulsively  in  order  use  the  time  available  to  him  as  productively  as 
possible and to educate his reader. We see that Lady Eastlake (Chapter One) erred 
when she accused him of making his life a self-obsessed refuge into art because in 
fact,  Ruskin  was  consistently  other-oriented  and  felt  a  very  strong  responsibility 
towards the moral health of his audience. Gerard Manley Hopkins, as we shall in 
Chapter Four, completely abnegated his private life and intended to devote his entire 
existence  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  divine  duties  when  he  joined  the  Jesuit  order. 
Despite his willingness to obliterate the self completely, which is obvious in the act of 
destroying  all  his  poetry,  his  dutiful  self-effacement  was  punctured  by  recurring 
instances  of  self-assertion,  as  the  re-uptake  of  poetic  composition  and  the  act  of 
keeping  a  diary  demonstrate.  Thus,  all  the  diaries  that  this  thesis  examines  are 
distinguished by the tense conflict between self-effacement and self-assertion.    159 
Chapter Three 
 
Visual and Temporal Appropriation in John Ruskin’s Diaries. 
 
John Ruskin’s diary, which he kept throughout most of his long life, shows that he 
was  obsessed  with  theorising  the  processes  inherent  in  the  perception  and 
representation of visual experience. Despite the conflicting statements Ruskin made in 
regard  to  the  photographic  medium,  he  was  governed  by  a  photographic  mindset, 
which  drove  him  to  obstinately  peruse  his  environment  for  sights  he  desired  to 
appropriate through artistic representation by drawing or writing. He did, however, try 
to redeem this self-assertive, self-centred and often entirely isolated condition of the 
observer  by  not  only  training  his  eye  for  the  maximisation  his  own  pleasure  by 
publishing work that aimed at making the reader see. Pleasure was thus legitimised by 
a philanthropic concern for the intellectually less privileged other. Because enjoyment 
was a vital part of perceiving the world “properly,” Ruskin, like Eliot and Gissing, 
expected  himself  to  switch  on  emotional  receptivity  at  will,  trying  to  control 
ungovernable aspects of the self and to make them function at maximal productivity. 
Ruskin’s diaries show that for him seeing and feeling were work, which can account 
for his frequent lamentations of personal inadequacy. While for George Eliot work 
and pleasure were mutually exclusive opposites, Ruskin was constantly trying to turn 
pleasure into a form of productive labour.   
This chapter focuses primarily on Ruskin’s hunger for visual and temporal 
possession  in  his  diaries.  Despite  the  unquestionably  self-assertive  nature  of  his 
appropriation of visual reality, Ruskin used his own experience as instructive material 
for his readers, thus effacing his right to privacy. He devoted his entire life to the 
study of his external environment and constructed himself as a prophet on whom his 
readers depended for aesthetic and moral education. Although Ruskin asserted his self   160 
by resisting the pressures to comply with traditional domestic conventions and by 
cultivating his eye through ceaseless observation, he simultaneously effaced his self 
by making the community of his readers the recipients of his own artistic illumination. 
Ruskin’s  diaries  served  as  a  medium  which  allowed  him  to  focalise  his  visual 
experience and, through insertion of selected diary entries into his published works, 
communicated it to his readers. They show that, for him, perceiving and representing 
the external world correctly was an incontrovertible obligation, both on a personal and 
a social level.  
In Ruskin’s diaries, self-cultivation took the shape of constant attempts at a 
complete  rendition  of  experience,  conveying  his  strong  desire  to  possess  selected 
objects/events  and  to  preserve  all  his  impressions  in  well-indexed  diaries  and 
sketchbooks: “I shall put down here whatever is worth remembering of the casual 
knowledge that we gain so much of every day, in conversation, and generally lose 
every tomorrow. Much is thus lost that can never be recovered from books.”
1 This 
entry of March 31
st 1839 is indicative of Ruskin’s efforts to retain those elements of 
reality that would otherwise fall through the cracks of memory, thus imitating the 
comprehensiveness of  a photographic record.  In his endeavour to memorialise his 
personal experience, Ruskin was always eager to avoid accusations of practicing the 
“Pathetic Fallacy” and tried to leave his self out of the observations. In order to do so, 
he  legitimised  strong  emotion  and  personal  involvement  in  his  work  through  by 
constantly addressing his reader. This attitude announces the simultaneously personal 
and communitarian concerns that motivated The Stones of Venice (1851-53), such as 
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his  indefatigable  eagerness  to  save  great  art  from  the  vulgar  modernisation  of 
nineteenth-century restorers by appropriating its visual reproduction.
2 
Significantly, emotion was an integral part of Ruskin’s observational work, 
because  for  him,  an  object  was  only  really  seen  when  the  observer  was  deeply 
touched by its exquisite appearance, as The Stones of Venice III shows: “how is [art’s] 
truth  to  be  ascertained  and  accumulated?  Evidently,  and  only,  by  perception  and 
feeling.  Never  either  by  reasoning  or  report.”
3 Throughout  the  diaries,  Ruskin’s 
inability to feel such amazement on command caused him great frustration, as he 
considered this numbness a waste of resources and a neglectful treatment of God’s 
creations. Like Eliot, Ruskin felt an intense sense of responsibility towards those who 
were unable to properly perceive the world of nature and architecture, and it was them 
that  he  neglected  when  he  felt  that  he  was  emotionally  unable  to  connect  to  his 
environment. Ruskin understood that lack of feeling was the natural consequence of 
physical and mental fatigue, as well as visual oversaturation, as can be seen in the 
justifications of this undesirable phenomenon in Modern Painters (1843-1860) and 
The Stones of Venice.
4 Nevertheless, Ruskin never allowed himself any rest and, like 
Eliot and Gissing, forced himself to work ceaselessly, to the point that, more so than 
for the latter, his life became his work. His private writings can be seen as evidence 
that he tirelessly attempted to live the theories on art he developed in Modern Painters 
and  The  Stones  of  Venice.  Ultimately,  however,  his  unwillingness  to  separate  the 
abstract concepts that were the foundations of his work from the private, more direct, 
experience of the world was the source of deep dissatisfaction with his own abilities. 
 Despite Ruskin’s perpetual insistence on the emotional receptiveness of the 
observer, his theorisation and rationalisation of emotion only legitimised emotion that 
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was the product of exquisite natural beauty. The result of this selective repression of 
personal  feelings  was  the  dehumanising  self-abnegation  which  led  to  overwork, 
isolation,  despair  and,  perhaps,  insanity.  Ruskin’s  attempts  to  silence  the  self 
consisted of a persistent focus on the visual and a continuous identification of himself 
as  a  professional  observer.  He  was  unable  to  uphold  this  utopian  self-construct 
because of his human limitations of satiability, indifference and coldness.  
The desire for visual possession is present in Ruskin’s diaries from its earliest 
volume, the Cumberland Diary (1830).
5 It is particularly elaborate in the 1835-1847 
diary, whereas the Brantwood Diary (1876-1883) seems characterised by complaints 
over  a  general  lack  of  “worthy”  emotion  and  a  panicked  desire  to  control  and 
appropriate temporal reality.
6 Jay Fellows is right when he argues that for Ruskin, the 
fear of loss was a strong motivational factor: 
Among  other  things,  he  would  like  to  preserve  the  notion  of  ‘present 
possession.’ More specifically, he would hold onto the present tense, or at 
least memoranda of the present. Even in his early diaries, the fear of a lost 
present is apparent. To forget is to lose time.
7  
 
Ruskin’s “autobiographical impulse,” to use Fellows’s term, is synonymous with his 
photographic  mindset,  which  entailed  the  problematic  mechanisation  of  pleasure 
manifesting itself most significantly in the Brantwood Diary. When first published, 
many  reviewers  of  Evans  and  Whitehouse’s  1956  edition  of  the  1835-1847  diary 
deemed its study to be pointless, as it “merely [confirmed] facts already known,” as 
C.H. Salter wrote.
8 T.S.R.B. wondered similarly “how much the diaries add to our 
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knowledge of Ruskin’s thought and personality.”
9 I believe that the diaries do provide 
crucial insight into the ways in which Ruskin situated himself in the world, beyond 
simply “providing factual details,” as George P. Landow wrote about the Brantwood 
Diary,  or  Van  Akin  Burd’s  insistence  that  the  diary  for  1842  was  primarily  an 
“objective study of beautiful forms.”
10 Like diary critic Robert A. Fothergill, I believe 
that diaries should be “[treated] as books rather than people” and that the literary 
analysis of the themes as well as the style of diaries, rather than the inverse process, 
can shed light on the diarist’s subjective processing of reality.
11  
The  interpretation  of  Ruskin’s  photographic  desire  can  further  our 
understanding of how his visual experience influenced the way he felt in the world. 
Martin  Seddon  has  convincingly  argued  that  Ruskin  chose  writing  primarily  for 
teaching  others,  whereas  the  pictorial  media  (drawing  and  photography)  served  a 
more personal desire to assure possession and avert loss.
12 The very high standards 
that Ruskin set for both his written and pictorial work came near his expectations of 
the ideal artist. Although, and perhaps because, the emotions were vital constituents to 
Ruskin’s perceptive process, their unreliability and their tendency to become saturated, 
tired  and  uncontrollable  made  them  tedious  obstacles  to  his  determination  to 
permanently  observe  his  environment.  These  revelations  can  improve  our 
understanding  of  Ruskin’s  subjective  experience  and  are  not  merely  rehearsals  of 
established scholarship.  
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Interestingly, although Ruskin cultivated his love of natural and architectural 
beauty  in  his  diaries,  the  latter  did  not  represent  an  introspective  mirror,  as  for 
instance, in the French “intimistes,” but astound through their tireless effort “to move 
the imaginative focus away from self-contemplation towards an autonomous subject,” 
as Hilary Fraser has noted.
13 Although Ruskin deemed the emotions to be sensors of 
primary importance in the process of perception, he was eager to monitor and contain 
the intensity of his “emotional response” because it might disturb his observations.
14 
In tune with some of the Victorian codes of conduct presented in Chapter One, Ruskin 
asserts in Modern Painters III that the selfish nature of “all violent feelings” tends to 
cause misrepresentation as “they produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of 
external  things,  which  I  would  generally  characterise  as  the  ‘pathetic  fallacy.’”
15 
Ruskin  despised  the  sentimentality  of  the  Romantics,  although  he  enjoyed 
Wordsworth, and was anxious to avoid a self-obsessed contemplative stance. As an 
observer,  Fraser  writes,  “[Ruskin]  sought  a  solution  in  the  objectification  of  the 
emotions themselves,” which is confirmed by his insistence in Modern Painters IV 
that the ideal artist must “receive indeed all feelings to the full but, having a great 
centre of reflection and knowledge, he [must stand] serene and [watch] the feelings, 
as  it  were,  from  afar  off.”
16 Ruskin  refrained  from  giving  in  to  emotion,  but  he 
constantly struggled to maintain his objective stance, as can be seen in his diary entry 
of  August  2
nd  1847:  “I,  with  every  hope,  every  power,  every  right  pleasure  at 
command, have yet no inconsiderable difficulty in restraining myself from merely 
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sensual pleasures!”
17 Like many of his contemporaries (Chapter One), he felt “great 
shame”  at  his  own  failure  to  withstand  what  he  would  later  call  the  “victory  of 
devil.”
18 Despite Ruskin’s “vision of an objective, unchanging reality” his “profound 
subjectivism” indeed could not be suppressed and would frequently resurface.
19 
Significantly, on March 31
st 1840, Ruskin resolved to “keep one part of diary 
for intellect and another for feeling.”
20 This decision suggests a clear wish to treat the 
emotions as an object of study, but the diary destined for feeling has disappeared. To 
me, there is reason to doubt whether it was ever written, because it seems that Ruskin 
generally did not separate between his professional and his private life, but rather 
adjusted the private to the professional, displaying a very strong personal involvement 
in observation, which was a full-time occupation he pursued with vigour.  
  Ruskin’s extreme need for self-enriching photographic possession is expressed 
in  his  perennial  habit  to  collect  sights,  memories  and  objects.  The  written 
representations of visual reality that characterise Ruskin’s diaristic records can thus be 
seen to claim ownership over lived experience and denote  a refusal to exert self-
abnegation. Through my theoretical exploration of the photographic gesture I aim to 
shed light on the possessive and retentive behaviour with which Ruskin governed his 
visual environment. Ruskin’s typical choice of non-human objects to contemplate and 
anthropomorphise represents an act of self-assertion in that it defied the Victorian 
idealisation of family and community (Chapter One), but the fact that he increasingly 
(especially in the 1870s) deplored his isolation indicates that he had renounced his 
need  for  human  companionship  by  his  consistent  focus  on  inanimate  objects. 
Although  this  chapter  will  primarily  consider  The  Stones  of  Venice  and  Modern 
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Painters, Ruskin’s vast body of socially engaged work reveals a desire to put his 
perceptive  skills  and  influence  to  good  use.  Whereas  the  Cumberland  Diary 
exemplifies Ruskin’s beginning passion for didactic observation, the 1835-1847 diary 
demonstrates his struggle between his human needs, his aesthetic moralism and his 
ability  to  experience  pleasure.  The  frequent  recognitions  of  loneliness  in  the 
Brantwood  Diary  can  be  seen  as  the  consequences  of  a  life  that  was  lived  in  an 
attempt to find pleasure purely in visual reality, disregarding other aspects of human 
existence.  
   
Possessive Genres: the Photographic and the Diaristic Gesture 
 
Initially, the photographic gesture in Ruskin’s diary can be seen as a self-assertive 
attempt to possess the intangible lived moment. The diary, in its ekphrastic endeavour, 
and the photograph stem from a similar desire to appropriate a fleeting reality through 
materialisation. Both transpose spatial and temporal reality into a manageable form 
that invites re-visitation by the means of technological reproduction.  
The  concept  of  ekphrasis,  also  mentioned  in  my  chapter  on  Gerard  Manley 
Hopkins (Chapter Four), is of primary importance to an analysis of Ruskin’s gesture 
of visual appropriation. The term “ekphrasis” designates the principle of “ut pictura 
poesis” (as is the picture, so is the poem), which consists of the verbal representation 
of visual and temporal reality. Some critics, such as Pia Brinzeu have insisted that 
“the result of the ekphrastic transmutation should always be a literary production” and 
should  focus  on  an  “artistic  object.”
21 Others,  such  as  Murray  Krieger,  seek  to 
“broaden the range of possible ekphrastic objects by re-connecting ekphrasis to all 
‘word-painting,’” tracing “the ekphrastic as it is seen occurring all along the spectrum 
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of  spatial  and  visual  emulation  in  words.”
22 Ekphrasis  can  be  seen  as  the  artistic 
principle that dominates Ruskin’s diary because he constantly verbally appropriated 
landscapes,  buildings  and  paintings.  The  visual,  for  Ruskin,  was  always  already 
verbal, as he wrote in Modern Painters III, “to see clearly is poetry, prophecy and 
religion,—all  in  one,”  but  necessitated  completion  by  the  actual  ekphrastic  act  of 
inscription.
23 George  Landow  has  suggested  that  Ruskin  was  familiar  with  the 
ekphrastic tradition from reading the work of eighteenth-century critics and artists, 
such as Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792), Henri Fuseli (1741-1825) and James Barry 
(1741-1806), as well as Leonardo Da Vinci’s (1452-1519) Treatise on Painting.
24 
The ekphrastic impulse is part of a larger desire to take possession of spatial and 
temporal  reality,  namely,  the  photographic  gesture.  Before  the  visual  could  be 
transmuted into the verbal, Ruskin needed to study the object/event in question in as 
much  detail  as  possible.  The  fact  that  Ruskin  composed  such  lavish  diary  entries 
denotes a sincere fascination with nature and architecture, as well as an inherently 
selfish desire to identify with and possess the observed object/event.  However, he 
also used these sumptuous descriptions of extraordinary beauty to cater to his intense 
feeling  of  responsibility  towards  his  reader,  for  whose  benefit  his  studies  were 
supposedly  conducted.  An  ontological  comparison  between  the  diary  and  the 
photograph can help us understand Ruskin’s unwillingness to be separated from his 
visual conquests, his desire to counteract loss of life through visual reproduction of 
selected objects/events and his unwavering need to ensure their symbolic presence. 
Both modes of representation were acts of self-assertion, which Ruskin, through his 
work, universalised by teaching others.  
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The French photography critic Philippe Dubois has visualised this selfish desire 
to retain the lived moment in his analysis of the interpersonal dynamics in the Scottish 
artist David Allan’s (1744-1796) 1775 work “The Origin of Painting,” which depicts 
Dibutates’s daughter drawing the shadow of her lover on the wall to retain a trace of 
his  presence.
25  This  possessive  gesture,  according  to  Dubois,  expresses  the 
anticipation and elimination of total loss, which are essential components of the diary 
genre: 
 
 
In order to call up the impending absence of her lover and preserve a physical 
trace of his presence, at this turning-point, tense with desire and fear, the young 
girl gets the idea to represent the other’s silhouette on the wall, using a stick of 
coal. The other is projected onto the wall in the last flamboyant moment, in 
order to kill time and fix the shadow that is still there but will soon be gone.
26   
 
Anticipating the painful yearning for her absent lover, the woman creates a reassuring 
substitutive presence for herself that is a constant reminder of the happiness that has 
disappeared: “the shadow always affirms a ‘that is there.’ Whereas the drawing of the 
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flamboyant, et pour tuer le temps, fixer l’ombre de celui qui est encore là mais sera bientôt absent. »  
(My translation). Dubois, L’Acte photographique p. 118.    169 
shadow affirms a ‘that has been there.’”
27 This effort to hold on to the beloved being 
in a symbolic form clearly evokes the act of taking a photograph as much as writing a 
diary  entry;  the  latter  being  less  immediate,  yet  trying  to  achieve  a  similar 
preservation of the escaping moment. The photograph represents a precious presence 
that was just about swallowed by oblivion, and similarly, the diary holds the inscribed 
embodiment of an avoided loss. Based on this painting, Dubois offers an engaging 
analysis  of  the  mechanisms  inherent  in  the  photographic  gesture  in  this  lengthy 
passage: 
The shadow, which is the image that only existed in the moment, when drawn, 
inscribes itself into a duration and into a determined state once and for all. […] 
By this inscription, the shadow loses its place within its temporal index and 
sends its spatial indiciality to the past. This loss of indiciality, this gain of 
iconisation,  this  temporal  autonomisation,  which,  while  maintaining  a  real 
connection with the referent, presents it as anterior, like a past origin. This 
responds to a grand fantasy of every representation of an element of an index: 
to  affirm  the  existence  of  the  referent  as  an  irrefutable  proof  of  what  has 
occurred,  which  is  to  eternalise  it,  to  fix  it  beyond  its  absence;  but  also, 
similarly,  to  pronounce  this  mummified  referent  to  be  irretrievably  lost, 
presently inaccessible in the shape that it once had. In this same movement the 
referent  is forever turned into a statuesque sign and sent back to the past—
into an interminable absence, oblivion, deficit, death. This is how the process 
of  indicial  fixation  operates,  and  one  could  assume  that  it  thus  functions 
globally,  in  all  cases—be  it  the  occurrence  of  fixation  by  drawing  or  by 
photography.
28 
 
Through  the  act  of  pictorial  or  written  representation,  the  “image,”  which  is 
synonymous with the object/event to be captured, is extracted from the ephemeral and 
inserted into a new temporality, which makes it durable and preservable. Its status 
                                                 
27 “L’ombre affirme toujours un ‘ça est là.’ Tandis que le dessin d’ombre affirme toujours un ‘ça a été 
là.’ » Ibid., p. 120.  
28 [L’]ombre, l’image qui ne vivait que dans l’instant ; dessinée, elle s’inscrit dans la durée et dans un 
état  déterminé  une  fois  pour  toutes.  […]  Et  cette  perte  d’indicialité,  ce  gain  d’iconisation,  cette 
autonomisation temporelle, qui, tout en conservant un rapport de connexion réelle au référent, le donne 
comme antérieur, comme origine dépassée, on voit bien que cela répond enfin a un grand fantasme de 
toute représentation indiciaire : à la fois affirmer l’existence du référent comme une preuve irréfutable 
de ce qui a eu lieu, et en même temps donc l’éterniser, le fixer par-delà sa propre absence ; mais aussi, 
par  la  même,  designer  ce  référent  momifié  comme  inéluctablement  perdu,  désormais  inaccessible 
comme tel pour le présent : c’est dans le même mouvement, le statufier à jamais en tant que signe et le 
renvoyer comme référent à une inexorable absence, à l’oubli, au manque, à la mort. Voilà ou engage ce 
processus de fixation à l’index, et on peut considérer, globalement, que cela vaut dans tous les cas, 
qu’il s’agisse en l’occurrence de fixation par le dessin ou par la photographie. » (My translation) Ibid.   170 
changes as the object/event is no longer a temporal or spatial element—it has become 
non-existent—but  through  its  reproduction  belongs  to  the  realm  of  physical 
concreteness, having become “iconic;” a symbol for what is past. This icon stands in 
for its origin, proving that the object/event was once “there” and that it still is present, 
despite its absence, in a different form. The awareness of the absence is evident, as is 
the conscious giving back of the origin to the past (time). No complete loss of the 
origin has occurred, since the object/event is retained in space, and will be accepted as 
a representative of that origin. Despite the relief of having averted the total loss of the 
object/event, the photographic or written record can never be more than a reminder or 
a “souvenir,” in critic Susan Stewart’s terms, which “may be seen as emblematic of 
the  nostalgia  that  all  narrative  reveals—the  longing  for  its  place  of  origin.”
29 
Photography  and  the  diary  thus  rise  out  of  a  yearning  for  reconnection  with  the 
reproduced original object/event. 
   The  French  film  critic  André  Bazin  (1918-1958)  has  insisted  on  the 
fragmentary status of the photograph as a visual splinter of a past reality rather than a 
living work of art whose meaning will evolve through time. Ruskin felt the same 
limitations as Bazin did, deeming the photograph to be too firmly tied to its origin—
or “referent,” which is the term commonly used by photography critics— and leaving 
too little space for the interpretations of its viewer to be admitted as a timeless artefact. 
Bazin writes that: “Photography does not, like art, create eternity, but rather embalms 
time, and subtracts only for its own profit. Photography benefits from a transfer of 
reality  between  the  thing  and  its  reproduction.”
30 Interestingly,  Bazin  deems  the 
                                                 
29 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Durham and New York: Duke University Press, 1993), p.xii.  
30 André Bazin,  « Ontology de l’image photographique, » in Les problèmes de la peinture, Gaston 
Diehl, ed. (Lyon : Confluences, 1945), p. 14: « La photographie ne crée pas, comme l’art, de l’éternité, 
elle embaume le temps, elle soustrait seulement à sa propre corruption ; (…) la photographie bénéficie 
d’un transfert de réalité de la chose sur sa reproduction. » (My translation).   171 
photographic  gesture  as  an  act  of  withdrawing  the  object/event  from  reality  and 
holding on to its reproduction, which is a non-creative transposition of a past reality 
onto an “embalming” surface.  
Bazin’s argument evokes Philippe Dubois’s comments on photographic space, 
presenting  an  analysis  of  the  fundamental  differences  between  photography  and 
painting in the context of time. His comparison between the photographic and the 
pictorial moment could situate the diary entry as in between the two on a temporal 
axis, enabling us to identify the decisive difference between the photographic nature 
inherent in the photograph and that of the diary: 
Photographic space is not given. Neither is it constructed. On the contrary, it is a 
space to be taken (or to be left), an appropriation of the world, subtracted by the 
bulk.  The  photographer  is  not  in  the  position  to  progressively  fill  an  empty 
frame that is already there. His gesture rather consists in snatching a space that 
is already ‘full’ in one strike. The question of space to him is not one of input 
but of removal in one piece.
31 
 
The selected object/event is chosen from infinite possibilities but is not assembled, 
even if previously staged, because it already exists in its entirety. By photographing, 
the  object/event  is  immediately  represented  and  completely  fills  the  designated 
physical space: the photograph. This process was evidently prolonged in Victorian 
times, but nonetheless the nineteenth-century photograph depicts the totality of the 
object/event presented to the photographer’s lens.  
Unlike a painting, which is a slow, arbitrary assemblage of shapes that, when 
finished,  can  constitute  a  work  of  art,  a  photograph  can  only  benefit  from  the 
corrective moves of “composition” after it has been shot and developed.
32 The diarist 
                                                 
31 « L’ESPACE photographique, lui, n’est pas donné. Pas plus qu’il ne se construit. C’est au contraire 
un espace à prendre (ou à laisser), un prélèvement dans le monde, une soustraction qui opère en bloc. 
Le photographe n’est pas du tout dans la position de remplir progressivement un cadre vide et vierge, 
déjà là. Son geste consiste plutôt à soustraire d’un coup tout un espace ‘plein,’ déjà rempli, à un continu. 
La question de l’espace pour lui, n’est pas de mettre dedans mais d’enlever d’une seule pièce. » (My 
Translation) Dubois, L’Acte photographique, p. 169. 
32 Ruskin, Modern Painters I (Orpington: George Allen, 1897), p. 208.    172 
makes  a  similar  decision  to  the  photographer  in  that  he  or  she  “snatches” 
objects/events  essential  enough  to  be  recorded,  picking  them  from  the  realm  of 
present  reality  (although  there  can  be  embellishment  and  the  unavoidable 
fictionalisation by language), but then moves on to the techniques of the painter, by 
inscribing them one after another, as synaesthetic immediacy in the writing process is 
not possible. Unlike in painting, editing after inscription violates the representational 
codes  of  the  diaristic  genre  as  it  implies  a  falsified  rendition  of  the  object/event, 
disobeying the careful adherence to the veracity of the moment. Ruskin, unlike other 
diarists such as Pepys (Introduction), felt deeply uneasy about changing his records in 
any way, as this entry of August 4
th 1879 shows: “Monday. I’ve written Saturday 
yesterday—but I don’t like scratching out.”
33 Erasing parts of his entries interfered 
with the authenticity of the endeavour and devalued the credibility of the diary by 
interrupting its illusion of immediacy and comprehensiveness.  
Like the diaristic gesture, photographic representation establishes a connection 
between selves—the past self that took the photograph and the present self looking at 
it—as  well  as  between  the  individual  and  his  or  her  world.  To  the  aesthetic 
philosopher Vilém Flusser (1920-1991), the representational potential of image and 
text  are  analogous.  He  holds  that  “writing  is  a  mediator—just  like  the  image.”
34 
Photographing and (diary-) writing are attempts to materialise and appropriate reality, 
making it more manageable. Ruskin’s desire to embody an object/event in its most 
visually accurate form, render its every feature and inscribe it into an anthological 
record can thus be seen to derive from the photographic gesture. 
                                                 
33 Viljoen, ed., The Brantwood Diary of John Ruskin, p. 188. Despite this statement, Ruskin destroyed 
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missing. 
34 Vilém Flusser, Pour une philosophie de la photographie, Jean Mouchard, trans. (Belval : Circé, 
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Robert  A.  Fothergill,  whose  historical  survey  study  of  English  diaries 
comprises a wide range of canonical writers such as Samuel Pepys, James Boswell, 
Fanny Burney, Walter Scott, Alice James and Anais Nin, does not explicitly comment 
on  the  gestural  similarities  between  the  diary  and  the  photograph,  but  employs 
photographic terminology to convey the fundamental constituents of the genre: “the 
imprint is the mark on the page left by a person living.”
35 Like reactive film, the 
material surface of the diary registers the intellectual and emotional activity of the 
diarist, which creates a “more or less intricate, variegated, and comprehensive” image 
of the writing subject.
36 The desire for such a record is always an act of self-assertion, 
which Ruskin, more so than the other diarists this thesis examines, used as a resource 
for  his  work.  In  fact,  by  making  his  emotions  integral  parts  of  the  observational 
process, Ruskin constructed himself as a medium between nature, architecture and 
humankind. 
According to Philippe Lejeune, the diarist’s self-image is based on his or her 
“need” to write and retain the world from his or her subjective perspective: “to the 
writer,  the  diary  presents  itself  as  a  literary  process  which  permits  him  or  her  to 
simultaneously capture instantaneous impressions, or fleeting nuances of impressions 
and to render the particular nuance that defines a human being.”
37 Lejeune refers to 
both the gestural and generic characteristics of the diary. The idea of the diary as a 
“process” to be engaged in implies the conscious framing of the diarist’s mind to 
receive and register the ephemeral, which for Ruskin was part of his professional 
requirements. The consequent rendition of the subjectively felt experience is seen to 
entail and reinforce the self-image of the diarist. 
                                                 
35 Fothergill, Private Chronicles, p. 56.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Philippe Lejeune, Les Brouillons de Soi (Paris: Seuil, 1998), p. 34. (My translation).   174 
The diary is thus constituted of the interplay between the diarist and the text. 
The  selected  content  of  the  diary  influences  the  diarist’s  self-image  and  from  the 
perspective  of  this  constructed  identity,  he  or  she  proceeds  to  register  future 
experiences.  Alain  Girard  has  held  that,  for  the  diarist,  “the  internal  landscape 
necessarily  reflects  the  variations  of  the  external  landscape,”  which  is  evident  in 
Ruskin’s as well as Hopkins’s diary.
38 This mimicking of the external environment 
can be seen as the essence of the dynamic inherent in Ruskin’s process of perception, 
which results in emotional exaltation when in the proximity to an exquisite landscape 
and  desolation  and  boredom  when  surrounded  by  dullness.  Because  Ruskin 
professionalised emotion, he reacted against such natural feelings of disinclination 
and this necessity to feel turned pleasure into pressure and indifference into failure.  
 
Ruskin’s Diary and the Photographic Gesture: Visual Truth  
 
For  Ruskin,  the  artist’s  duty  towards  the  community  consisted  of  observing  and 
preserving natural, artistic and architectural grandeur and guiding the reader towards 
“direct perceptual experience.”
39 Ruskin defined the “greatness” of a writer or painter 
“not by the mode of representing and saying, but by what was represented and said.”
40 
The vehicle of communication was seen as secondary; the content was essential and 
defined the usefulness of the artist, which accounts for Ruskin’s tireless explorations. 
Ruskin’s  attitudes  to  photography  reveal  the  prominent  position  the  emotions 
occupied in his value system. Because the mass production and ceaseless flow of 
photographic images that Ruskin witnessed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century were devoid of emotional authenticity, they, in his opinion posed a danger to 
artistic genres that were more labour-intensive, such as engraving, and threatened to 
                                                 
38 Alain Girard, Le Journal Intime (Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), p. xvi.  
39 Alexandra K. Wettlaufer, In the Mind’s Eye: The Visual Impulse in Diderot, Baudelaire and Ruskin 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), p. 233.  
40 Ruskin, Modern Painters I, p. 8.    175 
devalue culture generally. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ruskin was not 
necessarily  in  favour  of  excessive  labour.  He  was  mainly  worried  that  modern 
techniques of visual reproduction omitted the component of the observer’s subjective 
emotional experience, which determined the value of a work of art. Reacting against 
the ontological void of mechanical reproduction, Ruskin pressured himself to make 
every (developed) aspect of his life meaningful, which meant that the observational 
process  had  to  be  conducted  using  the  observer’s  full  intellectual  and  emotional 
attention, which then had to be translated in the written or pictorial representation. 
Ruskin’s consistent attempt to execute this ideal in his personal life was the source of 
ceaseless stress, which in the end was responsible for Ruskin’s empty and merely 
gestural appreciation of reality, characteristic of the modern tourist.  
Although Ruskin coveted the photograph’s inclusiveness of detail (at least early 
on in his career), he was skeptical of the medium because he believed that unlike 
pictorial  or  verbal  rendition,  photography  was  unable  to  capture  the  feeling  that 
dominated the depicted scene. From the perspective of art history, Wettlaufer explains 
that Ruskin, like Turner, broke with “the linear formalism of contemporary academic 
painting and embraced an aesthetic that privileges color, movement, expression and 
imagination  over  strict  mimetic  fidelity.”
41 Ruskin  indeed  remarks  that  whereas 
photography “renders subtleties of form which no human hand could achieve” and is 
very  nearly  perfectly  accurate,  “a  certain  veracity  is  altogether  wanting.”
42 Thus, 
Ruskin privileged the emotional energy conveyed by a painting over its ability to 
mimic reality. As Daniel A. Novak has shown, many Victorians, such as George Eliot, 
associated  the  photograph  with  the  “distortions  of  literary  fiction.”
43  “Art 
                                                 
41 Wettlaufer, In the Mind’s Eye, p. 198.  
42 Ruskin, Modern Painters IV, pp. 65, 2.  
43 Daniel A. Novak, Realism, Photography and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.    176 
photography,”  as  it  was  practiced  in  the  1850s,  implied  the  collage-like 
“transposition” of shots of figures, as well as isolated body parts, from “one scene to 
another;”  a  technique  that  “[tore  apart]  the  photographic  body  and  its  private 
identity.”
44 This mutilation of reality involved a desire to improve upon reality and a 
violation of the natural integrity of the depicted objects or scenes, whose authenticity 
was converted into an eerie half-fictional, half-real hybridity; all of which would have 
been “detestable” to Ruskin.
45   
Ruskin initially shared his culture’s excited responses to the appearance of the 
daguerreotype in 1839, as it allowed the individual to possess the visual aspect of far-
away buildings or mountains, which could obliterate the spatial distance separating 
the observer from remarkable architecture and nature. Contemporary reactions tended 
to stress the magical simplicity of the photographic process which accentuated the 
idea that “images [painted] themselves,” enabling travelers “to bring back to France 
the most beautiful monuments, the most beautiful scenes of the whole world.”
46 In 
this oft-quoted letter to his father from Venice on October 7
th 1845, Ruskin writes: 
“Daguerreotypes […] are glorious things. It is very nearly the same thing as carrying 
off the palace itself: every chip of stone and stain is there, and of course there is no 
mistake about proportions.”
47 Photography seemed to realise Ruskin’s utopian dream 
of total visual possession, which he tried to imitate in writing. On a practical level, 
                                                 
44 Ibid., pp. 2, 3.  
45 Ibid., p. 4.  
46 Reprinted in Beaumont Newhall, ed., Photography: Essays and Images: Illustrated Readings in the 
History of Photography (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1980), p. 17. Originally from La Gazette 
de France (Paris), January 6
th 1839, Beaumont Newhall, trans. For an in-depth study of the reception of 
photography in Britain and the appearance of a “new critical language” which sought to contain the 
new  medium,  see  Helen  Groth,  “Literary  Nostalgia  and  Early  Victorian  Photographic  Discourse,” 
Nineteenth-Century  Contexts, vol. 25, no. 3 (2003), pp. 199-217. For the French equivalent, analysing 
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47 Quoted in Michael Harvey, “Ruskin and Photography,” Oxford Art Journal, vol. 7, no. 2 (1984), 
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even when his scepticism towards the medium had grown, he still used photographic 
records for the purpose of work on the finesse of architecture, like the companion 
folios to The Stones of Venice. Ruskin considered such spatial copies to be valid tools 
of representation, but because they were reduced to a single momentary angle, they 
could not capture the emotional energy inherent in the process of observation of a 
“good and great human soul,” and hence could not be art.
48  
As the century progressed and photography became more widely accessible, 
Ruskin’s attitude towards the photographic medium changed into what many critics 
have read as a fundamental dislike of photography.
49 Principally, however, Ruskin 
disliked the “flood of photos [sweeping] away the dams of memory” that came with 
the  “capitalist  mode  of  production,”  to  use  Siegfried  Kracauer’s  expression,  not 
necessarily photography itself.
50 According to Nancy Martha West, for Ruskin, after 
the 1840s, “photography […] became symptomatic of an age in which the male artist 
had been stripped of his subjectivity by the ease of mechanism, and led to value 
ornamentation  of  photographic  detail  rather  than  the  essential  qualities  of  manly 
art.”
51 West is right when she suggests that photography’s dissemination may have 
threatened Ruskin’s public appreciation and critical authority. He may not just have 
feared for the status of art generally, but may also have worried about being dethroned 
as a critic.  
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49  See  also  Michael  Harvey,  “Ruskin,  the  Pre-Raphaelites  and  Photography:  A  Most  Blessed 
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Massachussetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 58, 61.  
51 Nancy Martha West, “Men in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Masculinity, Photography, and 
the  Death  of  Engraving  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,”  Victorians  Institute  Journal,  vol.  27  (1999), 
pp. 7-31 (p. 14).    178 
Ruskin  would  probably  have  had  more  respect  for  the  inclusive  approach 
demonstrated by photographer Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879) with whom he 
corresponded.
52 Heather  Birchall  has  argued  that  because  photographers  such  as 
Cameron,  Peter  Henry  Emerson  (1856-1936)  and  Frank  Meadow  Sutcliffe  (1853-
1941) “put photography on a par with fine art,” they destabilised Ruskin’s belief that 
photography merely served conservational purposes.
53 Birchall contends that Ruskin 
completely ignores artistic photographers in his work, and indeed, nowhere do we 
find a sustained discussion of contemporary photography as art. It does seem that 
Ruskin would have supported, at least in theory, Cameron’s attempts to capture both 
the soul and the body of her subjects in her photographs:  
When I have had such men [“the great Carlyle”] before my camera [,] my 
whole soul has endeavoured to do its duty towards them in recording faithfully 
the  greatness  of  the  inner  as  well  as  the  features  of  the  outer  man.  The 
photograph thus taken has been almost the embodiment of a prayer.
54 
 
Like Ruskin, Cameron was dedicated to producing an all-encompassing visual record 
of her subjects. Seeking with her “whole soul” to penetrate her subject and to depict 
his or her essence, Cameron invested all her imaginative ardour into the photographic 
act, focusing her perceptive powers onto the subject’s entire being. 
  For  Ruskin,  the  beauty  of  selected  visual  scenes  and  his  own  passionate 
impulse to create records of them (“Vidi”) was far more important than the realism of 
the representation.
55 When assessing artistic status, Ruskin did not blame any medium 
for  the  poor  quality  of  its  product,  but  held  the  maker  responsible  for  failing  to 
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involve “the inner part of the man” in the creative process.
56 He did not differentiate 
between  the  photograph  and  the  drawing’s  artistic  status,  for  neither  could  be 
considered a work of art if “made directly from nature.”
57 All media equally failed to 
produce art without the input of the artist’s full attention: “It is no more art to lay on 
colour delicately, than to lay on acid delicately. It is no more art to use the cornea and 
retina for reception of an image, than to use a lens and a piece of silvered paper.”
58 
Skilled drawing, or “detail sought for its own sake” as in the “calculable bricks of the 
Dutch house-painters,” did not produce art; detail had to be “referred to a great end” 
and be “treated in a broad and impressive manner.”
59 Ruskin’s “desire for totality,” 
which according to Lindsay Smith consisted in “the dual facility […] to ‘botanize’ 
and to infinitise simultaneously,” required the close study of minute details which 
could only be signified and raised to the status of art when viewed through an “active 
perceiving intelligence,” as Alexandra K. Wettlaufer has held.
60  
  In both The Stones of Venice I and in the well-known Lecture on Art VII, 
Ruskin  rejects  mere  replication  of  the  external  world  and  pleads  for  the  viewer’s 
active engagement with his or her surroundings: “Have we only to copy, and again 
copy, for ever, the imagery of the universe? Not so. We have work to do upon it.”
61 
As this work consists of establishing an emotional connection to the observed object, 
photographs, although “they are invaluable for record of some kinds of facts,” “will 
give  you  nothing  you  do  not  work  for.”
62 The  work  required  to  really  see  an 
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object/scene consists of conscientious study; the observer must see and feel the object, 
devoting “the appointed price of [his] own attention and toil” to capture its essence.
63  
Ruskin  warned  that  a  photograph  could  never  replace  the  “eye-witness”-
experience of a landscape that is more than “spoiled nature” and could truly put the 
observer in touch with nature.
64 Guido Garboni has noted that in Victorian England, 
especially by the 1880s, “any fool” could take a photograph “without undergoing any 
serious  learning  experience.”
65 Ruskin  was  greatly  disturbed  by  this  mechanical 
process  that,  without  the  sufficient  use  of  human  labour,  produced  an  “excess  of 
mimesis” and erased the human effort that characterised great art.
66 Photography was 
too easy and too perfect to translate the artistic impulse of a great mind. Ruskin’s “all-
consuming desire to make his reader see,” to use Wettlaufer’s phrase, motivates all 
his ekphrastic writings, and he informs his students that once they “learn to watch the 
course  and  fall  of  light  by  whose  influence  [they]  live,”  they  will  not  need 
photography.
67 “Sun-blackened paper” depicting “a panorama of a belt of the world 
photographed round the equator,” pales in comparison to “the dappling of one wood-
glade with flowers and sunshine.”
68 The true observer, who is “in possession of a 
quiet heart, a healthy brain and an industrious hand,” thrives on the contemplation of 
local  beauty  and  is  happy  to  abstain  from  the  “restless,  heartless  and  idle” 
photographic  frenzy.
69 Caroline  Levine  has  highlighted  that  Ruskin,  throughout 
Modern Painters, insists that the variety of nature can “[teach] us to resist industrial 
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society.”
70 Again, the humble and attentive observer, who appreciates natural beauty 
when he or she encounters it, is closer to the truth than any explorer in possession of 
professional photographic equipment. Truthful observation depends on the observer’s 
mindset even beyond the choice of subject and means of representation. 
In order to see the truth, for Ruskin, the observer of nature and art has to train 
his or her eye and acquire the “habit of representing faithfully all things, that we can 
truly learn what is beautiful and what is not.”
71 Crucially, mere observation is not 
enough,  but  the  active  rendition  of  the  object/event  completes  the  contemplative 
process. In Modern Painters V, when comparing Dürer’s and Landseer’s glass blades, 
Ruskin invites his reader to “take a pen and copy a little piece of each example, you 
will soon feel the difference.”
72 Only in physically imitating the pictorial process can 
the reader understand the visual differences between the two artists’ techniques. For 
Ruskin himself, as this chapter emphasises, the pictorial and linguistic reproduction of 
reality was essential to close study. Gail S. Weinberg has highlighted Ruskin’s life-
long habit of “copying paintings while studying them.”
73 She explains this impulse by 
quoting Ruskin’s letter to his father of June 22
nd 1845 in which he insists that “unless 
I draw a bit of a thing, I never arrive at conclusions to which I can altogether trust.”
74 
Visual  truth  was  thus  accomplished  by  the  consistent  investment  of  all  of  the 
individual’s critical and emotional faculties.  
Driven by his duty to see and to educate, Ruskin himself was unable to maintain 
a calm contemplative stance and constantly pushed himself to maximise his visual 
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intake. Certainly without intending to do so, Ruskin participated in the picture-making 
craze, which, according to Karen Burns, characterised the nineteenth-century tourist, 
by  his  urge  to  “[produce]  documentation.”
75  Burns’s  assertion  that  despite  his 
sophisticated  standards,  Ruskin  “[enacted]  the  tourist”  by  “producing  diaries,  and 
sketches [and] collecting souvenirs such as paintings, bought from artists or dealers” 
is confirmed by Ruskin’s diaries.
76 Ruskin involuntarily distanced himself from the 
truth he sought to capture by his very need to ceaselessly observe and appropriate 
what he saw.  
 
The Cumberland Diary: Performing the Observer 
 
Ruskin  began  to  establish  himself  as  an  observer  at  the  age  of  thirteen.  The 
Cumberland Diary (1830) documents his nascent urge to chronicle, as well as his 
experimentations  as  an  author.  This  diary  was  co-authored  by  his  cousin  Mary 
Richardson (1815 - 1849) who travelled with the Ruskins and it is fuelled by the 
notion  that  unrecorded  life  is  meaningless.  Despite  the  objective  stance  of  these 
entries—they contain very little personal information and are mainly written in a style 
that is typical of travel guides—the Cumberland Diary displays Ruskin’s burgeoning 
desire to possess his visual experience and to counsel and guide his reader.  
Through their highly descriptive entries, Ruskin and Richardson constructed 
themselves  as  authorities,  possessing  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  landscapes 
they traversed. Although there were books presenting the same facts in a professional 
fashion, the cousins’ verbal appropriation of visual reality established them irrefutably 
as  authors  who  enjoyed  the  position  of  knowing,  authoritative  signifiers  and  who 
exercised power over the described objects/events, organising them as they pleased. 
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When  young  Ruskin  and  Richardson  told  themselves/their  audience  the  way  to 
Matlock on June 8
th 1830, “you enter the dale,” “you have the first view,” “you next 
see  Dovedale  castle,”  they  established  themselves  as  instruction-giving  agents, 
performing the selves they wanted to be.
77 At the same time, they seemed to be aware 
of the performativity of their role, as can be seen in this entry describing the castle, 
greenhouse and Punch Bowl of Leamington as being “so well known we need not 
give descriptions of it” (May 26
th-31
st).
78 This entry considers an audience and clearly 
sets up the authors of the diary as experts on the object/event described, portraying 
their subjective experience as objective fact. 
  In the Cumberland Diary, Ruskin and Richardson cultivated their combined 
self  by  using  the  information  they  inscribed  into  their  common  diary  to  make 
themselves extensions of the prestigious objects/events described. For instance, when 
reporting  on  the  pictures  of  great  artists  in  Haddon  Hall,  Thorpe,  their  entry  is 
coloured by a desire for identification and inclusion, which becomes evident in the 
diarists’ ‘critique’ of the paintings, dealing with,  
[works  of  art]  amongst  which  were  some  by  Carlo  Dolce,  Claude  Lorraine, 
Rembrandt, Caracci, & c they were wonderfully done, and every touch shewed 
the hand of a master, some appeared to be so carelessly thrown off, you could 
hardly distinguish the outline, but yet such an effect was produced you could 
easily see, whose hand pencil had touched the canvas.
79 
 
The diary allowed them the space to construct themselves as art critics, capable of 
recognising  artists  by  the  ‘touch  of  hand.’  They  not  only  strove  to  make  the 
object/event their possession by establishing themselves as specialists, but they also 
attempted to possess the virtual authority and agency of the roles they adopted, by 
having the object/event reflect its aura of quality upon them. Their status, or identity, 
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correlated  with  the  chosen  content  of  the  diary.  In  order  to  perform  this  role 
convincingly, Ruskin and Richardson endeavoured to dutifully present a complete, 
consistent record. Comments such as “we neglected to say in the morning,” or “we 
must  now  describe  them  [Pillars  of  Gloucester  Cathedral]”  document  both  the 
pressure to chronicle and the desire to possess and preserve, if these two are separable, 
which inspired the diarists with the responsibility of reproducing reality.
80  
From  the  beginning,  Ruskin  used  his  diaries  to  construct  himself  as  an 
observer, who processed visual reality for a reader. A much-used source of material 
for his theoretical work, Ruskin’s diaries can be seen to reflect the formative process 
of observation on which his discussions of nature, drawing and art criticism were 
based. Within this process, the diaries were the elements that made the process of 
visual  perception  complete.  Like  the  preliminary  jottings  of  the  composer  or  the 
painter,  Ruskin  used  them  “to  fasten  down  […]  an  idea  in  the  simplest  terms.”
81 
Despite Ruskin’s eagerness to capture the immediacy of the moment, the constraints 
of language forbade such simplicity, and many of his entries are long and elaborate. 
Numerous  extracts  from  the  diary  were  copied  straight  into  Ruskin’s  published 
works—his autobiography Praeterita (1885) is just one prominent example—which 
shows that the basis for his public persona was crafted in the private realm of the 
diary.
82  
 
The 1835-1847 Diary: the Problems of Ekphrasis 
Ruskin’s  1835-1847  diary  presents  an  even  stronger  preoccupation  with  visual 
appropriation.  Ruskin  was  keen  on  possessing  the  amazing  sights  he  encountered 
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during  the  extensive  travels  he  conducted  during  this  period  and  demonstrates  a 
compulsive  desire  to  possess  the  lived  moment.  Gaps  in  his  visual  records  were 
odious  to  Ruskin,  and  he  felt  great  frustration  when  his  verbal  renditions  were 
incapable  of  carrying  a  precise  memory,  as  can  be  seen  in  this  entry  of 
October 10
th 1841: “I have grievously forgot the lovely bit of landscape which we saw 
from the hill above Le Puy this time last year. It made a great impression on me, too; 
but  how  utterly  useless  all  words  are  to  arrest  any  of  these  strong  distinctive 
impressions.”
83 Upon  re-reading  his  diary  of  1840,  Ruskin  is  displeased  with  the 
limitations of language which caused the loss of a memory he had hoped to keep. 
Oblivion  deprives  the  entry  of  its  signification  as  it  is  forever  separated  from  its 
referent and becomes meaningless. The diary entry, like a photograph, represents the 
moment in which Ruskin’s desire for possession became concrete, but although the 
visual experience had been captured, possession was not assured.  
Despite his constant “awareness of language’s expressive insufficiencies,” to 
use Wettlaufer’s term, Ruskin defied the limitations of verbal communication and 
composed innumerable ekphrasic transcriptions, particularly in the 1835-47 diary.
84 
Ruskin was driven by what Murray Krieger has called the “ekphrasic ambition” which 
craves to fix “the literally unrepresentable.”
85 Words, as Krieger writes, are unable to 
capture  spatial  and  temporal  reality  as  they  “cannot  have  capacity,  cannot  be 
capacious,  because  they  have,  literally,  no  space.”
86  Words  are  mere  signs, 
symbolising  the  referent  from  which  they  are  separated  by  an  insuperable  gap. 
Ruskin’s obsessive desire to “have the world captured in the word” is, according to 
Krieger, a fundamental component of the Western imagination: “The exhilaration […] 
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derives from a dream—and the pursuit—of a language that can, in spite of its limits, 
recover  the  immediacy  of  a  sightless  vision  built  into  the  habit  of  our  perceptual 
desire since Plato.”
87 In Ruskin, the hope that through verbal description some of the 
depicted reality may attach itself to the words is always paired with the utopian desire 
to conquer and possess the mesmerising object or scene.  
  Ruskin’s  ekphrastic  records  were  generally  attempts  to  intensify  fragile 
memories and make them last. He felt the duty and the insuppressible desire to depict 
extraordinary sights in order to own them in times of want and to open up this visual 
territory  to  others  later.  Through  the  other-oriented  nature  of  his  work,  Ruskin 
channeled his desire to be the first/only person to have captured the scene, which 
motivated his youthful 1830 diary as well as the following one, towards the education 
of a wider community. On June 20
th 1844 in Chamonix, Ruskin described the “most 
beautiful  sight  that  ever  morning  gave  me  among  the  Alps”  and  subsequently 
rendered this surprising delight of the “whole aiguille du G[oûter] [looking] pure and 
serene in intense light.” This he contrasted with the dreary dullness that followed, 
which made this moment outstanding:
88 “But all passed away as soon as seen; the 
bank of grey cloud rose and extended; now all is sunless.”
89 Retrospectively reporting 
exceptional beauty, Ruskin refused to let these fleeting moments disappear into the 
realm of oblivion and sought to immobilise and eternalise them through verbal (and 
pictorial) representation, which he later universalised through publication. 
  In some entries, the observation of dazzling beauty and verbal representation 
coincide on a temporal axis, which demonstrates Ruskin’s craving for total possession 
of his immediate visual reality and his indomitable desire to record during observation. 
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On June 23
rd 1844, for instance, Ruskin’s compulsion to verbally photograph Mont 
Blanc is evident: 
9 o’clock morning. There is a strange effect on Mont Blanc. The Pavillon hills 
are green and clear, with the pearly clearness that foretells rain; the sky above 
is fretted with sprays of white compact-textured cloud which looks like flakes 
of dead arborescent silver. Over the snow this is concentrated into a cumulus 
of the Turner character, not heaped, but laid sloping on the mountain: silver-
white at its edge, pale grey in interior. The whole of the snow is cast into 
shadow  by  it  and  comes  dark  against  it,  especially  the  lower  curve  of  the 
aig[uille] du Goûté.
90 
 
This entry’s sense of photographic immediacy is communicated through the use of the 
present tense and the inclusion of the exact time at which the entry was composed. In 
addition,  the  announcement  of  rain  and  the  detailed  description  of  such  transient 
meteorological  phenomena  as  clouds,  which  can  pass  or  dissolve,  heightens  the 
impression that Ruskin has only just caught an ephemeral scene that was about to 
disappear. In this entry, Ruskin’s struggle to verbally render an atmosphere he can 
only  describe  as  “strange”  becomes  obvious.  Despite  his  employment  of  visual 
language and the accentuation of the contrasts between materials and colours, he fails 
to  find  an  accurate  verbal  description  of  the  cumulus  cloud  and  thus  resorts  to 
labelling it “of the Turner character.”  
  Why did Ruskin not photograph or draw this scene? Martin Seddon has argued 
that  Ruskin’s  “visual  approach  to  life,”  generally  did  not,  as  we  would  expect, 
translate into “a pictorially visual means of expression.”
91 The innumerable sketches, 
watercolours,  engravings,  daguerreotypes  and  photographs  that  Ruskin  made  and 
commissioned throughout his life usually were aide-mémoires that served illustrative 
purposes and scientific study. Seddon’s point that “broadly speaking, Ruskin drew for 
himself whilst he wrote for others” can be confirmed by the fact that even Ruskin’s 
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diaries  were  not  strictly  intended  for  private  use  because  he  frequently  inserted 
extracts into his published work to support the theories he presented.
92 In addition, 
Christopher Newall has argued, Ruskin viewed himself as an “amateur” when it came 
to artistic creation, which is why his drawings were largely kept away from the public 
in his lifetime, apart from an exhibition of his drawings in the United States in 1879.
93 
We can deduce from these critical appraisals of Ruskin’s generic choices that in this 
1844 entry, Ruskin sought to render an atmosphere rather than study the physical 
properties of a visual phenomenon. 
Verbal expression was exceedingly complicated. In Modern Painters I, Ruskin 
deplored  the  ekphrastic  problems  he  encountered  when  describing  Turner’s  work, 
establishing that “words are not accurate enough, to express or trace the constant, all-
pervading  influence  of  the  finer  and  vaguer  shadows  throughout  his  works,  that 
thrilling influence which gives to the light they leave its passion and its power.”
94 
Indeed, words could only vaguely approximate the breathtaking gradations of colour 
in a Turner painting and therefore Ruskin supplanted his own efforts to translate a 
visual experience through the verbal medium by exchanging one image (the cloud) for 
another  (the  Turner  painting),  thus  by-passing  language  altogether.  Wettlaufer  has 
noted that for Ruskin, “the artist’s goal [was] not to reproduce the actual scene, but 
the experience of that scene, the mental state provoked.”
95 Both the painter and poet 
had to provide an “emotional equivalence” to the original image in order to create 
art.
96 Although Christopher Newall has explained that Ruskin “had no professional 
ambitions as an artist,” the expectations he had of his own work come very close to 
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the standards he set for the artist when he sought to “illustrate the whole feeling” of 
this  scene.
97 Ruskin  tried  to  “transcend  his  own  language  of  words,”  to  use 
Wettlaufer’s term, by forsaking ekphrasis and offering a more powerful visual image 
than  his  verbal  representation  of  the  original  object  could  have  rendered.
98 
Significantly, he described clouds in a way that any of his readers would have been 
able to grasp, which again accentuates the semi-public nature of his diary.  
This desire to appropriate visual stimuli through verbal representation did not 
just inform Ruskin’s professional life, but it dominated his personal life as well, if the 
two can indeed be separated. His identities as a critic, an artist and a human being all 
depended on the visual richness of his environment—fascinating scenery tended to 
make Ruskin happy and dullness made him feel like he was neglecting his duty to 
perceive and translate the external world.
99  
 
Desire and Duty 
 
Ruskin’s  process  of  perception  was  greatly  disturbed  by  the  dialogical  movement 
between desire and saturation, which is most clearly displayed in his 1835-1847 diary. 
Because observation was work for Ruskin, he viewed his failure to feel excited by 
exquisite  sights  as  spoiling  a  unique  and  irretrievable  opportunity  to  collect 
experience. As we have seen, the semi-private renditions of visual reality, which filled 
Ruskin’s diary, were the building stones on which his work was based.  
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Ruskin could not realise his “omnivorous” desires, to use the words of John 
Dixon Hunt and Michael Bartram, as can be seen in this entry of December 30
th 1840 
from the French Alps:
100  
I was tormented with vague desires of possessing all the beauty that I saw, of 
keeping every outline and colour in my mind, and pained at the knowledge that I 
must forget it all; that in a year or two I shall have no more of that landscape left 
about me than a confused impression of cupola and pine. The present glory is of 
no use to me; it hurts me from my fear of leaving it and losing it, and yet I know 
that were I to stay here it would soon cease to be beauty to me—that it has 
ceased, already, to produce the impression and the delight. I believe the only 
part of a journey really enjoyable to be the first six weeks, when every feeling is 
fresh,  and  the  dread  of  losing  what  we  love  is  lost  in  the  delirium  of  its 
possession.
101 
 
Although Ruskin longed to be a “true Seer” who “always feels as intensely as anyone 
else; but he does not much describe his feelings,” he did not manage to eradicate his 
human  flaw  of  satiability.
102 This  entry  clearly  exemplifies  Ruskin’s  photographic 
desire to grasp the scene in its entirety and keep a record of it. However, rather than 
describe the beauty of nature, Ruskin’s silenced self flares up with a vengeance and 
he confesses his inability to remain a detached, yet emotionally invested, observer. 
Ruskin cannot clasp ‘that landscape’ in all its magnificence and is only capable of real 
enjoyment during the ecstasy of “the passionate thrill of delight” that comes with 
“novelty.”
 103   Pleasure  thus  inevitably  means  pain,  even  at  the  very  moment  of 
experience,  before  the  loss  has  actually  occurred.  Another  time-related  issue  is 
broached in this entry: the idea that beauty must be mortal in order to be precious; if 
the moment could indeed be captured in its entirety, it would inevitably terminate in 
banality.   
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Possession never led to satisfaction, nor should it, as this annihilated the glory 
and  uniqueness  of  the  experience.  In  The  Stones  of  Venice  III  Ruskin  advocates 
disinterested observation, insisting that rational possession may be coveted but may 
never be fulfilled:  
Once thoroughly our own, the knowledge ceases to give us pleasure. It may be 
practically useful for us […] but, in itself, once let it be thoroughly familiar, 
and it is dead. The wonder is gone from it, and all the fine colour which it had 
when first we drew it up out of the infinite sea.
104 
 
Ruskin constantly seemed to find himself in a Faustian dilemma, as possession led to 
stasis and despite the impulse to exclaim: “Beautiful moment, do not pass away,” an 
over-saturation of beauty would put an end to dynamic curiosity, which was fuelled 
by desire, and instate boredom.
105 Ruskin could only “feel it” when he was in this 
state of longing for possession; when possession had been completed, he was filled 
with numbness and desired new objects/events, as is manifest in the following entry 
of December 18
th 1840: 
I am losing all the feeling of intense interest that the Italian landscape used to 
rouse a few weeks ago. […] I am getting tired of Rome as I thought I should, 
and long for Venice and the Alps. When I get there I shall long for home; and 
when I get home, for Rome.
106 
 
The abundance of beauty is impossible to process and Ruskin’s sincere admiration 
cannot be maintained. Ruskin feels guilty for losing the “freshness in feeling” and for 
no longer wholeheartedly appreciating exquisite objects/events.
107  
Although  in  theory  Ruskin  considered  monotony  to  be  the  necessary 
contrasting background against which splendid natural and artistic beauty stood out, 
he was intensely bored and frustrated when confronted with a landscape he did not 
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care to possess because it left him indifferent. During his tour of Switzerland in 1835 
he seemed disillusioned with his ekphrastic endeavour:  
The opening to Airolo is beautiful, but what is the use in describing it. There 
were villages and fields, rocks and torrents, and grassy mountains and snow 
covered Alps, and we have had all of that before. Objects on paper are always 
the  same,  it  is  by  the  disposition  of  them  that  nature  gives  variety,  and 
therefore you can say no more than that—the opening to Airolo is beautiful.
108 
 
The monotony of the landscape is reflected in Ruskin’s unimaginative language. He 
simply  offers  an  uncaring  “beautiful”  as  a  description  and  seems  to  say  that  the 
encountered  objects  in  themselves  are  unremarkable.  The  passage  also  indicates 
Ruskin’s frustration with ekphrasis, which fails to clearly distinguish the wide variety 
of “objects on paper” from one another and thus makes the description “beautiful” 
completely meaningless. 
  Because Ruskin was so invested in the perceptive process, he was unable to 
simply overlook repetitive visual reality and was annoyed by the “tiresome enough” 
aspect  of  the  valley  connecting  the  Swiss  Grindelwald  and  Lauterbronn.
109 
Overabundance of geological specimen had dulled his interest and he felt like he was 
merely ploughing through more rock formations: “I had seen so many instances of 
twisted strata that I was little interested in the numerous and remarkable contortions 
of these strata till I observed one very peculiar, fig. 24.”
110 An unexpected noteworthy 
layer of soil punctured Ruskin’s boredom and gratified his investigations. 
  Excess  of  beauty  similarly  deprived  the  observer  of  the  desire  he  or  she 
needed in order to conduct his or her visual investigations. In Modern Painters IV, 
Ruskin wrote that “it is not good for a man to live among what is most beautiful,” 
because the constant confrontation with “the utmost the earth can give is the surest 
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way to cast him into lassitude and discontent.”
111 On September 23
rd 1835 in Bormio, 
Ruskin was taken aback by the beauty of the landscape: “the whole scene foreground 
(or  foresnow)  and  distance,  astonish  as  much  as  they  delight  the  eye  that  is  not 
accustomed to the scenery of such elevations.”
112 He clearly distinguished between 
the  eye  that  was  used  to  mountain  scenery,  and  therefore  indifferent,  and  the 
overwhelming surprise that the unaccustomed eye experienced.  
Ruskin  repeatedly  voices  angry  self-reproach  due  to  his  lack  of  necessary 
emotion. On December 30
th 1840, he writes: “All was exquisitely beautiful […] and I 
saw this though I could not feel it, and got into a rage with myself, to no purpose.”
113 
Here Ruskin, like Henry Crabb Robinson (Chapter One) and Gerard Manley Hopkins 
(Chapter  Four),  who  at  times  viewed  themselves  as  devoid  of  creative  drive,  felt 
powerless  to  appreciate  nature  because  he  felt  emotionally  drained  and  could  not 
gather the necessary passion to create, or even contemplate, beauty. On June 6
th 1844 
after descending from his “old seat on the block of the Breven” in Chamonix, Ruskin 
complains of an inability to surrender to the visual marvels presenting themselves to 
him:  “I  do  not  feel  as  I  ought  to  feel.  For  the  first  time  in  my  life  I  miss  the 
exhilaration of spirit which these scenes awakened in my childhood.”
114 Desire, once 
satisfied by possession that is achieved through representation and intense study or 
attenuated by the “heavier cares of the world,” fades.
 115 The self that once desired 
cannot sympathise with the self that now possesses and vice-versa: 
How little could I have imagined, sitting in my home corner, yearning for a 
glance of the hill-snow, or the orange leaf that I should at entering Naples, be as 
thoroughly out of humour as ever after a monotonous day in London—more so. 
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[…] And I shall read and remember this hereafter and be mad (Naples, January 
9
th 1841).
116 
 
When, after a long period of anticipation, Ruskin finally reaches the destination he 
has yearned for, he often has difficulty seizing and cherishing the present moment. 
Although  in  Modern  Painters  II,  Ruskin  explains  that  the  “Imagination 
Contemplative”  is  always  superior  to  lived  reality  because  “there  is  an  unfailing 
charm in the memory and anticipation of things beautiful” that cannot be matched by 
their presence, his diaries show that he never accepted this fact in reality and was 
always eager to engage with reality directly.
117  
  In  Ruskin,  the  acknowledgment  that  the  observer  was  easily  “sated”  or 
“wearied” by the actual experience of desired objects/events coincided with the moral 
obligation  to  respond  to  natural  and  architectural  beauty  with  intense  emotional 
excitement.  In  The  Stones  of  Venice  I,  for  instance,  Ruskin  portrays  desire  as  a 
mandatory attitude when he tells his reader: “you were made for enjoyment, and the 
world was filled with things which you will enjoy, unless you are too proud to be 
pleased by them.”
118 Beyond the requirement to personally “examine” and “measure” 
the  external  world,  the  observer  was  compelled  to  “enjoy”  the  visual  delights 
provided  for  him  or  her,  as  failure  to  do  so  was  equated  with  unrespectable, 
contemptible  arrogance.  Although  Ruskin’s  experience  taught  him  differently,  he 
continued,  like  Bain,  to  believe  in  the  individual’s  ability  to  control  his  or  her 
emotions through exerting “self-discipline to prevent the mind from falling into a 
morbid  condition  of  dissatisfaction  with  all  that  it  immediately  [possessed],  and 
continual longing for things absent.”
119 Ruskin actively attempted to counteract this 
attraction to an imagined “self-inscaping” (Chapter Four) experience when he insisted 
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on his duty as an observer, who had to seek out and appreciate the beauty of “God’s 
work” and communicate it to others.
120  
When  Ruskin  did  not  desire  to  ingest  his  visual  environment,  he  forced 
himself through the motions that were necessary to avert the guilt of the ungrateful 
spoiler of precious experience. Ruskin’s diary shows that he was continuously driven 
by  his  dutiful  desire  to  capture,  appropriate  and  enjoy  his  experience  and,  in  an 
attempt  to  artificially  create  the  sensation  of  novelty  and  surprise,  he  incessantly 
hunted for fresh sights and sensations. Although there was a consistent attachment to 
selected places, such as Venice and Mont Blanc, Ruskin tended to be exhilarated by 
the surprise of novelty and then to gradually lose interest as he reached saturation. On 
February 26
th 1841 in Sorrento he stated that “I seem always in a hurry, or not where I 
should  like  to  be,  now.  […]  There  is  a  bad  restlessness  upon  me.”
121 Although 
suffering from fatigue, Ruskin was obsessed with taking in and capturing as many 
sights as his limited time allowed him to. He thus rushed from scene to scene and was 
prevented from thorough enjoyment by his “restlessness,” which on February 12
th 
1841  he  defined  as:  “the  desire  to  see  something  finer,  newer,  different.”
122 This 
impatience was followed by “fatigue, with a total loss of all feeling of the place or its 
spirit,” and the pressure to “begin drawing” and “a desire to get it done.”
123 Ruskin’s 
fixation with photographic intake, combined with his obsessive fear of wasting time, 
accounts  for  this  hectic  type  of  day,  which  brought  him  “twenty-five  minutes 
enjoyment and the rest desire.”
124 Ruskin recognised that his photographic mindset 
and the inherent pressure to maximise visual conquest, could lead to “discontent,” 
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impeding him from “tasting all these pleasures” and “shutting out” future ones.
125 
Nevertheless he was pushed on by his duty to report his visual experience to others.  
As  if  to  rectify  and  legitimise  the  behaviour  depicted  in  his  diary,  in  The 
Stones of Venice II, Ruskin theorises the hunt for exquisite sights and the fatigue that 
is  its  natural  consequence.  He  writes:  “we  must  bear  patiently  the  infliction  of 
monotony for some moments, in order to feel the full refreshment of the change.”
126 
In reality, as his diaries show, he suffered from the “diseased love of change” that 
made him unable to bear the “pain” of recovering and rushed him onwards in search 
of future delights.
127 He had long understood the invincible “weariness which is so 
often  felt  in  travelling,  from  seeing  too  much.”
128 Nevertheless  he  consistently 
neglected  to  take  his  own  advice  of  “letting  [the  imagination]  rest”  and  directly 
experienced  the  “imaginative  faculty  [fainting]  utterly  away,  beyond  all  further 
torment or pleasure, dead for many a day to come.”
129 
  The  “innocence  of  the  eye”  that  Ruskin  strove  to  maintain  was  a  utopian 
endeavour because it omitted the period of recovery that the mind needed in order to 
appreciate beautiful objects and scenery.
130 The eye was only innocent and could only 
resist conventional thinking if in a state of probing desire. On December 6
th 1840 in 
Rome,  Ruskin  bemoans  the  fact  that  he  cannot  uphold  a  steady  interest  in  his 
observational work: “I  wish  I could keep myself in the humour, especially in the 
desire  of  raking  together  all  possible  scraps  of  information  from  everyday 
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occurrences.”
131 There  were  limits  to  Ruskin’s  inquisitiveness  and  his  mind  was 
plagued by indifference and fatigue. 
In order to accomplish his duty as an artist, however, Ruskin constantly forced 
himself  to  develop  his  “perceptive  [and  his]  sensitive,  retentive  faculties.”
132 
Moreover,  as  a  human  being,  he  wrote  in  The  Stones  of  Venice  III,  it  was  his 
responsibility  to  observe  the  world  and  be  deeply  touched  by  it:  “we  live  to 
contemplate,  enjoy,  act,  adore.”
133 Although  these  obligations  were  articulated  in 
1853, the diary shows that observation, for Ruskin, had been of a moral nature since 
the  early  years.  On  January  27
th  1841,  near  Naples,  Ruskin  reported  that  “I  am 
gradually losing my zest for scenery.”
134  He did not, however, allow himself to relax 
after intensely exciting experiences, but pushed himself to be emotionally receptive: 
“[I] stood at the window to night, while the sunset was touching the sprinkled snow 
on the lovely forms of the Mt. Angelo, rather with the sense of discharging a duty in 
drinking the draught of beauty than because it gave me pleasure.”
135 Ruskin expected 
himself to be profoundly moved by this sight that he knew to be exquisite, but he was 
unable to feel the delight that he thought he should: “Yet all this could not touch me. I 
felt as if my whole spirit had been turned into ice.”
136 Contemplation, for Ruskin, was 
incomplete without the emotional reaction of the observer, as “perception and feeling” 
had  to  be  inseparably  intertwined  to  assure  the  “truth  of  essence”  the  artist  was 
supposed to be concerned with.
137 
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Ruskin viewed himself as the recording device that transmitted beautiful sights 
to his audience. In Praeterita, for one, he realises that this self-construction opposed 
the cultivation of human relationships:  
In blaming myself, as often I have done, and may have occasion to do again, 
for my want of affection to other people, I must also express continually, as I 
think  back  about  it,  more  and  more  wonder  that  ever  anybody  had  any 
affection for me. I thought they might as well have got fond of a camera lucida, 
or an ivory foot-rule: all my faculty was merely in showing that such and such 
things were so; I was no orator, no actor, no painter, but in a minute and 
generally invisible manner; and I couldn’t bear being interrupted in anything I 
was about.
138 
 
We see that Ruskin feels unable to evaluate his personal value, or lovableness, apart 
from his usefulness. He portrays himself as an essentially empty container, or rather, a 
photographic surface upon which visual objects/events were projected,  but who is 
non-creative and merely mimics visual reality. in his professional capacity, Ruskin 
did  not  enter  into  direct  contact  with  human  beings,  but  acted  as  a  meta-critic, 
teaching his readers how to see landscapes and paintings other artists had created. 
Stressing his role as a mediator, Ruskin simultaneously asserts and annuls his own 
importance  by  making  his  “invisible”  actions  visible  through  autobiographical 
intervention. Although, for Ruskin, the artist had to be a disinterested “instrument” 
that faithfully recorded “the visible things around him,” leaving out “no shadow, no 
hue, no lobe, no instantaneous and evanescent expression,” and also capturing “the 
emotions which they are capable of conveying to the spiritual which has been given 
him,” he claims acknowledgment for his work.
139  
Failure to conduct private observation adequately had a direct effect on the 
reader  who  was  deprived  of  valuable  lessons.  The  Stones  of  Venice  I  illustrates 
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Ruskin’s firm identification with the artist who had to visualise and “explain” the 
world to others: 
This  infinite  universe  is  unfathomable,  inconceivable,  in  its  whole;  every 
human creature must slowly spell out, and long contemplate, such part of it as 
may be possible for him to reach; then set forth what he has learned of it for 
those beneath him; extricating it from infinity, as one gathers a violet out of 
grass;  one  does  not  improve  either  violet  or  grass  in  gathering  it,  but  one 
makes the flower visible; and then the human being has to make its power 
upon his own heart visible also, and to give it the honour of the good thoughts 
it has raised up in him, and to write upon it the history of his own soul.
140 
 
Ruskin  felt  that  it  was  his  mission  to  invest  his  utmost  effort  in  studying  and 
reproducing the visual world in a tangible form in order to enlighten those who had 
not found a way to appreciate the delights of God’s creation. Rather than imagining 
and staging a more stunning reality, the artist had to show the natural beauty of the 
object through communicating the delight he or she received from it. 
Despite the solitary nature of Ruskin’s observational process, he sought to 
interrupt strictly self-centred behaviour and, at least in theory, reach out to a human 
other—his reader. Ruskin’s ekphrastic writing often took on an educational character 
because he did not only feel responsible to worship God’s creations, at least before his 
loss of faith, but, like Eliot, he sought to redeem his ‘guilt of the privileged’ through 
illuminating his readers and providing perceptive skills to those whose sight had been 
obstructed by academic conventions or lack of education. Ruskin was aware of his 
exceptional genius of observation and felt a strong moral obligation to use it, as can 
be seen in the following entry of June 1
st 1844 in Geneva: “I think always of those 
who have no power of seeing what I see, and am full of remorse that I see it, and of 
the time that may—and that must—come when I shall not see it myself.” 
141 Excited 
discovery thus became a duty. Not only did Ruskin have to compensate for others’ 
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deficiency in visual perception but, with blindness looming, he needed to maximise 
his own visual intake to provide for his old age.  
The duty of the artist to feel his visual sensations was not only a source of 
barely tolerable pressure, but it also established Ruskin as the observing other who 
had to follow the world as it revolved. On December 30
th 1840, Ruskin describes a 
French  girl and her bonne “laughing and  chattering with an  expression of perfect 
happiness on their faces, thinking no more of the Alpine heights behind, or the sweep 
of  city  before—which  they  never  looked  at,  than  of  Constantinople.”
142 They  are 
entirely oblivious to that which formed the content of Ruskin’s life—the observation 
of  mountain  scenery.  Completely  unresponsive  to  the  natural  grandeur  at  their 
doorstep,  their  sensitivity  is  greatly  inferior  to  Ruskin’s,  who  has  “every  faculty 
cultivated and directed to receive the impression of beauty, with every sensation and 
feeling raised […] to a great degree above theirs.”
143 Ruskin is theoretically equipped 
and  prepared  to  embrace  the  “truth  of  essence”  of  this  wonderful  spot,  but  he, 
although he can see the “glory in things” to which they are blind, cannot feel: “[I] was 
in a state of severe mental pain, because I could perceive materials of the highest 
mental pleasure about me, and could not receive it from them.”
144 Ruskin suffered 
from this failure to accept what was so generously offered to him. Instead, he had to 
stay at the surface of creation, having to content himself with the visual aspect of the 
scene and forced to renounce the “whole” experience. The incapacity to feel reduced 
Ruskin to the status of a mere onlooker who was shut out of the sublime, which 
clearly threatened his identity as an observer. Despite his understanding that feeling 
was spontaneous and could not be fully mastered, Ruskin treated feeling like work, 
which caused endless frustration and depression.  
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The diary shows that the reality of successful observation was complicated, as 
Ruskin  had  to  homogenise  the  enormous  responsibility  he  attributed  to  the 
artist/observer,  the  ephemeral  nature  of  his  emotions  and  the  changeable  external 
environment. Moreover, Ruskin knew his best efforts at verbally reproducing reality 
to  be  inadequate.  His  diaries  are  characterised  by  the  pressure  to  gather  visual 
experience and to unravel the mechanisms inherent in the act of perception, which 
informs The Elements of Drawing, Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice. His 
responsibility  towards  the  unknown  reader  can  be  seen  to  partially  motivate  his 
restless  urge  to  conquer  new  visual  territories.  The  pressure  to  feel  became 
particularly strong when Ruskin re-visited geographical places that he had once liked. 
The repeated visits and the ardent admiration for a spot’s beauty inspired Ruskin with 
feelings of deep love, to the point that these places can be seen to have replaced 
human  affection.  When  emotionally  numb,  Ruskin  was  forced  to  question  his 
connection with these places because the emotional support he drew from them had 
been destabilised, which perpetuated his isolation.  
 
Attachment to Place and Objects 
 
Although  Eastlake  had  unjustly  criticised  Ruskin  for  being  indifferent  to  human 
beings, his diaries clearly foreground nature and architecture over emotional, inter-
human relationships. He consistently silenced experience that gave him personal pain, 
such as his failed marriage, or the bitterness he felt over his disappointed love for 
Adèle Domecq, as can be seen in this entry of December 27
th 1840: “This day last 
year was the last I ever spent with [Adèle] I do not like writing on these anniversaries, 
but I must to day for exercise. I am getting confoundedly blue—or black—and must   202 
shake  it  off.”
145 The  diary  presents  very  few  such  explicit  invocations  to  exert 
emotional  self-discipline  that  involve  a  human  being.  Generally,  Ruskin  seems  to 
have channelled his personal frustration through a focus on work-related issues.  
In  order  to  counteract  his  human  isolation,  Ruskin  cultivated  and 
anthropomorphised the bonds that connected him to selected places, such as Venice 
and  Chamonix,  which  he  considered  his  “two  bournes  of  earth.”
146 Like  Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, Ruskin seemed to feel genuine affection for geographical locations, 
which was in some ways comparable to the romantic love for a person. Ruskin not 
only  worshipped  and  idealised  the  visual  splendour  of  natural  and  architectural 
objects, but he felt that they responded to him as well, which again recalls Hopkins’s 
imagined communication between the observer and the observed. This geographical 
romance was subject to the dynamic of desire and saturation I have just examined, 
which led to emotional exhilaration as well as unfulfilled longing and despair. The 
basis  for  this  intense  attachment  to  certain  places  was  their  visual  attractiveness. 
Indulging  in  self-assertive  impulses,  Ruskin  yearned  for  the  possession  of  these 
exquisite sights so intensely that he hungered for fusion with these places and their 
associated objects. Ruskin’s photographic desire to capture every detail of Venice, for 
instance, was motivated by an eroticised craving of complete possession which was 
mellowed by his self-effacing duty as a superior observer towards those he wanted to 
educate.  
The anthropomorphisation of inanimate objects/events through which Ruskin 
counteracted  the  loneliness  of  the  observer  is  evident  in  a  sequence  of  entries  of 
March 1841 in which he continuously personified Mount Vesuvius as “an old friend,” 
making  this  natural  structure  the  recipient  of  his  affection.  The  parting  with  the 
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beloved  volcano,  on  March  16
th,  was  extremely  dramatic  and  shows  Ruskin’s 
frustration  of  forever  being  a  spectator,  who  is  always  giving  but  never  directly 
receiving love: “Sorry to bid him goodbye. I wish Vesuvius could love me, like a 
living thing; I would rather make a friend of him than of any morsel of humanity.”
147 
Feeling always involved an immense personal effort and although Ruskin expressed 
passionate  sentiments  towards  the  mountain,  he  wished  the  companionship  he 
imagined when exclaiming “Adieu mon ami, mon volcan!” to be real.
148 Ruskin’s 
relationship with the visual world was always contrived due to the obligation to study 
natural and architectural objects and to feel intensely about them. When thus craving a 
response from non-human objects/events, Ruskin expressed a desire for an organic, 
effortless relationship with his beloved other(s), which could overcome the distance 
between the observer and the observed.  
Dramatic leave-taking became a reassuring, ritualised duty for Ruskin, which 
catered  to  his  possessive  desire  to  supply  himself  with  provisions  of  memorable 
experience. When in April 1841 Ruskin visited Rome, he is initially enthusiastic and 
“very full of feeling” although he suspects that he has to “go home and get up the 
steam again” in order to refresh his eye.
149 Because he cannot “feel now as [he] could 
five months ago,” his exploration of Rome is mechanical and forced, and his goodbye 
consists of a very contradictory evaluation: “I date ‘Rome’ for the last time this year, 
at least; probably for a long time to come, for though I am sorry to leave the place—
more so than I thought—there is something about it which will make me dread to 
return.  Farewell  Roma  mia!”
150  Ruskin  pushes  himself  to  acknowledge  the 
significance of his departure by emphasising its finality.  He is relieved to leave Rome 
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because he can stop forcing himself to feel, but at the same time he regrets being 
separated  from  the  beauty  he  will  soon  long  for.  In  the  following  days  he  “bid 
farewell to St. Peter’s with some feeling,” and to his “pet Raphael;” the latter giving 
him the most pleasure, along with the Venus and Michael Angelo’s Bacchus.
151 The 
stay in Rome was exhausting because Ruskin, despite trying his hardest, failed to 
develop a meaningful connection with the city. By inscribing these farewells into his 
diary, he accomplished his duty to live correctly. However, representation without 
emotion was a mere performance which Ruskin failed to invest with meaning. 
When in May 1841, Ruskin finally reached the long-anticipated Venice, “the 
Paradise of cities,” he deemed himself “happier than I have been in these five years—
so happy, happier than in all probability I ever shall be again in my life.”
152 At the 
heart of human-made beauty, Ruskin felt the exquisite “thrill” of this “feline, sensual 
and orientally feminine” city, to use the words of Clive Wilmer.
153 Proximity to this 
“adored object,” as J.B. Bullen has called the city, put Ruskin “in good humour with 
all the world.”
154 But even the delight of visiting Venice, his “place of dreams,” was 
no longer “childish” as Ruskin was disillusioned with the decay of the city, finding 
“the canals […] shallower [and] dirtier than they were of old.”
155 Ruskin’s disgust 
with modernity’s pollution and architecture, as well as his eagerness to preserve the 
Byzantine and Gothic architecture he so admired, motivated the creation of the great 
ekphrastic  record  The  Stones  of  Venice,  which  was  the  product  of  the  possessive 
photographic gesture.
156 
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Ruskin’s  desire  to  identify  with  and  appropriate  the  city  gave  rise  to  an 
immensely large collection of meticulously sketched, and photographed, magnificent 
scenes and isolated visual detail. Ruskin obviously felt the need to create a physical 
copy of lived reality for private use and, through drawing the city, made it into a non-
human,  two-dimensional  companion.  However,  Ruskin  devoted  this  selfish 
accumulation of drawings to his readership, as these images formed the basis for The 
Stones of Venice, as the Preface of 1851 shows: “when I planned the book, I had 
materials with me, collected at different times of sojourn in Venice during the last 
seventeen years.”
157 J. Howard Whitehouse has argued that “Ruskin rarely sat down 
to paint a picture in the conventional sense. He always drew with a purpose. […] But 
his  immediate  interest  was  to  record,  not  to  make  a  picture.”
158 Indeed,  Ruskin 
sketched for appropriative reasons rather than for the pleasure of aesthetic expression; 
he drew to take and to teach, rather than to impress. 
Despite Seddon’s argument that Ruskin’s drawings were designed for private 
consumption, the diaries show that he measured them against the very high standards 
he set for his own work as much as for others’. Recording was work for Ruskin, as 
can be seen in the entry of May 9
th 1841: “I have got all wrong with my drawing too, 
and that upsets me in humour.”
159 Like not being able to feel, the failure to create an 
accurate representation of the city and its atmosphere resulted in deep frustration as 
unrecorded experience was forever lost and thus wasted. Ruskin was relieved when he 
finally managed to “get” his “subject of the Grand Canal,” as it was “almost the only 
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thing  I  have  got  in  Venice  worthy  of  Venice.”
160 The  perceptive  process  was  not 
complete until Ruskin had represented, fixed and appropriated the observed scene or 
detail on paper. More generally, Ruskin perceived unrecorded spectating of natural 
grandeur as a waste, as he noted on March 31
st 1844: “I am afraid all my watching is 
of very little use unless I get a pencil in hand.” Sketching allowed him to capture 
specific aspects of nature scenes and his vocabulary was often distinctly photographic, 
as for instance in this entry of October 24
th 1840 in Nice: “I climbed and sketched; got 
two general views.”
161 The verb “get” clearly accentuates Ruskin’s desire to remove 
and own the depicted scene. 
Just  like  the  photograph  captivates  and  represents  selected  spatial  and 
temporal  aspects  of  reality,  Ruskin’s  diaries  are  preoccupied  with  arresting  the 
transience of lived experience. His ekphrastic and photographic records of Venice 
respond to a voracious need for appropriative intake, which was intensified by the 
threat which modern industrialisation posed to the authenticity of this masterpiece of a 
city.  However,  beyond  the  preservation  of  Venice,  which  was  intended  for  his 
personal and the universal good, Ruskin generally tried to evade the passage of time.  
His  diary  was  an  essential  instrument  in  his  struggle  to  use  his  remaining  time 
efficiently because its photographic and ekphrastic gesture allowed him to preserve 
and re-appropriate time that had lapsed.  
 
Obsession with Time: the 1835-1847 Diary versus the Brantwood Diary  
 
Before investigating the significance of time in the Brantwood Diary, I shall examine 
the 1835-1847 diary’s preoccupation with remembering the past, which shows that 
Ruskin forced himself to keep a continuous written record for future consumption. 
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Ruskin viewed time as a precious resource, which became the standard against which 
he measured the quality of his life. He frequently debated whether an experience he 
had just noted was worthy of the time spent on it. In the Brantwood Diary (1876-
1883), Ruskin was less concerned with the time occupied with recording; now he 
panicked because the years were “narrowing to end,” as he wrote on July 18
th 1879.
162 
He anxiously looked into the future and consciously tried to make the most of the past 
(by frequently re-reading his diaries), the present and the future. Ruskin’s health was 
fragile: he had suffered episodes of dementia and feared that the strike of blindness 
might deprive him of the visual delights he so cherished. Accordingly, with death 
looming, Ruskin became all the more determined to “spend” time “well” and was 
obsessed with calculating the days he had left. Diary-keeping and the sensible use of 
time became inseparable tools through which Ruskin intended to maintain his mental 
health. 
During  1835-1847,  Ruskin  treated  the  diary  as  storage  for  his  visual 
memoranda.  He  sought  for  the  diary  to  imitate  the  comprehensiveness  of  a 
photographic anthology by transferring visual information onto its pages. The process 
of  compilation  was  less  important  than  the  hoped-for  result—Ruskin  consistently 
needed to convince himself that the self-discipline required to verbally encapsulate 
time ultimately served his endeavour to perceive his life as a “whole.” The diary of 
the 1840s is thus scattered with entries in which Ruskin laments the tediousness of the 
task. On December 30
th 1840, for instance, he confesses that “I should write much 
more here. […] It is a great bore to keep a diary but a great delight to have kept 
one.”
163 Keeping a diary is thus seen as a present investment in the future. The present 
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self anticipates the future self’s need for reconnection and therefore sacrifices time 
into recording visual experience. 
Ruskin measured the magnitude of the depicted experience in terms of how 
much time it deserved in his diary and hierarchically ordered the material that merited 
the  diary’s  attention.  On  January  3
rd  1841,  for  instance,  Ruskin  regrets  omitting 
anecdotes from his social life over the depiction of a sublime moment listening to 
music: “I wish I could note more of the conversation yesterday—or rather, all—for it 
was thoroughly interesting or amusing; but I cannot spend much time over this.”
164 He 
then at length describes “the purest piece of music I have yet met with,” asserting the 
prominence of art over the self.
165 
The  scarcity  of  available  time  reinforced  Ruskin’s  tendency  to  treat  his 
professional and private life as one, which is obvious in the occasional conflation of 
his diary and his letters. Shortage of time seemed to temporarily obliterate the diary’s 
need for privacy. The entry of February 8
th-11
th 1841 indicates that, for Ruskin, in 
imitative  representation,  the  generic  outlet  used  for  expression  was  of  minor 
importance, given that expression took place at all: “I have been writing so many 
letters that I forgot [the diary].”
166 The letters, although they provided an expressive 
vent, deprived Ruskin of the possession of his experience, which is why the diary 
quickly  regained  importance  after  periods  of  substitution  by  the  letter.
167  On 
September 2
nd 1841 in Leamington, Ruskin realises the necessity of diaristic activity: 
“I have considered my letter home as diary enough lately, but in case they are not kept 
I shall begin again. I have had a good deal of pleasure looking over this thing to night. 
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I begin to feel poetical about the places now.”
168 Ruskin refuses to be separated from 
the  experience  that  he  nostalgically  feels  belongs  to  him  and  resumes  the  time-
consuming habit of self-writing.  
  The choice to recommence his diaristic activity is significant, because at times 
Ruskin  seemed  to  be  not  altogether  assured  of  the  purpose  of  these  records.  The 
amount of time the diary necessitated was a recurrent concern for Ruskin, already in 
the 1835-47 diary, as can be seen in the following entry of March 16
th 1941, in Mola 
di Gaeta, now Formia, near Naples: “I have kept this stuff of diary for a year; it has 
taken up quantities of time, and is a heavy thing in one’s desk—I don’t know how 
much else it is good for, yet it may be amusing, some time or other.”
169 Again, Ruskin 
debates  whether  the  quality  of  the  amassed  memories  can  justify  the  time  their 
representation requires. The entry of April 10
th of the same year similarly ponders 
whether  the  value  of  time  has  exceeded  the  value  of  the  diaristic  record:  “I  am 
neglecting this at present. I usually consult my inclinations with respect to it, and have 
not made up my mind what time is really due, or whether it is all waste.”
170 The 
diary’s content is thus dictated by Ruskin’s emotional preferences, and because of the 
strong  emotional  bias  that  is  inherent  in  the  compositional  process,  its  value  is 
questionable. However, Ruskin seems to distrust neither the quality of his writing, nor 
the remarkableness of his memories, but is most concerned about whether he has put 
time to good use. 
  These doubts relating to the fruitful employment of his temporal resources are 
juxtaposed with entries that display a sheer obsession with the accurate rendition of a 
temporal sequence. On June 27
th 1841 in Calais, Ruskin writes up his continental 
journey and displays a strong desire for photographic completeness: “I hardly know if 
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it is wasted time, but I have missed two or three important hours in the hurry of the 
stuff above, which I may as well note; so I go back to Vallombrosa.”
171 Ruskin’s 
eagerness to create an all-encompassing retrospective account aims at preventing gaps 
in his memory, because, as I have shown, for Ruskin “wishing [he] had kept more 
diary” was a sinful waste of resources.
172 
In  the  Brantwood  Diary,  Ruskin’s  intense  preoccupation  with  the  correct 
employment of time took the shape of retrospective doubt.  His loneliness increased 
as can be seen in this entry of September 3
rd 1879: “every year leaves me more lost to 
myself and to my memories—a gleaner in reaped or ravaged fields.”
173 Because his 
receptiveness to visual stimulations had decreased immensely, observation, which had 
for so long been the primary content of Ruskin’s life, no longer connected him to the 
external world. Like this entry suggests, he had extracted everything he could from 
ephemeral visual pleasures.  
  Ruskin’s seclusion became manifest when he realised that the insubstantial 
nature of visual reality, which provided but momentary joy, could not console his 
isolation as an ageing man. In March 1878, in his Notes on Turner, Ruskin laments 
the utter futility of his perceptive project:  
Oh, that some one had but told me, in my youth, when all my heart seemed to 
be  set  on  these  colours  and  clouds,  that  appear  for  a  little  while  and then 
vanish away, how little my love for them would serve me, when the silence of 
the lawn and wood in the dews of the morning should be completed; and all 
my thoughts should be of those whom, by neither, I was to meet more!
174  
 
The discontent behind this passage may stem from the fact that Ruskin, like Hopkins, 
had filled this emotional emptiness with the observation of the external world and 
                                                 
171 Ibid., p. 207.  
172 Ibid., p. 214; September 30
th 1841.  
173 Viljoen, ed., The Brantwood Diary of John Ruskin, p. 198.  
174 Edward Tyas Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, eds., The Works of John Ruskin, vol. 12 (London: 
George Allen, 1912), pp. 409-410. My italics.   211 
never knew the “joy of approved love,” which he greatly laments in Praeterita.
175 
Christopher Newall similarly mentions this escapist tendency, referring to an instance 
in Chamonix of 1854 when Ruskin was determined to forget about his failed marriage 
by concentrating on his drawings.
176  
Having effaced his needs for human affection through focussing on nature and 
art, by the late 1870s, Ruskin felt that he had invested his energies wrongly. Because 
he had concentrated on the ephemeral all his life, Ruskin felt lost in an increasingly 
depopulated world. A belated return to the self through the creation of self-portraits, 
which the American author and professor of art Charles Eliot Norton (1827-1908) had 
suggested to Ruskin as a means to control his mental illness, proved to be a difficult 
endeavour.  There  is  surprisingly  little  critical  material  on  these  self-portraits,  but 
Christopher  Newall  finds  that  they  “speak  of  unhappiness  and  frustration.”
177 The 
look in the mirror did not bring about the hoped-for consolidation of the self, but, as 
Newall notes: “as the artist looked at himself, he was confronted by the reality of his 
own isolation.”
178 Making himself the object of study might have clashed with his 
early Evangelical beliefs but, most importantly, it seems that Ruskin was confronted 
with a self he had never aspired to and resorted to reading himself instead of seeing 
himself. 
  The  Brantwood  Diary  shows  that  Ruskin’s  rigid  adherence  to  his  lifelong 
habit of diaristic recording rose out of an effort to maintain mental sanity. Newall has 
observed  that  since  the  1850s,  Ruskin  had  used  drawing  as  a  means  to  escape 
emotional despair. Furthermore, since the 1860s, “[Ruskin] suffered increasingly from 
                                                 
175 Ruskin, Praeterita, p. 190.  
176 Whelchel, ed., John Ruskin and the Victorian Eye, p. 103. 
177 Ibid., p. 111.  
178 Ibid.   212 
bouts of deep depression [and] turned to drawing as an aid to mental stability.”
179 
Whereas drawing allowed Ruskin to “forget himself,” he used his diary as a means of 
keeping himself organised when this became increasingly difficult. The diary became 
a ledger, an organisational tool and a forum for his quantitative approach to time, 
which was seen as both the poison that would kill him and as a life-giving resource. 
Ruskin developed an obsession with the countable nature of time and increasingly 
deplored his own uselessness and that of the material he gathered in his diary. His 
habit  of  dutifully  recording  astonishing  visual  spectacles  remained  unbroken  and 
defied the obstacles of mental illness, blindness and listlessness, as can be seen in his 
entry of October 15
th 1877: “I never wrote diary with so little care or satisfaction, 
feeling how the useless mass accumulates—but must note this most terrific morning 
of rain with frantic N.W. wind I have ever seen.”
180 Ruskin’s habit of keeping a diary 
is stronger than his languor and the moral necessity to depict outstanding phenomena 
withstands the general “[numbness] and [uselessness]” that he reported in October 
1877.
181 The photographic gesture was now devoid of emotional intensity and Ruskin 
at  times  devalued  the  content  of  his  diary.  Thus,  neither  desire,  nor  the  typical 
admiration for the subject, motivated this entry, but it was a product of reflex and 
therefore mere gesture.  
  Ruskin sought to stay in control of his life by using the limited time available 
to him as productively as possible through naming time’s entities. In 1883, the dates 
of  many  of  the  entries  were  preceded  by  the  number  of  days  until  his  seventieth 
birthday, as this entry of July 5
th shows: “Wednesday, 2024, [2]6
th, [2]7
th, 2022, all 
work against me, with great general vexation for a result.”
182 Like Eliot and Gissing, 
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Ruskin directly associated time with his sense of self-worth, as can be seen in the 
deep shock he experienced upon the discovery that his system for calculating life 
expectancy was flawed: 
Why,—I have miscounted grievously. There are now only 148 days left of this 
year—the five whole ones—1725 and 39 in 1889, altogether only 1912 [.] 
How I got my number of 2145, at p 62 [March 25] I can’t think—but even 
taking that, there have been 144 days since, so I have missed count of two [.] 
Today, by that count would be 2001, which I’ll go on with—as it is so.
183 
 
Ruskin’s obsession with time compelled him to approximate the moment of his death, 
which he deemed necessary to a maximisation of experience. He tried to get as much 
work  done  as  possible  and  thus  needed  to  know  the  limits  within  which  he  was 
operating.  
   As for Alexander Bain, for Ruskin, the discipline the diary required was a 
deliberate  effort  to  both  retain  and  regain  a  clear  and  balanced  mind:  “I  CAN’T 
understand how so extremely rational a person as I am can lose their wits […] I do 
think if it were to go crazy again for the third time I should know I was so.”
184 Despite 
its limited efficiency, the diary constituted a reassuring self-monitoring device, which 
offered  an  opportunity  for  therapeutic  self-retrieval  through  re-reading,  allowing 
Ruskin to see himself as a “whole.” However, Ruskin seemed to find the diary an 
effective monitor of his professional output. Work and rigid self-control were needed 
to keep Ruskin’s condition from getting worse, as his entry of February 15
th 1878 
shows: “I must get to work,—or I shall get utterly into dreamland.”
185 Ruskin was 
exceedingly  busy  with  other-directed  study  during  the  last  years  of  his  life;  he 
founded the Guild of St George, wrote Fors Clavigera, numerous lectures and his 
autobiography. He also taught at Oxford.  
                                                 
183 Ibid., p. 330; August 15
th 1883.  
184 Unpublished  letter  of  August  20
th  1881;  quoted  in  Viljoen,  ed.,  The  Brantwood  Diary  of  John 
Ruskin, p. 258.  
185 Ibid., p. 92.    214 
 As with the other diarists, work and emotional agitation often interfered with 
Ruskin’s duty to keep a diary, despite his best efforts to be disciplined, as he reported 
on  January  5
th  1882:  “It  is  infinitely  strange  to  me  that  I  can’t  keep  this  book 
regularly—resolve as I will.”
186 Like reading Plato, writing the diary was seen as a 
necessary and beneficial form of mental exercise, as this entry of January 27
th 1879 
shows: “Monday. After the most solemn resolutions always to do this first thing, here 
I’ve missed two days.”
187 Ruskin equated the interruption of the regularity of these 
healthy activities with self-neglect, which was the source of guilt: “A whole week 
unrecorded—no Plato done—nor much else.”
188 Although his experience proved the 
contrary, Ruskin believed he could be in control of his mental health by exerting 
rigorous self-discipline and he thus viewed the deterioration of his condition as his 
personal  responsibility.  Ruskin’s  honest  account  of  his  deficiencies,  which  recalls 
Eliot, takes on a confessional character that denotes a desire for an absolving other to 
forgive the shortages that even extreme self-control and incessant effort to be both 
creative and efficient could not equalise.  
 
Ruskin’s diary resembles George Eliot’s and George Gissing’s diary in that it 
treats the execution of duty towards the self and the other as a primary subject. Like 
Eliot,  Ruskin  was  uncomfortable  with  cultivating  the  self  without  being  socially 
conscious  and  desired  to  educate  those  that  were  not  given  his  extraordinary 
perceptive  skills  or  the  opportunity  to  travel.  His  diary’s  concern  with  work  is 
comparable to Gissing’s, but since Ruskin had no money worries, the premises of the 
lives of these two diarists are radically different. However, we can identify a principal 
characteristic  that  unites  these  three  diarists:  the  duty  to  observe  the  external  and 
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social  environment  and  create  didactic  (Gissing  to  a  lesser  extent)  representations 
with ceaseless energy and motivation. The accomplishment of this duty determined 
the value of the individual.  
Despite his intense dislike of the ontologically void mechanisation that came 
with  modernity  and  despite  his  humanistic  defence  of  fallibility  in  The  Stones  of 
Venice, it seems that Ruskin expected himself  to function with the regularity  and 
precision  of  a  machine.  The  fact  that  no  visual  medium  could  render  the  reality 
Ruskin sought to represent in satisfying quality reveals that Ruskin did not accept his 
own  imperfections.  Like  Eliot  and  Gissing  he  constantly  strove  to  achieve  the 
humanly impossible and even his own realisation that perception was governed by an 
inherent  emotional  dynamic  did  not  lessen  the  disappointment  he  felt  about  his 
shortcomings as an observer. The diary was seen as a means to capture, organise and 
preserve Ruskin’s visual and professional experience and was both the product and 
the witness of his photographic possessiveness. 
Ruskin’s obsession with arresting ephemeral visual reality can also be seen in 
the diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins, whose desire to possess the visual aspects of the 
natural  world  was  so  intense  that  he  longed  to  be  part  of  them.  Ruskin’s 
anthropomorphist attachment to places and nature can also be found in Hopkins’s 
work. However, Hopkins, the Jesuit, obviously lacked the large audience that Ruskin 
enjoyed  and  was  forced  to  keep  his  creative  work  to  himself.  Because  he  was 
motivated by a strong desire to observe and appropriate visual sights, he emphasised 
the religious importance for the observer to establish a dialogue with the natural world, 
responding  to  nature’s  fundamental  need  to  be  seen.  Hopkins’s  diary  presents 
photographic representations of nature scenes that could be compared to Ruskin’s, but   216 
Hopkins, much more so than Ruskin, kept the emotional self out of his diary and 
constructed himself purely as an observer.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Finding a Place for the Self: the Ontological Struggle of Gerard Manley Hopkins 
(1844-1889). 
 
In the work and diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins, the pressures that the previously 
discussed diarists perceived to be acting upon them, such as emotional repression, 
self-discipline and the obligation to record visual experience, mingled. All his life, 
Hopkins struggled to reconcile his homosexual emotions with his love of poetry and 
his need for ascetic order and human affection. Hopkins greatly exerted himself trying 
to settle the quarrel between socio-religious convention and personal fulfilment. This 
chapter argues that in order to evade shameful, unrespectable emotion and contain his 
ongoing internal conflicts, Hopkins converted to Catholicism and joined the Jesuit 
order, which promised him shelter through self-effacement. However, this religious 
choice could not quench Hopkins’s need for validation as a human being and a poet. 
Because his desire to assert himself violated the ascetic stance that he sought to adopt, 
he designed a system of signification that was based on the concepts of “inscape” and 
“instress”  in  order  to  convert  undesirable  emotions  into  divine  praise  through 
aesthetic contemplation.
1  
Through  imagining  nature  to  be  dependent  on  the  human  observer  for 
signification, Hopkins could theoretically combine self-effacement and self-assertion 
and construct his sensual desires as essential to the execution of God’s will. In reality, 
although the Jesuit doctrines provided Hopkins with the tools to exert self-control, he 
was unable and unwilling to give up his love of beauty. The inability to develop his 
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poetic talent, the frequent logistic changes and the lack of a human “other” can be 
seen to have led to the desolation of the “terrible” sonnets of 1885, which, as I shall 
show,  mark  the  collapse  of  Hopkins’s  ontological  construct,  crumbling  under  the 
weight of the demands of asceticism.  
The vast body of religious scholarship dealing with Hopkins has tended to 
read the “spiritual desolation” of the “terrible” sonnets as an abstract despair in which 
“the  self,  abandoned  of  all  support,  dwells  in  a  space  which  is  entirely  without 
contents,” as J. Hillis Miller has noted.
2 I, on the other hand, will show that this “lack” 
of  content  was  not  purely  of  a  spiritual  nature,  but  had  material  implications: 
Hopkins’s gradually decreasing ability to suppress his emotional self and to focus 
only on nature and God can be traced back to a lack of interpersonal bonding, the 
mental  exhaustion  due  to  a  lifelong  lack  of  belonging  and  the  lack  of  sources  of 
natural beauty through which to compensate for said lacks. While Miller has rightly 
observed that Hopkins refused to take responsibility for the “terrible” sonnets and 
attributed  them  to  “inspirations  unbidden,”  I  will  explain  that  he  associated 
involuntary emotion with those aspects of his self he sought to silence, namely, his 
homosexual otherness.  
Generally, religious critics tend to appropriate Hopkins’s terminology, such as 
“inscape” and “instress,” in order to conduct an analysis of his work; an approach that, 
through sympathetic immersion, attempts to recreate Hopkins’s thought processes and 
perpetuates his circular, self-inscaping ontology.
3 Although the frequently discussed 
religious  elements  such  as  Duns  Scotus’s  “hacienda”  (thisness)  and  Ignatian 
Meditation reinforced Hopkins’s preoccupation with the external environment, they in 
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themselves did not motivate Hopkins’s decision to convert to Catholicism, but were 
part of his attempts to ground himself in the world. I will therefore not analyse the 
impact of religious practices on Hopkins’s mental states but argue that the perceived 
pressure to conform to the codes of respectability (Chapter One) caused Hopkins’s 
conflicted identity, which he sought to resolve through religion.
4   
Throughout his life, Hopkins demonstrated an unquenchable need to write. 
Whereas his early confession notes were written in response to the duty to purge his 
soul, his poetry was a source of pleasure, his diary contained his observations of the 
external  world  and  represented  a  forum  for  his  etymological  findings.  Through 
writing, Hopkins sought to mediate between the visual and the spiritual realms of 
experience,  which  allowed  him  to  maintain  a  safe  distance  from  the  world  while 
crafting  the  illusion  of  proximity.  Hopkins’s  need  for  ontological  integration  is 
obvious  in  his  diary,  as  he  performed  the  role  of  masculine  poet  (Chapter  One), 
describing and poeticising nature rather than processing “dangerous” emotion.”
5  The 
diary  can  be  seen  as  a  basis  for  Hopkins’s  poetry;  from  its  beginnings  in  his 
undergraduate  years,  he  noted  “etymological  speculations,”  which  Miller 
convincingly reads as “the first examples in his work of a reconstruction of the world 
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5 Robert Bernard Martin has suggested that Hopkins, in his early adulthood, executed the purification 
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nd /November 18
th, 1879:  
No one can admire beauty of the body more than I do, and it is of course a comfort to find 
beauty in a friend or a friend in beauty. But this kind of beauty is dangerous. Then comes the 
beauty of the mind, such as genius, and this is greater than the beauty of the body and not to 
call dangerous. And more beautiful than the beauty of the mind is the beauty of character, the 
‘handsome heart.’  
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through the discovery of rhymes.”
6 Beyond the onomatopoeic connections between 
words  that  Hopkins  was  searching,  he  used  the  diary  to  construct  himself  as  an 
observer. 
Hopkins, like Ruskin (Chapter Three), needed to invest both his visual and 
emotional capacities into the observed object in order to fulfil his perceived function 
as an observer. The observer’s emotions had to be passionate, yet devoid of selfish 
motivations, which shows that Hopkins strove to achieve the delicate balance between 
the  cultivation  of  his  talent  and  the  silencing  of  the  self.  Although  this  tension 
between self-effacement and self-assertion characterises all the diarists this thesis has 
dealt with, for Hopkins, giving in to his physical desires for the male body represented 
a  serious  transgression  against  his  own  masculinity  and  Victorian  sexual 
conventions.
7  By  joining  the  Jesuits,  however,  Hopkins  compromised  both  his 
effeminate sexual desire for men and his masculine wish for the publication of his 
work. The result was that Hopkins felt like an ineffectual “eunuch,” who violated 
conflicting codes of behaviour, because none of his identities could be developed.
8 
Like Justus George Lawler, I would like to clarify that for Hopkins, manliness never 
“entail[ed] anything like bluff, male assertiveness.”
9  It is more likely that he thought 
along the lines of Pater’s 1893 essay on Plato’s aesthetics, which viewed a “man” as 
an “apt” person advocating “temperance;” someone “full of consciousness of what 
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one does […] of intention and of consequent purpose,” which reflects some of the 
codes of respectability that Chapter One has described.
10 
Although Howard J. Fulweiler has called Hopkins “the Victorian poet of the 
self,”  his  “self”  should  not  be  understood  as  fulfilled,  actualised,  or  unified.
11 
Throughout his life, Hopkins struggled to reconcile his emotional self, the self that 
society  deemed  acceptable  and  an  ideal  ascetic  self.  In  the  1860s,  Hopkins  first 
attempted to redeem his unrespectable emotions through his confession notes (March 
1865-January 1866), which he used to monitor and purge his shameful longings for 
Digby Dolben. Significantly, in the 1860s, Hopkins sought to contain his urges to, if 
not physically, then definitely visually,  establish homosexual contact by  using his 
diary  and  poetry  to  affirm  his  position  as  a  passive  observer,  wooed  by  nature. 
Looking  at  boys  was  supplanted  by  the  consistent  observation  and  description  of 
nature. Because Hopkins diverted his gaze and his emotions from the human being to 
the natural world, he needed to legitimise his attachment to plants and animals by 
constructing them as animated beings that invited his gaze. Hopkins viewed himself 
as  connected  to  nature  through  a  relationship  of  magnetic  symbiosis:  through 
investing all his emotional energy into observing natural objects and realising their 
inscapes, he worshipped God, who had created all this splendour. By thus portraying 
his emotions as necessary components of an interconnected universe, Hopkins both 
normalised their subversive nature and validated himself in God’s eyes. 
  In the 1870s, Hopkins’s diary displays an increased identification with nature 
which  was  evidenced  by  a  consistent  personification  of  natural  objects.  The 
consciousness  he  ascribed  to  the  plants  he  observed  became  progressively 
anthropomorphised, as he described the physical particularities of natural objects as 
                                                 
10 Ibid.  
11 Howard  W.  Fulweiler,  “Here  a  Captive  Heart  Busted":  Studies  in  the  Sentimental  Journey  of 
Modern Literature (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), p. 114.   222 
their “behaviour.” Hopkins’s attempt to humanise the natural world can be compared 
to Gissing’s identification with his literary heroes as both compensated their lack of 
companionship through clinging to an ideal. Despite actively positioning himself at 
specific spots from which to conduct his studies of the visual world, Hopkins still 
insisted on portraying himself as a passive observer. His desire to be an integral part 
of nature was reflected in this habit of including his own presence in his ekphrasic 
records. 1875 is the last year of which we possess a diaristic record, but Hopkins’s 
subsequent poems, letters and sermons provide evidence of a gradual disillusionment 
with his religio-aesthetic system and a forced resistance to the threat of ontological 
annihilation.  
  This disenchantment culminated in the 1880s, a period of much emotional 
turmoil.  Hopkins  manifested  an  immense  discontent  with  his  work  at  University 
College Dublin which the Jesuits had assigned to him. He felt a growing need to 
assert his individuality and counteract his feelings of eunuchal ineffectualness through 
the publication of his poetry. Hopkins realised that, paradoxically, he had lost power 
over  his  life  by  trying  to  gain  control  over  his  emotions,  which  triggered  his 
simultaneous desire for a total seclusion from the world and a more direct engagement 
with it. At this point, it seems that Hopkins would have liked to devote his life to his 
poetry,  if  this  desire  for  personal  validation  had  not  violated  the  vows  of  self-
effacement that determined his life. His frustration over being a “eunuch” who could 
produce  neither  poetry  nor  offspring  culminated  in  the  crisis  of  1885,  which  is 
represented in the “terrible” sonnets, a sequence of poems that is characterised by 
intense  despair  and  religious  doubt.  Because  his  ontology  no  longer  offered  the 
necessary support, Hopkins found himself in a hell of self-reflexive barrenness in 
which  self-inscaping  alone  arrested  the  ever-increasing  effacement  of  his  self.   223 
Hopkins prevented a total collapse by admitting his need for a human other and this 
refusal  to  give  in  to  despair  reflects  the  same  emotional  self-discipline  the  other 
diarists under examination administered.  
  However, we see that Hopkins attempted to silence his self more pitilessly 
than any of the other diarists did. Intending to maintain order in his emotional life, 
Hopkins gave up personal agency both through substituting his will for God’s and 
handing his body and mind to the Jesuits. Because both work and charity were a 
necessary  part  of  Hopkins’s  vocation,  his  other-directed  behaviour  seems  less 
heartfelt than George Eliot’s as he did not feel attracted to community work. Although 
George Gissing was forced to work ceaselessly, he had the relative luxury of being 
able to pick the professional occupation he desired; an avenue that was closed for 
Hopkins. Hopkins was even less free to travel than Gissing, which intensified his 
indifference towards the community. For Hopkins, much like the other diarists, albeit 
for different reasons, the pressure to work with absolute self-discipline was a source 
of great discontent. Whereas for Eliot, Gissing and Ruskin, the diary offered a forum 
for constructing a ‘work identity’ as it were, and allowed them to vent and relativise 
work-related frustration, Hopkins’s diary tends to only portray the self as an observer 
of nature, displaying relatively few emotional struggles or complaints. This can partly 
be attributed to the fact that Hopkins expressed his meditations on the self in his 
retreat notes and redeemed his sins in his confession notes (at least early on in his 
career), which shows that he abstained from contemplating his self except through the 
veil of religious practice.  
Although  Victorian  Oxford,  according  to  Alison  G.  Sulloway,  “fostered 
[intense  male  friendships]  as  pedagogical  weapons  in  forming  and  chastening  the 
young,” Hopkins’s sexual orientation placed him outside of the realm of respectability,   224 
which he could only re-enter if he permanently distanced himself from his emotional 
urges.
12 I agree with Julia F. Saville that Hopkins seems to have developed an interest 
in  ascetic  religion  due  to  his  pathologisation  of  “same-sex  passion  as  a  malady 
associated with self-indulgence and insidious languor to be remedied with strict self-
discipline.”
13  Because  homosexual  emotions  were  regarded  as  completely 
unacceptable, Hopkins felt guilty of violating the codes of propriety that Chapter One 
has described, even if he never physically acted out his passions. Hopkins’s drastic 
decision  to  convert  to  Catholicism  and  to  join  the  Jesuits,  by  which  he  hoped  to 
acquire  total  self-mastery,  represented  both  a  “source  of  spiritual  strength”  that 
counteracted  emotional  subversion  and  a  “regrettably  oppressive  regimen”  from 
which poetry was the only escape, as Saville has rightly claimed.
14 As I shall show, 
the temptations of the external world constituted both the source of disgust and fear 
which Hopkins was glad find shelter from, and a well of fascinating, self-affirming 
avenues, such as thrilling friendships and the prospect of literary fame which Hopkins 
longed  to  take  part  in.  However,  the  self-abnegation  that  Hopkins  strove  towards 
condemned him to invest his work in unappreciative congregations and students and 
to reserve his poetry for selected friends.  
Hopkins’s diary, in its dual role as both the voice and ‘silencing tool’ of his 
self, reveals very little personal information. This chapter’s chronological structure 
aims  to  decode  Hopkins’s  poetic  diaristic  records  and  reveal  their  function  in  the 
legitimisation  and  channelling  of  his  shame  over  his  homosexual  desires.  Before 
analysing Hopkins’s role as a static, yet dynamic observer in his diary, I will offer a 
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biographical account of his religious career and explain his terminology. I will then 
read Hopkins’s “terrible” sonnets of 1885 in light of contemporary critical views of 
the relation between place and subjectivity.  
 
Hopkins’s Religious Career 
Gerard Manley Hopkins was born on July 28
th 1844 in Stratford to Manley Hopkins 
and Kate Smith. Manley Hopkins was a successful marine lawyer who had a strong 
interest  in  literature  and  published  several  books  of  poetry  and  critical  reviews. 
Although Kate had been mildly interested in modern languages in her adolescence, 
she  did  not  pursue  these  once  she  was  married.  The  family  was  quite  well-off 
financially and their religious beliefs can be described as “mainstream Anglican.”
15  
After  spending  nine  years  at  Highgate  School,  Gerard  entersed  Balliol  College, 
Oxford in April 1863.  
  Hopkins’s life was dominated by an alternating desire to embrace and reject 
human contact. As his homosexual emotions established him as other to his cultural 
and familial background, his decision to convert to Catholicism, which involved a 
drastic dissociation from his family, friends, and a traditional home, caused him both 
relief and intense anxiety. Converting to Catholicism and joining the Jesuit order can 
therefore be seen as a resolve to permanently adopt a respectable identity, which made 
Hopkins disregard his need for a human other. 
When Hopkins went to Oxford in 1863, he spent the first months in an excited 
social frenzy, making many friends and, as he wrote to his mother, he was “almost too 
happy.”
16 According to Hopkins’s biographer Norman White, Oxford in the 1860s 
was populated by different “sets” of students who grouped together according to their 
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aesthetic tastes and artistic and leisurely interests. Because Hopkins was not gifted 
when it came to sports, he befriended the “readers,” who, like him, cultivated a life of 
the  mind.
17 It  soon  became  obvious  that  Hopkins  could  not  share  his  friends’ 
attraction to girls and was extremely uncomfortable with sexuality in general, which 
can account for his efforts to minimise his bodily desires and his focus on the visual. 
Even before the events of February 1865, Hopkins was extremely concerned with the 
propriety  of  his  own  behaviour,  to  the  point  that  he  felt  that  others’  unrestrained 
indulgence in the pleasures of the senses corrupted his own purity. Hopkins seems to 
have been strongly influenced by the cultural scepticism towards unconcealed sexual 
emotions (Chapter One), which explains his disgust with the coarse, unrespectable 
behaviour  which  his  friends  Alfred  Erskine  Gathorne-Hardy  and  Edward  Bond 
displayed on their reading holiday in Wales of August 1864. Hopkins generally had “a 
hard time of it to resist contamination from the bawdy jokes and allusions of Bond 
and  Hardy,”  as  his  letter  to  Mowbray  Baillie  of  July  24
th  shows.  His  friends’ 
excitement at the presence of four girls from Reading, which degenerated into an 
“unacademic romp,” to use Michael Matthew Kaylor’s term, intensified his aversion 
to this giddy debauchery.
 18 Hopkins found himself in a liminal space between (at 
least) three conflicting value systems: first, his culture’s general scepticism towards 
the  display  of  emotion,  second,  his  own  homosexual  preferences  and  third,  the 
heterosexual curiosity and titillation of his friends from which Hopkins wanted to 
abstain.  
During  his  first  months  in  Oxford,  Hopkins  felt  attracted  to  Liddon  and 
Pusey’s Anglo-Catholic aestheticism, and, as Jill Muller has convincingly argued, “he 
might have remained in the Church of England all his life […] were it not for the 
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emotional  and  religious  crisis  he  experienced  in  the  early  months  of  1865.”
19 In 
February  1865,  Hopkins  made  the  acquaintance  of  Digby  Mackworth  Dolben,  a 
young religious poet who was going to convert to Catholicism but was impeded from 
doing so by his tragic death by drowning at age nineteen. Hopkins was extremely 
taken by Dolben’s beauty and religious devotion. This strong attraction resulted in 
sexual guilt, which Hopkins immediately counteracted by starting to write confession 
notes  to  increase  his  self-mastery  through  rigorous  self-monitoring.  When 
encountering Dolben, Hopkins’s homoerotic desire flared up and caused anxiety and 
shame, which he, like many homosexual men of the nineteenth century according to 
David Hilliard, expressed through the “codes” of Anglo-Catholicism, but particularly 
through his concepts of “inscape” and “instress,” as I shall show.
20 Hopkins’s desire 
for  a  consistent  and  unified  self  that  could  transcend  emotional  confusion  and 
fluctuation, can thus partly be traced back to romantic disappointment, such as his 
obsession with Dolben or the friendship with Alexander Strachey, which like many 
Oxford friendships “hovered somewhere in the undefined area between friendship and 
love.”
21 David Hilliard’s suggestion that Catholicism might have offered a structure 
repelling  all  sexuality,  thus  sheltering  a  distressed  young  Hopkins,  seems  very 
convincing:  
It seems inherently possible that young men who were secretly troubled by 
homosexual feelings that they could not publicly acknowledge may have been 
attracted by the prospect of devoting themselves to a life of celibacy, in the 
company of like-minded male friends, as a religiously-sanctioned alternative 
to marriage.
22 
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Because his sexual orientation established Hopkins as “other” to the cultural norm, he 
consciously turned his otherness into a virtue by joining a community that validated 
non-participants in traditional sexual politics. 
Arguably, Hopkins effaced his emotional needs in a radical attempt to silence 
his homosexual self through converting to Catholicism, which permanently alienated 
him from his parental home. His “dear” Anglican family experienced a serious shock, 
prompting  their  “terrible”  reaction  at  his  decision  to  convert.
23 Manley  Hopkins 
implored his son to forbear the conversion and maintain the integrity of the family in 
a very moving letter: “O Gerard my darling boy are you indeed gone from me?”
24 
Hopkins’s conversion inflicted a severe wound to the family unity and the experience 
was equally painful for him, as this extract from a letter of October 20
th 1868 to his 
mother shows: “You might believe that I suffer too.”
25 Despite the deep conviction 
that Hopkins’s need for conversion was beyond his need for human support, he was 
relieved that his family did not exclude and shun him, as can be seen in this letter to 
his father of October 16
th 1866: “you are so kind as not to forbid me your house, to 
which I have no claim, on condition, if I understand, that I promise not to try to 
convert  my  brothers  and  sisters.”
26 The  conversion  did  not  fully  sever  the  family 
bonds but Hopkins’s new identity permanently altered his position in the family. He 
was  still  organically  connected  to  his  family,  but  they  were  “in  Christ  not  near,” 
which made them spiritual strangers.
27  
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Despite his obvious need for the affection of his family, Hopkins longed to be 
part of the eclectic Jesuit community of the select few, who had absolute control over 
their  senses.  Roman  Catholicism,  more  so  than  “effeminate”  Anglo-Catholicism, 
offered  Hopkins  the  high  standards  of  behaviour  which  he  hoped  could  help  him 
overcome  his  sexual  self.
28 In  an  attempt  to  efface  his  homosexual  tendencies, 
Hopkins handed all control over the physical and emotional aspects of his self to the 
Jesuits by entering the Novitiate in 1868. With the consequent abnegation of personal 
agency Hopkins abdicated his right to enjoy emotional groundedness and to develop 
tenderness for a geographical spot, which caused his life to became marked by many 
abrupt and involuntary shifts in location.  
After leaving Oxford in 1868, a place he truly loved, Hopkins grew very fond 
of Stonyhurst where he studied philosophy (1870-1837), but his inability to reside in 
the  location  of  his  choice  impeded  him  from  allowing  his  roots  to  extend  and 
prevented a secure identification with place. Hopkins was forced to repeatedly retract 
his emotional bonds and transfer his existence to a new location, which meant that he 
had to be constantly ready for “instant despatch,” as changes in professional position 
were announced unexpectedly with no more than a few days notice.
29 For instance, at 
Stonyhurst,  “binding  attachments  to  place  or  person  were  never  encouraged  to 
develop.  Similarly,  students  were  not  allowed  to  keep  the  same  rooms  for  long 
periods, but were shifted around.”
30 The objective was of course to force the novices 
to surrender their need for worldly possessions and to maintain a consistent focus on 
God.  
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The Jesuit insistence on the erasure of the physical was geared to eradicate 
personal agency in order to bring about a closer proximity to God. In Roehampton, 
the place of Hopkins’s noviceship 1868-1870, he was not given a new habit, but “an 
older Jesuit’s cast-off,” which impeded any formation of worldly vanity or pride.
31 
The  Jesuits  recognised  the  importance  of  dress  in  the  construction  of  the  self,  as 
Joseph  M.  Becker  explains:  “Dress  serves  as  a  shorthand  expression,  generally 
understood by all, of how one sees oneself and how one wants to be understood by the 
society in which one lives.”
32 Clothing one’s body in unpretentious second-hand attire 
accentuates a deliberate disregard of the body that is comparable to an obliteration of 
physicality. This uniform, worn every day, deprives the Jesuit of the choice of how to 
present himself to others and leaves him always already dressed—the habit becomes 
and replaces the body, thus guaranteeing chastity. 
Material possessions are another aspect of individuality denied to the Jesuit.  
To  let  the  novices  “experience  dependence  first  hand,”  Alfred  Thomas  SJ.  has 
explained, they “had to ask permission from the novice master to be allowed to retain 
the  use  of  certain  personal  belongings  such  as  a  watch,  razor,  a  pocket-knife,  or 
scissors. ‘Little leaves,’ as the practice was called, were renewable monthly.”
33 The 
cultivation of the self thus had to be purely internal, with the vows of poverty and 
obedience encouraging a modest life of chastity. The personal space available to a 
novice was extremely limited, consisting of a small cubicle that resembled a “stall in a 
well-kept stable, except for the red curtains that could be drawn across the front,” 
according to the autobiography of the Jesuit Denis Meadows.
34 The cubicles were 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 116. 
32 Joseph M. Becker, The Re-formed Jesuits: A History of Changes in the Jesuit Order During the 
Decade 1965-1975, p. 51.  
33 Alfred Thomas, Hopkins the Jesuit: the Years of Training (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
p. 79.  
34 Denis Meadows, Obedient Men (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 14.    231 
empty except for an “iron bedstead, a washstand with a pitcher, and a […] chamber 
pot.” We see that, Hopkins’s environment, like Gissing’s, encouraged his aspirations 
to lead a life of the mind.  
The Jesuit life offered little space for self-assertion as both work and leisure 
time  (retreats)  were  determined  by  Hopkins’s  superiors  and  he  had  no  say  in 
determining  his  own  future.  This  complete  dependence  could  feel  homely  and  a 
comfortable relief from the emotions of a conflicted self. Hopkins initially found the 
Catholic  community  to  resemble  a  family  that  provided  warmth,  friendship  and 
entertainment, but often felt depressed over his lack of control. As early as 1868, at 
the debut of his Jesuit career, Hopkins voiced apprehension at the want of assurance 
concerning his future. He wrote to Bridges from Croydon on January 9
th:  
The year you will be away I have no doubt will make a great difference in my 
position though I cannot know exactly what. But the uncertainty I am in about 
the  future  is  so  very  unpleasant  and  so  breaks  my  power  of  applying  to 
anything that I am resolved to end it, which I shall do by going to a retreat at 
Easter at the latest and deciding whether I have a vocation to the priesthood.
35  
 
Presumably still filled with the rather romantic hopes which influenced his decision to 
convert  to  Catholicism,  Hopkins  seemed  threatened  by  the  impending  and 
incomprehensible change.
36 The “unpleasantness” connected to an undefined future 
prevented  him  from  forming  a  concept  of  self  that  was  adapted  to  the  upcoming 
situation.  
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This constant uncertainty dominated Hopkins’s life. At several instances in his 
career, Hopkins was content in the environment in which he was placed and was 
unwilling to leave the geographical place he had become accustomed to. After being 
ordained  as  priest,  in  1877,  Hopkins  was  forced  to  leave  his  beloved  St  Beuno’s 
College as this letter from Hampstead of August 10
th 1877 shows: “Much against my 
inclination I shall have to leave Wales.”
37 Hopkins was rendered ineffectual like a 
child, defenceless against the incontestable decisions of his superiors. Hopkins’s letter 
to Bridges from Bedford Leigh near Manchester of October 8
th 1879 is one of many 
instances in which he was unsure as to the direction his life was to take: “I have left 
Oxford. I am appointed to Liverpool, I do not know for what work.”
38 In Liverpool, 
Hopkins had to deal with impoverished crowds and was frequently confronted with 
alcoholism;  social  work  he  was  in  no  way  qualified  for.  A  letter  to  Baillie  from 
Liverpool of May 22
nd 1880 shows that Hopkins regretted his lack of authority over 
his own place of residence or his occupation: “I do not think I shall be long here. I 
have been long nowhere yet.”
39 Thus deprived of the possibility to plan ahead and 
anticipate future tasks and accommodation, Hopkins’s self was reduced to a dynamic 
of pressure and release: extreme involvement in the trivial world in the form of his 
clerical and educational duties, counterpoised by invigorating spiritual retreats and 
holidays—none of which Hopkins chose himself. 
   Similarly, after having taught Classics for about a year at Stonyhurst College 
(1882-84), a place that he was particularly fond of, he contemplated the prospect of 
being transferred with a certain degree of fatalism in a letter to Bridges of July 26
th 
1883:  
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It seems likely that I shall be removed; where I have no notion. But I have long 
been Fortune’s football and am blowing up the bladder of resolution big and 
buxom for another kick of her foot. I shall be sorry to leave Stonyhurst; but go 
or stay, there is no likelihood of my ever doing anything to last.
40 
 
Hopkins’s  consideration  of  himself  as  “Fortune’s  football”  constitutes  a  critical 
allusion to the arbitrariness with which he was pushed around by his superiors. The 
image of himself as humbly preparing to receive the impact of another shock denotes 
a  self-ironic  acknowledgment  of  his  personal  powerlessness  and  questionable 
manliness.  This  lack  of  self-direction  was  even  experienced  as  shameful  as  he 
admitted on retreat in Tullabeg on January 1
st 1889: 
  Five wasted years almost have passed in Ireland. I am ashamed of the little I 
have done, of my waste of time, although my helplessness and weakness is such 
that I could scarcely do otherwise. […] what is life without aim, without spur, 
without help? All my undertakings miscarry: I am like a straining eunuch. I wish 
then for death: yet if I died now I should die imperfect, no master of myself, and 
that is the worst failure of all. O my God, look down on me.
41 
 
Hopkins’s life as a teaching fellow in Greek at University College Dublin (1884-1889) 
was distinguished by ceaseless, tedious work and the despair of this retreat note is a 
combination of his frustration over bodily illness and a general lack of command over 
his actions. He was “helpless” because the locus of control was outside of himself as 
he had allegedly handed over his will to God, to be administered by his superiors. 
Although, as he wrote in the same note, in general, Hopkins was “only too willing to 
do God’s work,” this particular task, “my work at Stephen’s Green,” proved to be too 
draining.
42 Hopkins felt the dishonour of unmanly passivity despite his eagerness to 
worship God and display a diligent work ethic because his work did not afford him 
the validation that he needed. 
This  eunuchal  ineffectuality  which  was  the  product  of  Hopkins’s  constant 
confrontation with unmanageable tasks is apparent in the oft-quoted passage from 
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Liverpool of October 26
th 1880: “one is so fagged, so harried and gallied up and down. 
And the drunk go on drinking, the filthy, as the scripture says, are filthy still: human 
nature is so inveterate.”
43 Unable to change the chronic vices of those under his care, 
Hopkins  was  never  fully  successful  in  his  endeavours  and  remained  “a  lonely 
began”—not even a beginning which is necessarily followed by a consequence, but a 
being that had achieved absolutely nothing.
44  
To Hopkins, the distance from the social community was both desirable and 
hateful—Ireland, his perceived exile, constituted a “third remove” (l. 9-10), as he 
wrote  in  “To  seem  the  stranger  lies  my  lot”  (1885),  from  his  worldly  core  and 
impeded necessary identification with others. Seclusion from the worldly, however, 
was necessary to the cultivation of his interiority through which he could “give and 
get” “kind love” (l.10). At the ultimate remove from the world, such as in retreats, 
Hopkins was the most able to enjoy his life, as we see in “The Habit of Perfection” 
(1866):
45 
Elected silence, sing to me 
And beat upon my whorled ear, 
Pipe me to pastures still and be 
The music that I care to hear (l.1-4).  
 
This  poem  from  his  pre-conversion  days  demonstrates  Hopkins’s  need  for  silent 
meditation during periods of spiritual and emotional turmoil and the healing powers 
of deliberate withdrawal from the world. The absence of sound was as pleasant and as 
real  as  music  because  the  speaker  had  “elected”  it.  Sheltered  from  work-related 
pressures as well as homoerotic temptations, Hopkins thrived on the calm and silence 
he experienced when in deep religious thought. This was the spiritual home from 
which he drew emotional strength.  
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Despite the very tiring activity of daylong prayer, which was common during 
the years of training and which reoccurred periodically during the retreats he went on 
throughout his life, Hopkins reported genuine happiness when he was able to lead a 
life of the mind. On 12/17 October 1881, during his tertianship in Roehampton, he 
wrote to his friend Dixon:  
My mind is here more at peace than it has ever been and I would gladly live all 
my life, if it were so to be, in as great or a greater seclusion from the world and 
be busied only with God. But in the midst of outward occupation not only the 
mind is drawn away from God, which may be at the call of duty and be God’s 
will,  but  unhappily  the  will  too  is  entangled,  worldly  interests  freshen,  and 
worldly ambitions revive. The man who in the world is as dead to the world as if 
he were buried in the cloister is already a saint. But this is our ideal…
46 
 
Hopkins had joined the Jesuits in order to be “dead to the world” but his mission work 
forced him to engage with the social community very closely. He frequently resented 
these tasks, particularly the years as a professor of Greek at University College Dublin 
(1884-1889).  Hopkins  shared  Ruskin’s  moral  obligation  to  represent  visual  reality 
through writing and sketching and located his real task in the observation of nature.  
 
The 1860s: “Silencing” the Eye 
Because Hopkins had abnegated his body and renounced his ability to travel, his eye 
represented his principal connection to the external world. Like the body’s, the eye’s 
movements  needed  to  be  closely  monitored  as,  for  Hopkins,  both  were  equally 
capable  of  sinful  sexual  behaviour.  As  I  have  explained,  Hopkins  began  writing 
confession  notes  (March  1865-January  1866)  when  he  struggled  to  contain  his 
amorous feelings for Dolben. The initial attempts to control his gaze that these notes 
display can be seen as the foundation of Hopkins’s ontology. 
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In March 1865, Hopkins began to give confession regularly to Canon Liddon 
(1829-1890) as well as Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-1882) at Oxford. Significantly, 
Hopkins’s predominant concern in his confession notes was already his behaviour as 
an observer, as he self-consciously censored his visual intake. Norman H. Mackenzie 
has proposed that in order to make the confession as beneficial as possible, Hopkins 
may have responded to a set of questions from a manual, such as Questions for Self-
Examination: For Common Use:
47 “Have I sought to be noticed, especially by the 
opposite sex? Have I taken undue notice of them? Not ‘made a covenant’ with mine 
eyes?”
48 The  religious  framework  Hopkins  chose  for  his  life  thus  encouraged  the 
“silencing” immobilisation of the eye by portraying gazing at humans as lustful and 
inappropriate, which motivated him to monitor his physical attraction to men even 
more  carefully  and  candidly.  Mackenzie  has  claimed  that  through  such  measures, 
“Hopkins tried to catch at the earliest stage any natural physical impulses that might 
cripple  his  ambition  to  develop  to  their  highest  degree  his  mental  and  spiritual 
capacities.”
49 By conscientiously noting down these visual “sins” and presenting them 
at confession, Hopkins tried to not only to silence but to purge these emotions. 
We can see that Hopkins sought to repress his homosexual desires through 
controlling his visual intake because the confession notes portray the eye as directly 
corresponding to the (physical) emotions. Hopkins attempted to impede his active eye 
from protruding into forbidden territories, as can be seen in a multitude of confession 
notes: “looking at a face in the theatre” (June 20
th 1865), “looking at boys, several 
instances, and foolishness also. Vanity after looking into glass” (July 5
th), “imprudent 
looking  at  organ-boy  and  other  boys”  (July  8
th),  “looking  at  temptations,  esp.  at 
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Geldart naked.”
50 It is obvious that Hopkins had sexual feelings for these boys, which 
he perceived as sinful. It is thus conceivable that Hopkins deflected his gaze from the 
male body onto unthreatening natural objects. 
  Although  homosexuality  was  at  the  top  of  the  hierarchy  of  inappropriate 
behaviour, it was not the only type of conduct that Hopkins sought to eradicate. In the 
confession  notes,  Hopkins  tended  to  reproach  himself  for  lacking  self-control 
generally,  which  resulted  in  “inattentions  at  morning  chapel”  (March  25
th  1865), 
“speaking impertinently to Liddon (about Jowett)” (March 26
th-29
th), or “laziness in 
getting up” (April 5
th).
51 Hopkins’s standards of behaviour became startlingly high as 
he aimed to attain his ascetic ideal.  
Self-control was essential to Hopkins’s existence, because the senses, when 
unmonitored, threatened to take over and destroy his entire being. The following, oft-
quoted,  entry  of  January  22
nd  1866  was  written  several  months  before  Hopkins 
committed himself to the ascetic life of a Catholic novice. It shows that, following the 
shock  of  his  attraction  for  Dolben,  Hopkins  was  determined  to  abstain  from 
unnecessary pleasure and to force himself to keep his focus on his religious duties: 
For Lent. No pudding on Sundays. No tea except if to keep me awake and then 
without sugar. Meat only once a day. No verses in Passion Week or on Fridays. 
Not to sit in armchair except can work in no other way. Ash Wednesday and 
Good Friday bread and water.
52 
 
Although this entry reflects a particularly stern attitude because it addresses Lent, it 
seems that Hopkins attempted to purify his emotions by pushing his body to the limits 
of  endurance.  Hopkins’s  confession  notes  show  that  he  looked  to  Catholicism  to 
acquire techniques by which to strengthen his will power and maintain control over 
the senses. This argument confirms Norman Mackenzie’s suggestion that: 
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the unruliness of [Hopkins’s] passions was the principal hidden emotional spur 
to his determination to devote his whole being to God, and for his choice of the 
Order reputed to be the most exacting, the Jesuits. Certainly his decision against 
the life of a painter was associated with his resolve to avoid a dangerous ‘strain 
upon the passions.’
53 
 
Catholicism,  and  the  Jesuits  in  particular,  offered  Hopkins  an  opportunity  for 
complete self-mastery through guaranteed self-effacement in the worldly sense. Even 
if Hopkins’s will had failed to restrain his emotions, his sexual curiosity would have 
been  prostrated  by  the  rigid  regime  of  the  Jesuits.  Significantly,  writing  was  an 
integral component in exerting self-control as it increased Hopkins’s grasp on reality 
through the visualisation of abstract ideas. However, because poetry for Hopkins was 
an expression of sensual experience, he burnt most of his poems in 1868. At this point, 
the diary became the only immediate extension of the eye, as it had been for Ruskin.  
 
“Inscape” and “Instress”  
In order to escape from the temptations of the body, Hopkins sought to tame his gaze 
through  a  conscious  aversion  from  the  human  object  to  the  natural  object,  which 
became  the  only  stimulant  allowed  into  his  visual  consciousness,  apart  from 
representations  of  Christ.  Around  1868,  Hopkins  started  validating  himself  by 
constructing an ontological system, built on the concepts of “inscape” and “instress,” 
which allowed him to unite the human being, all natural objects and God.
54 Hopkins 
imagined himself as spiritually connected to nature through the eye; with the natural 
object  depending  on  the  observer’s  attention  in  order  to  be  realised.  Although  he 
positioned himself as a passive observer within this interactive system, he integrated 
himself as a necessary part of its functioning.  
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The turn towards nature can be seen as a deliberate movement away from 
dangerous human beauty into the safe realm of natural shapes. Rebecca Boggs has 
suggested that due to the impurity of the act of observing human objects, Hopkins 
devoted his meticulous poetic mind to the portrayal of nature: “Sensual perceptions 
can be trusted to  yield  moral truths only  when objects in nature are the focus of 
perception;  seeing  and  admiring  other  human  beings,  in  contrast,  is  fraught  with 
difficulties.”
55 Sensuality  being  the  “enemy,”  Hopkins  can  indeed  be  seen  to  hide 
behind  the  God-given  responsibility  of  the  observer  to  concentrate  on  the  natural 
world, which is in need of human contemplation.
56  
This ontological system was essential to Hopkins’s self-fashioning because it 
determined the way he positioned himself in the world throughout his life. According 
to  philosopher  J.E.  Malpas,  an  individual’s  identity  is  formed  by  the  narrative 
framework with which he or she interprets the events of his or her life and which 
motivates his or her actions: “The construction and reconstruction of our selves in the 
stories we tell ourselves or that we employ in understanding ourselves—both with 
respect to our pasts and our futures—is integral in the very content and identity of our 
attitudes  and  actions.”
57 Through  animating  his  physical  surroundings,  Hopkins 
established himself as the centre of creation around which the natural objects revolved. 
He was able to legitimise his passion for observation by employing it to praise God. 
Throughout his work, Hopkins aimed to maintain emotional stability by stressing the 
connections between all of God’s designs. Although observation without feeling was 
as unsatisfactory to Hopkins as it was to Ruskin, he rationalised this process through 
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the neologisms “inscape” and “instress” in order to evade the dangerous, erotic aspect 
of emotion. The diary played a crucial role in the conventionalisation of these terms 
on the level of subjective semantics. 
Through his gaze, Hopkins sought to protrude into the natural object and gain 
access  to  its  “inscape,”  which  J.  Hillis  Miller  has  described  as  “the  inner  law  or 
pattern which any one oak tree, cloud, or flower shares with similar trees, clouds or 
flowers.”
58 In Hopkins’s narrative, any natural object belonged to a patterned system, 
but was ultimately unique in itself. As Walter J. Ong has explained, “the ‘inscape’ of 
a being is the distinctive controlling energy that makes the being itself and connects it 
distinctively with all else.”
59 Margaret R. Ellsberg has brilliantly defined “inscape” as 
“universality and particularity unified in a precise identity,” as the form an object or 
being  takes,  which  makes  it  recognisable  in  its  individuality.
60 Hilary  Fraser  has 
emphasised the direct link between Hopkins’s aestheticism and his religion, which 
presented nature as a mirror of Christ. Animated natural objects constantly strove to 
reach as high a level of perfection as possible:  
Christ incarnate, the physical manifestation of God, represented for Hopkins, 
in His selfhood, the pattern, the inscape, to which all created forms aspire. The 
distinctiveness  of  certain  forms,  of  certain  experiences  of  beauty,  was 
explained  by  their  resemblance  to  the  uniqueness  of  Christ’s  religious, 
aesthetic, and poetic experience alike. Christ represented the ultimate inscape, 
and  through  His  Incarnation  the  principles  of  perfect  physical  and  moral 
beauty, love and sacrifice became manifest in the created world.
61 
 
Christ  was  thus  the  corporeal  representative  for  divine  perfection;  a  view  which 
Hopkins designed to remove the dangerous aspects of beauty.
62 Through observing 
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and “inscaping” Christ in and through nature, Hopkins stressed his own resemblance 
to  Christ,  which  allowed  him  to  sanctify  himself  as  God’s  virtuous  servant, 
consciously extinguishing his sexual self. 
  The term “instress” designated the energy that communicated the inscape of 
the  object/being  to  the  perceiver.  Ellsberg  has  characterised  “instress”  as  the 
“undercurrent of energy, the inner pressure that holds things up and together and gives 
them observable intelligibility.”
63 “Instress” thus shaped the object and allowed it to 
maintain  its  “inscape,”  which  made  perception  and  realisation  by  the  observer 
possible.  Beyond  that,  however,  as  Ong  has  argued,  “instress”  denominated  the 
observer’s reaction: “‘Instress’ is the action that takes place when the inscape of a 
given being fuses itself in a given human consciousness in contact at a given moment 
with the being.” The “instress” of an object/being entered the consciousness of the 
perceiving other, which then allowed the “inscape” to be realised. Thanks to these 
definitions, Hopkins could consolidate his belief into the interconnectedness of all of 
God’s creations.  
“Inscape” and “instress” emphasise the interdependence between the observer 
and  the  observed,  opposing  community  to  individualism  and  competition.  These 
metaphors helped Hopkins to counteract his fundamental loneliness, as, through his 
ontological  narrative,  he  reacted  fervently  against  “atomism,”  both  in  science  and 
society.
64  Hopkins had to believe in the existence of an essence within the observed 
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object so that it could carry the meaning he projected upon it and signify him in turn 
as a vital part of creation. He considered “inscape” to be god-given, which negated the 
atomist[s’]  sense [that] the  properties  of  an  object  such  as  the  consecrated 
bread, were caused by the atoms of which it was composed; therefore what 
appeared as bread had to be bread, and not the flesh of God as the doctrine of 
transubstantiation required.
65  
 
Conversely, for Hopkins, the external aspect of natural objects confirmed, rather than 
denied, the existence of a divine creator, as can be seen in this oft-quoted entry from 
his diary of May 18
th 1870: “I do not think I have ever seen anything more beautiful 
than the bluebell I have been looking at. I know the beauty of our Lord by it.”
66 
Hopkins’s  observations  of  nature  were  thus  affirmations  of  his  faith,  as,  in  his 
narrative, God was embodied in his creations.  
 
The Passive Observer in Hopkins’s Diary 
Starting  with  his  early  poetry,  Hopkins  adopted  the  stance  of  the  receiver  of 
impressions in order to guarantee his emotional purity. However, even at this early 
stage  in  his  religious  career,  Hopkins  was  not  altogether  comfortable  with  the 
questionable masculinity which resulted from considering himself as an “all-accepting 
fixèd eye” (l. 6).
67 Hopkins therefore appointed himself as the signifying centre to the 
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natural world in a Platonic fashion, as his poem “The Earth and Heaven so Little 
Known” of 1866 shows: “I am the midst of every zone/And justify the East and West” 
(l. 1-4), which stresses the human being’s active power to organise and possess nature 
by  linguistic  and  scientific  categorisation.  Hopkins’s  identity  as  an  observer  was 
divided between his role as an independent agent seeking out fascinating sights in a 
Ruskinian fashion, gratifying nature’s need to be seen, and the unjudging, charitable 
and endlessly receptive spectator of the natural world. 
Although Hopkins selected objects to which to devote his attention, in his 
diary,  he  portrayed  himself  as  an  observer  who  waited  for  the  natural  objects  to 
present themselves to his gaze and who graciously tended to the dynamic vibrancy of 
a world in constant movement. He constructed himself as the realiser of “inscapes,” 
denying his freedom of choice in an effort to silence the selfish pleasure inherent in 
the observational process. Heuser has proposed that, for Hopkins, “the observer, the 
fixed register of sense-impressions, became the focus both of reception, acceptance, 
and  of  quickening  participation.”
68 In  the  figure  of  the  observer,  Hopkins  tried  to 
reconcile his conflicting desires: his love of beauty, his need for divine and human 
affection  and  the  pleasure  he  took  in  describing  and  signifying  his  external 
environment. 
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The diaristic record of Hopkins’s trip to Switzerland, which he undertook in 
the summer of 1868, presents him as a static onlooker, observing a quickly changing 
landscape: 
Walked up the valley of the Aar, sallow-coloured and torrent, to the Grimsel. 
The heights bounding the valley soon became a mingle of lilac and green, the 
first the colour of the rock, the other the grass crestings, and seemed to group 
above in crops and rounded buttresses, yet to be cut sharp in horizontal or 
leaning planes below.
69  
 
Hopkins stressed his agency as an observer when he included himself in the scene, 
explained his route and stressed the pains it took to position himself as the spectator 
of this magnificent panorama. However, Hopkins presented the changing colours of 
the landscape in a way that recalls the motion picture, or the lighting of the stage in a 
theatre: dazzling mixtures of lilac and green, moving across the frame of his focus, 
accentuating  the  dizzying  height  of  the  mountains.  Nature  was  established  as  an 
animated agent eager to impress the observer, inviting and accommodating the latter’s 
gaze  by  its  visual  infrastructure:  “at  times  the  valley  opened  in  cirques, 
amphitheatres.”
70  
In  order  to  avert  an  existence  as  a  completely  passive,  unmanly  observer, 
Hopkins elevated himself to the position of an active signifier of the external world, 
insisting on his environment’s need for his input. For instance, on July 31
st 1868, 
when visiting the cathedral in Geneva, Hopkins was confronted with an inscape that 
time impeded him from tending to: “the mouldings too of two arches near the door we 
came in by were very beautiful and elaborate and wanted long study, which I could 
not give.”
71 The structure “wanted” Hopkins’s complete attention, which denotes that, 
without  his  meaning-giving  gaze,  its  existence  was  futile.  Hopkins’s  personal 
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investment  was  essential  to  the  communication  between  subject  and  object  and 
absolutely necessary to realising “inscape.”  
Hopkins’s  explanation  of  dreams  confirms  this  idea  that,  for  him,  the  eye 
functioned independently of the analytical mind. When on December 23
rd 1869, tired 
Hopkins “shut [his] eyes” during Father Rector’s instructions, he “began to dream.”
72 
He identified these “impressions of sight” as “dead,” meaning that the mind did not 
substantiate  them  into  fully  developed  visual  images,  “either  because  you  cannot 
make them out or because they were perceived across other more engrossing thoughts, 
[the  mind]  has  made  nothing  of  [them]  and  brought  [them]  into  no  scaping.”
73 
Catherine Phillips has remarked that in the diary manuscript, Hopkins had initially 
written “inscaping” and then struck through the “in.”
74 This corrective move seems 
indicative of Hopkins’s desire to differentiate between complete images and those that 
remained  fragmentary  because,  as  Phillips  holds,  the  latter  “[lacked]  a  relation  to 
other things, or meaningful context.”
75 These perceptions entered the “all-accepting 
eye” but were not duly registered by the observer, who consequently was unable to 
realise  the  “inscapes”  of  the  objects  that  had  forced  themselves  into  the  space 
“between our eyelids and our eyes.”
76 Only in dreams could these spectral images be 
revived:  “you  cannot  make  them  at  will  when  awake,  for  the  very  effort  and 
advertence would be destructive to them.”
77 Dreams are seen to be revived imprints of 
the visual impressions that the eye  admitted during the day: “The eye  in its sane 
waking office kens only impressions brought in from without, that is to say either 
from beyond the body or from the body itself produced upon the dark field of the 
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eyelids.”
78 Scapes penetrated Hopkins’s consciousness through the opening of the eye, 
but when the observer’s mind was oblivious to this process, these objects remained 
unsignified.  By  thus  stressing  the  observed  object’s  absolute  dependence  on  his 
wholehearted acknowledgment, Hopkins established himself as the authority around 
whom nature revolved.   
Accordingly, Hopkins interpreted his own amazement with natural splendour 
as his reaction to nature’s active efforts to capture his gaze. When in autumn 1869, 
Hopkins looked at a “fine sunset […] from the upstairs windows,” he felt enraptured 
by nature’s luminous plenitude: 
My eye was suddenly caught by the scaping of the leaves that grow in allies 
and avenues: I noticed it first in an elm and then in limes. They fall from the 
two sides of the branch or spray in two marked planes which meet at a right 
angle or more. This comes from the endeavour to catch the light on either side, 
which falls left and right but not all round.
79 
 
Significantly, Hopkins’s “eye” became aware of the spectacular appearance of the 
leaves before his “I” did, which indicates that he considered his visual consciousness 
to precede his analytical mind. Observation thus consisted of the mental process of 
interpreting visual stimuli. Hopkins again presented himself as having little control 
over the scapes of the leaves that took control over his eye and ensnared him like 
lianas. Their “endeavour” to “catch the light” presupposed a desire to shine in order to 
alert the attention of the perceiver and be inscaped.  
  Hopkins’s construct of himself as observer was thus a utopian endeavour to 
simultaneously  “silence”  his  eye  and  insist  on  its  essential  role  as  a  signifier.  He 
sought  to  distance  himself  from  the  guilty  pleasure  inherent  in  observation  by 
stressing that natural objects entreated him to “inscape” them and that by doing so he 
followed God’s will, not his own. In his diary, Hopkins sought to realise his own 
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 27.  
79 Ibid., p. 124.   247 
“inscape” by including himself into the scenes he described and by observing himself 
in the process of observation. The diary helped Hopkins to strengthen his faith in the 
indispensability of his input in creation, which allowed him to consolidate the identity 
he had fashioned through self-signification.   
 
The 1870s 
This decade of Hopkins’s life comprised seven of the nine years of training before his 
ordination  as  priest  in  September  1877.  As  I  have  explained  in  my  section  on 
Hopkins’s religious career, these years were characterised by frequent, unannounced 
changes in location and assignment. Hopkins sought to counteract his lack of control 
over his geographical environment and his inability to create a sense of “rootedness” 
within a stable home by imagining nature as a nourishing, helpful instance.
80 He not 
only channelled his sexual energies by focussing his eye on natural objects that were 
not sexually charged, but, through increased personification, he also perceived these 
objects as independent agents which provided him with guidance. So far, for Hopkins 
the process of observation had consisted of the human subject signifying the natural 
object.  In  the  1870s,  however,  Hopkins  increasingly  anthropomorphised  his 
environment and demonstrated an eagerness to depict this “inscaping” interaction in 
its fullness, by not only rendering the spectacle that nature staged in order to attract 
his gaze, but also including his own perspective and specifying his exact position in 
this process more frequently. This need to be “inscaped” by nature can be interpreted 
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as a response to loneliness and lack of control and choice, which impeded Hopkins 
from forming a sense of belonging. 
  Hopkins’s insistence on his inclusion in the world through his religio-aesthetic 
ontology can be seen to have become more pronounced as he was sent across the 
country by his superiors. Since entering the Jesuit order in 1868, Hopkins studied in 
Roehampton, Stonyhurst and St. Beuno’s in Northern Wales. He taught at Mount St. 
Mary’s near Sheffield, went back to Stonyhurst and then was sent to Farm Street, 
Mayfair (1877-78). Further placements included St. Aloysius at Oxford (1878-79) and 
Bedford Leigh near Manchester (1879, October-December).  
The  diaries  until  1875  still  display  countless  personifications  of  natural 
elements, such as the attribution of agency to the wind operating the clouds in March 
1870: “in the Park in the afternoon, the wind was driving little clouds of snow-dust 
which caught the sun as they rose and delightfully took the eyes.”
81 In this entry, 
Hopkins bestowed consciousness upon the clouds, which are pushed into a favourable 
light in order to conquer the observer’s eye.  
Arguably, Hopkins attempted to render his isolation less hostile by assigning 
human  qualities  to  natural  objects  and  imbuing  them  with  agency.  Through  this 
consistent  anthropomorphism,  the  “inscaping”  communication  resembled  actual 
human interaction to a greater degree if Hopkins imagined the contemplated natural 
objects to be infused by consciousness. On March 17
th 1871, for instance, he reported 
that: 
The sycomores [sic] are quite the earliest trees out: some have been fully out 
some days (April 15). The behaviour of the opening clusters is very beautiful 
and when fully opened not the single leaves but the whole tuft is strongly 
templed like the belly of a drum or bell.
82 
 
                                                 
81 Ibid., p. 129.  
82 Ibid., p.142.    249 
Mary Ellen Bellanca has argued that “the journal can […] be read as a prose text in 
the tradition of British nature diaries.”
83 Although the inclusion of the date in this 
entry and the engaged description of the growing process demonstrates Hopkins’s 
interest in natural history and scientific observation, he did not write in the naturalist 
tradition.
84 Hopkins embraced the re-population of nature in the spring because nature 
provided him with the sense of being needed; he was not purely interested in form. 
Similarly,  his  interest  in  patterns  was  intended  to  produce  a  sense  of 
interconnectedness  that  was  opposed  to  scientific  atomism.  The  “behaviour”  was 
“beautiful”  because  it  translated  God’s  presence,  not  merely  because  it  was 
aesthetically pleasing and scientifically interesting. Thus, for Hopkins, observation 
should be concerned with a plant’s “successive sidings of one inscape,” as can be seen 
in the respectful attention he devoted to the “‘behaviour’” of the flag flower on June 
13
th 1871.
85 The observed object thus deserves earnest consideration, as can be seen in 
this entry of May 9
th 1871: “A simple behaviour of the cloudscape I have not realized 
before.”
86  Meteorological  forces  are  similarly  attributed  consciousness  which 
heightens Hopkins’s responsibility to “realize” their “inscapes.” Although created by 
God, the clouds are seen as self-directed beings, again looking to be completed by the 
inscaping observer’s gaze.  
Hopkins’s ontological narrative, which was exhibited in and reinforced by his 
diary, can be seen to compensate for the lack of coherence his life afforded. Until 
about 1877, his conceptualisation of reality determined his perception of the world 
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rather  than  vice-versa.  Geographer  D.W.  Meinig  has  stressed  the  symbolic 
components of landscape description: “any landscape is composed not only of what 
lies  before  our  eyes  but  what  lies  within  our  heads.”
87 In  Hopkins’s  diary,  his 
immense efforts to find meaning in nature represent a compensation for the home he 
had  renounced,  which  explains  the  urgency  with  which  he  sought  to  establish  an 
ontological connection between the observer and the observed. Indeed, as Anthony 
Mortimer  has  convincingly  argued,  Hopkins’s  descriptions  of  nature  put  across  a 
nervous  tension,  which  translates  the  poet’s  eager  anxiety  to  find  “rootedness”  in 
nature: “trees, plants, rocks, clouds, ice, waves, flowers—all appear as in some way 
stretched,  drawn  out,  strained,  under  pressure.”
88   Hopkins’s  writing  was  indeed 
characterised  by  “intense  stylization,”  which  reveals  that  he  was  “doggedly 
determined to find inscape.”
89 In order to make up for the deprivations of his life, 
Hopkins looked for the universal in the particular and for the human in the non-human. 
Mortimer has also remarked that Hopkins’s ontological narrative shaped the way he 
perceived reality: “what Hopkins describes is not what the eye normally sees, nor 
even what a trained eye sees, but what a trained eye forces itself to see.”
90 Hopkins 
needed to scrutinise “the glories of the earth,” in order to feel connected to “the hand 
that wrought [it] all.”
91  
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Not only did Hopkins’s ontological outlook ascribe a conscious desire to be 
looked at to natural objects, he also imagined them to return his gaze: “what you look 
hard at seems to look hard at you.”
92 This undated entry of 1871 epitomises Hopkins’s 
utopian hope of overcoming the isolation of the observer and establishing a mutually 
nourishing  relationship  with  nature.  Daniel  Brown  has  read  this  crucial  extract  as 
evidence of Hopkins’s belief in the power of the “human percipient” to “bring the 
expressive  potential  of  nature  […]  to  energeia  or  […]  ‘consciousness’  as  a 
manifestation of divine being.”
93 I would contend that in this instance, Hopkins took 
the interactions that he imagined to be at work between subject and object beyond 
mere  “inscaping”  as  he  conceived  of  a  response  to  his  presence.  He  sought  to 
surmount  his  basic  belief  in  what  William  A.  Cohen  has  called  the  “continuity 
between the external form of natural objects and their effects on human subjects’ 
interiors,” when he invested natural objects with a gaze.
94 This imagined interaction 
was no longer between the eye and the form of the object, but between the human eye 
and the (invisible) eye of the object, which created a direct, equal and humanised 
relationship. Michael Matthew Kaylor has argued that although for Hopkins natural 
paradises  were  “sensually  suggestive  in  their  flow  and  foliage,  they  [lacked]  the 
reciprocity  necessary  to  satisfy  fully.”
95 I  would  like  to  take  Kaylor’s  argument 
further by noting that Hopkins did not only “realize that without human intimacy even 
the presence of God amidst his creation [implied] an infelicitous loneliness,” but that, 
by  furnishing nature with a  gaze, he attempted  to simulate the mutual  action and 
reaction he longed for.
96 
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In August 1871, during a visit to Scotland, Hopkins portrayed the realisation 
of  inscape  as  an  act  of  listening  to  the  imagined  voice  of  the  object.  In  order  to 
establish the communication between object and observer, Hopkins depicted himself 
at once as a passive openness and a focused lens, as the following two entries show. 
On August 24
th, Hopkins deplored that the limited time available to him impeded him 
from fully connecting to Edinburgh’s magnificent architectural objects: “I should like 
to stay here long enough to let the fine inscape of the Castle rock and of Arthur’s Seat 
and Salisbury Crag grow on me.”
97 Hopkins exposed himself to the city, waiting for 
the essence of these monuments to permeate him and to inscribe itself upon him, 
which denotes that he viewed himself as a blank surface, resembling photographic 
film.  At  the  same  time,  Hopkins  had  to  actively  think  about  the  objects  he 
contemplated and mentally dig into them in order to penetrate their “inscapes,” as his 
entry of August 28
th, depicting his visit of Glasgow cathedral, shows: “[I] had not 
time to study the tracery well.”
98 Whereas in the previous entry the objects failed to 
reach Hopkins and “grow on” him, this entry reveals the importance of Hopkins’s 
knowing appreciation in seeking out—catching—the “inscape” of the building and 
establishing a dialogue.  
Hopkins not only anthropomorphised the “behaviour” of specific objects but 
also  their  shape,  when  he  described  the  “beautiful  changes”  of  a  streamer  in  an 
undated entry of 1871.
99  Although Hopkins had assigned human qualities to natural 
and architectural objects for  years, in the 1870s the complexity of their imagined 
consciousness  augmented,  which  demanded  more  input  from,  and  hence  more 
validation  for,  the  observer:  “unless  you  refresh  the  mind  from  time  to  time  you 
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cannot always remember or believe how deep the inscape in things is.”
100 Objects 
were  no  longer  easily  knowable;  instead,  the  elaborate,  ever-changing  “inscapes” 
required greater involvement from the part of the observer. Hopkins perceived his role 
as an observer as gradually more challenging, because he needed a reliable source of 
personal validation and longed to feel grounded in nature.  
In order to place his trust into nature, Hopkins had to establish its benevolent 
disposition,  which  is  reflected  in  his  portrayal  of  natural  objects  as  assisting  the 
observer. For instance, in an undated entry of 1871, Hopkins described a nature walk 
during which he “saw the water-runs in the sand of unusual delicacy and the broken 
blots of snow in the dead bents of the hedge-banks I could find a square scaping 
which helped the eye over  another hitherto disordered field of things.”
101 Clearly, 
nature was an animated whole, an aggregation of flora, fauna and geological features 
which bent over to accommodate the observer and direct his gaze through the visual 
field. Hopkins’s eye was “helped” to visually organise the objects it perceived by the 
very  elements  composing  the  scene.  Again,  in  the  same  year,  on  March  17
th,  he 
remarked that “the swelling buds carry [the spraying trees] to a pitch which the eye 
could not else gather.”
102 Without this “selving” of the natural objects, boosting their 
“pitch,”  the  observer  would  not  notice  them.  Hopkins  stressed  nature’s  need  for 
human inscaping and her cognisance of the human observer in his diary, because he 
needed  to  create  a  balance  between  the  mateless  existence  of  the  Jesuit  and  the 
longing for physical expression.  
Hopkins went so far as to replace his need for human affection by a strong 
personal identification with nature. He did not merely establish a connection to nature 
through visual contemplation, but he almost felt physically joined to specific natural 
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objects, through, as Rossana Bonadei has pointed out, a specific fondness for trees, 
which is well-illustrated in this entry of April 8
th 1872:
 103   
The ashtree growing in the corner of the garden was felled. It was lopped first: I 
heard  the  sound  and  looking  out  and  seeing  it  maimed  there  came  at  that 
moment a great pang and I wished to die and not to see the inscapes of the world 
destroyed anymore.
104 
 
Hopkins’s distress is palpable through the breathless urgency with which the entry is 
composed;  it  seems  that  he  sought  to  write  down  the  painful  news  as  quickly  as 
possible.
105 The  word  “maim”  recalls  a  permanent  human  injury,  which  Hopkins 
seems to have felt himself when he was overcome by “a great pang.” The depth of 
Hopkins’s shock would constitute a typical response to the death of a loved human 
being, but since he had anthropomorphised nature through cultivating his connection 
to specific objects, the damage done to a tree harmed Hopkins personally. J. Hillis 
Miller has similarly argued that, for Hopkins, “natural objects [were] not dead, but 
[were] sustained from within by a vital pressure,” which was “inscape.”
106 Hopkins 
felt honest grief over a felled tree because to him it was a living being, created to 
worship  God,  “the  world’s  great  landlord,  owner  of  earth  and  man.”
107  The 
destruction of a natural object that was suffused with God’s energy was not only an 
act of blasphemy, but hurt Hopkins personally, as he spiritually dwelled within the 
“wild and self-instressed (l. 5)” “homing nature (l. 6)” he was to describe in his poem 
“The Handsome Heart” of 1879.
108  
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  In his descriptions of nature, Hopkins, more consistently than in the 1860s, 
included his personal point of view, which can be seen as an attempt to overcome the 
irreconcilable gap between the observer and the object. Hopkins yearned for inclusion 
into the natural realm, but, as his diary shows, he also longed to be perceived by a 
human other and to avoid the dangers of eunuchal self-inscaping. By indicating the 
angle from which he observed specific natural scenes, Hopkins made it possible for an 
imagined  other  to  relive  his  experience,  as  these  entries  show:  “A  lunar  halo—I 
looked at it from the upstairs bathroom” on February 23
rd 1872; or “With Wm. Kerr, 
who took me up a hill behind ours (ours is Mynefyr), a furze-grown and heathy hill, 
from which I could look round the whole country, up the valley towards Ruthin and 
down  to  the  sea”  on  September  6
th  1874.
109 The  precise  standpoint  offered  an 
opportunity  for identification to a possible reader of the diary, thus universalising 
Hopkins’s very private experience.  
Despite his muted longing for a human companion, Hopkins was never able to 
reconcile his experience of nature and the presence of a human being, which to him 
was  an  annoying  distraction  interrupting  the  sacred  communication  between  the 
object  and  the  observer.  Hopkins  first  mentioned  this  dislike  of  human  company 
during  his  trip  to  Switzerland  in  1868,  when  he  insisted  that  solitude  was  a 
prerequisite for inscaping and complained that “even with one companion ecstasy is 
almost banished: you want to be alone and to feel that, and leisure—all pressure taken 
off.”
110  Hopkins could only mentally integrate himself into creation during solitary 
contemplation when the human element was blocked out. Hopkins’s diary entry of 
December 12
th 1872 repeats the irony that he felt himself to be incomplete when in 
company: “I saw the inscape though freshly, as if my eye were still growing, though 
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with  a  companion  the  eye  and  ear  are  for  the  most  part  shut  and  instress  cannot 
come.”
111 It  seems  that  the  human  companion  scared  “instress”  away—both  the 
natural object and Hopkins were incapable of the deep connection that the realisation 
of “inscape” necessitated.  
The  diary  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  substantiate  the  “inscaping” 
communication,  which,  through  the  mental  revisitation  of  natural  or  architectural 
objects,  represented  a  magnification  of  “inscape”  through  writing.  The  ekphrasic 
transmutation of visual experience into a written record helped Hopkins gain control 
over his responsibilities as an observer, as it prolonged the communication between 
object and observer and made it permanent. The following entry of April 20
th 1874 
shows that the diary represented a channel for Hopkins’s pleasurable emotions as well 
as a guarantor that this (legitimate) pleasure could be maintained:  
My eye was struck by such a sense of green in the tufts and pashes of grass, 
with purple shadow thrown back on the dry mould behind them, as I do not 
remember ever to have been exceeded in looking at green grass. I marked this 
down on a slip of paper at the time, because the eye for colour, rather than the 
zest in the mind, seems to weaken with years, but now the paper is mislaid.
112
   
Hopkins’s  immediate,  almost  instinctive,  reaction  to  represent  the  experienced 
luminosity on paper can be seen as an effort to complement the bodily deficiencies of 
the  observing  eye  “[weakening]  with  years”  that  Hopkins  expected.  The  “slip  of 
paper” had been lost, so Hopkins compensated for the consequent loss of memory by 
entering the experience into his diary and thus making it durable. This entry is a rare 
case in which Hopkins simply described his observations and actions and did not 
poeticise either, as he did in most of his diary records. Here, Hopkins neglected to 
transmute  the  visual  into  the  verbal,  which  perhaps  announced  his  increasing 
realisation that he had “[overtrusted] the magic of words,” to cite Jeffrey B. Loomis’s 
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analysis of Hopkins’s poem “The Lantern out of Doors.”
113 In this instance, Hopkins 
did not seem to feel restricted by the boundaries of the verbally expressible, because 
he did not even attempt to specify the shades of green and purple through ekphrastic 
metaphorisation. We see however, that for Hopkins, as for Ruskin, the process of 
perception was not complete unless written or pictorial representation had occurred. 
Through this necessity to “‘catch’ one moment of static vision” and possess it, as 
Heuser  has  noted,  the  diary  acquired  the  status  of  materialised  memory,  which 
Hopkins called his “treasury of explored beauty.”
114  
Hopkins  frequently  recreated  his  experiences  of  nature  walks  after  a 
considerable lapse of time and even if the precise memory was by then lacking, he 
insisted on retaining the remaining impressions. This is evident in this entry from 
August  14
th  1874,  which  depicts  Hopkins’s  recollections  of  Little  Haldon,  near 
Dartmoor: “I have forgotten even now much but this was a very beautiful sight.”
115 
The wish to acknowledge even what had been forgotten, and was therefore absent, 
recalls  Hopkins’s  descriptions  of  the  Little  Matterhorn  of  1868,  is  indicative  of  a 
strong desire for control. The same aspiration to possess his experience, even as it had 
already fled, is evident  in the entry  from the following day, August 15
th: “Exeter 
Cathedral. […] Some notes to remember it by.”
116 Presumably, Hopkins could not 
transcribe  the  notes  for  lack  of  time,  but  still  insisted  on  briefly  mentioning  the 
experience  in  his  diary  and  adding  the  comforting  reassurance  that  some  notes 
commemorating the event existed. The diary as a recording device was thus superior 
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to  flimsy  notes,  whose  immediacy  could  only  be  given  the  status  of  memory  by 
inscription.  
For Hopkins, writing lent permanence and depth to the observer’s perceptions 
and reinforced the dutiful engagement with God’s creations. As Rebecca Boggs has 
argued, “Hopkins [wished] to seize the moment when man [was] at the height of his 
moral power and purity rather than of his sensual and sexual prowess.”
117 The diary’s 
almost  exclusive  focus  on  natural  phenomena  is  thus  representative  of  Hopkins’s 
desire for moral purity, using the ontological metaphors “inscape” and “instress” for 
mediated, but never direct, personal gratification.  
 
1875: The Silence of the Diary   
Hopkins’s last extant diary ends in February 1875 and we cannot be sure whether he 
kept similar records of his life after that. As I have shown in the previous section, both 
Hopkins’s deeply felt need to inscribe his visual experience and affirm his religio-
aesthetic ontology through his diary indicate that he was likely to have continued this 
habit.  Nevertheless,  as  his  decision  to  burn  (most  of)  his  poems  in  1868  proves, 
Hopkins  was  prone  to  drastic  changes  of  mind.  The  fact  that  in  December  1875, 
Hopkins,  after  seven  years  of  silence,  composed  his  ode  “The  Wreck  of  the 
Deutschland” seems unrelated to the abandonment of the diary as ten months elapsed 
between these events. A possible reason for ceasing to keep a diary could be that 
Hopkins may have begun to sense the “danger of self-preoccupation,” to use Saville’s 
phrase, which would lead to the crisis of the 1880s.
118 Although it is impossible to 
determine the exact reason why Hopkins did not maintain his diary habit, it is an 
undeniable fact that the many distractions of his life as a priest (ordained in 1877) did 
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not allow for the extensive observations of nature that Hopkins had been used to in 
the previous years and thus made him unable to sustain his ontology. In addition, as 
the  gesture  of  taking  up  poetry  again,  as  well  as  the  explicit  discussions  of  the 
possibilities  for  publication  in  his  letters  indicate,  Hopkins  began  to  crave  the 
impossible wider acknowledgment of his work which fuelled the despair of the 1880s. 
  The years following 1875 were characterised by growing discontent, which, 
like biographer Norman White, I shall trace to the unpleasant nature of Hopkins’s 
ever-changing environment, over which he had no control.
119 Morally obligated to 
“carry on work for which he had no talent or inclination,” Hopkins was forced to 
invest most of his physical and mental strength into the professional requirements of 
the priesthood.
120 Although he had wished to channel his homosexual desires by a 
focus on legitimate natural beauty, he had never coveted a life that was devoid of 
pleasure altogether. The lack of free time that this role afforded and the uninspiring 
surroundings of his external environment—with the exception of Oxford, Stonyhurst, 
and  Roehampton—can  account  for  the  diminishing  ontological  grounding  that 
Hopkins demonstrates in his letters and poems during the last fifteen years of his life. 
Only on retreats was Hopkins able to re-connect with the core of his ontology, as the 
absence of worldly distractions was the prerequisite for upholding his ascetic ideals. 
Hopkins’s deep connection with the natural world suffered enormously from 
the  frequent  moves  he  had  to  undertake,  to  the  point  that  it  transformed  his 
ontological outlook from forced optimism to fatalistic pessimism. Hopkins confirms 
philosopher  J.E.  Malpas’s  thesis  that:  “the  structure  of  the  mind,  and  of  mental 
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content, cannot […] be severed from the structure of the world in which the subject is 
necessarily located.”
121 For Hopkins the natural world had provided a resource which 
he  moulded  into  his  ontology  and  the  absence  of  such  inspiration  aggravated  his 
isolation and powerlessness; the very condition he had longed to escape from when he 
devoted his life to religion.  
As we have seen, nature provided an affirmation for Hopkins’s faith and his 
inability to tap into this source of signification can be held accountable for his crisis 
of faith. This again reflects Malpas’s insistence on the interdependence of space and 
subjectivity: “Place is […] that within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself 
established—place  is  not  founded  on  subjectivity,  but  is  rather  that  on  which 
subjectivity is founded.”
122 The individual’s self-concept is formed in relation to the 
spatial limitations and privileges he or she encounters that represent the necessary 
other against which individuality takes shape. White supports this idea when arguing 
that  “[Hopkins]  reacted  most  constantly  to  place:  while  the  Welsh  countryside 
charged his optimistic spirits, the town of Rhyl provoked his disgust at Man.”
123 Like 
Ruskin, Hopkins was revolted by the pollution and the careless treatment of nature 
that came with industrial modernity.  
Starting  in  1877,  with  his  placement  at  Mount  St  Mary’s  College  in 
Chesterfield near Sheffield (1877-78), the focus of Hopkins’s life switched from study 
and  observation  to  teaching  and  community  work.  His  letters  began  to  resemble 
George Gissing’s in that they were characterised by complaints over the impediments 
to  creativity  posed  by  the  obligation  to  work.  As  White  has  explained,  in  1877, 
Hopkins’s  
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daily theological work and [his final] examinations [were] always mentioned 
in  Hopkins’s  letters  in  connection  with  emotions  of  worry,  tiredness,  and 
tension;  not  once  during  the  year  did  he  write  enthusiastically  about  his 
professional studies. He could focus his mind and emotions on nature only 
when he was off-duty, on half-days, Blandykes, and vacations, officially let 
loose from work.
124  
 
Work presented a great distraction to the mental focus that Hopkins’s observational 
process necessitated. Hopkins neglected the responsibility he felt towards the natural 
world: “the world is full of things and events, phenomena of all sorts, that go without 
notice,  go  unwitnessed.”
125   Although  he  did  not  explicitly  express  guilt  over  the 
reduced attention he was able to devote to nature, work had a destabilising effect on 
Hopkins’s  self-concept  because  he  no  longer  received  validation  from  the 
communication between object and observer. 
Although Hopkins still created magnificent poetry, his lack of agency and his 
dissatisfaction with the locations of his appointments stifled his imaginative impulse. 
St Mary’s, for instance, offered no opportunities to conduct excursions into nature. 
Hopkins  deplored  that  “the  air  [was]  never  once  clear  in  this  country,  not  to  see 
distances as in Wales or at Hampstead.”
126 The claustrophobic atmosphere rendered 
“inscaping” impossible and threw Hopkins back upon himself, which set the premises 
for the self-inscaping distress of the 1880s. With life “dank as ditch-water”
 and the 
industrial  environment  lacking  inspiration,  Hopkins’s  “muse  [had]  turned  utterly 
sullen  in  the  Sheffield  smoke-ridden  air  and  [he]  had  not  written  a  line  till  the 
foundering of the Eurydice the other day.”
127 Hopkins’s poetic creations (and until 
1875 his diary) represented linguistic vents that permitted him to channel his physical 
and  mental  passions  through  indirect,  stylised  and  therefore  ascetic  expression. 
                                                 
124 Ibid., pp. 288-89.  
125 Roberts, ed., Gerard Manley Hopkins: Selected Prose, p. 70; Letter to Dixon of June 13
th 1878 at 
Stonyhurst.  
126 Abbott, ed., Further Letters, p. 143.  
127 Ibid., p. 47; February 25
th 1878; p. 48; April 3
rd 1878.   262 
Obviously, uninspiring places and the constant duty to work did not arouse Hopkins’s 
need to process reality in poetic form. 
The  absence  in  Hopkins’s  life  of  what  J.  Douglas  Porteous  has  called  the 
“satisfactions” provided by the possessive “[assertion] of exclusive jurisdiction over 
physical space” can thus be seen as the cause of Hopkins’s despair. 
128 Porteous has 
convincingly argued that “the personalization of space is an assertion of identity and a 
means  of  ensuring  stimulation.  The  defense  of  space  is  the  means  by  which 
stimulation is achieved and security assured.”
129 Subjecting himself to the vows of 
poverty  and  chastity,  Hopkins  abjured  any  form  of  worldly  possession  or  deep 
emotional  attachment  and  thus  forever  abandoned  claims  to  personal  space  and  a 
worldly identity. Hopkins did not only suffer from this lack of territorial authority, but 
he also lamented the related impossibility to cultivate his identity as a poet. 
In the late 1870s, Hopkins felt the emasculating futility of producing poetry 
for  the  “banal  company”  of  the  self,  to  use  Saville’s  term,  and  he  increasingly 
demonstrated  interest  in  publishing  his  work.  However,  any  act  of  poetic  self-
assertion was quenched by his unappreciative superiors: “all that we Jesuits publish 
(even  anonymously)  must  be  seen  by  censors.”
130 After  both  “The  Wreck  of  the 
Deutschland” and the “The Loss of the Eurydice” had been rejected by publishers, 
Hopkins was deeply offended when, during his three-month stay in Stonyhurst of 
1878, the authorities refused to place his poem “The May Magnificat” in front of the 
statue of the Virgin Mary. As White has argued, in his letter to Canon Dixon of June 
6
th 1878, Hopkins insisted not only that validation be given to the former’s poetic 
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talent, but this letter “is as close as [Hopkins] came to speaking the truth about his 
own case:”
131 
It is not that I think that a man is really the less happy because he has missed 
the renown which was his due, but still when this happens it is an evil in itself 
and a thing which ought not to be and that I deplore, for the good work’s sake 
rather than the author’s.
132 
 
White  has  noted  that  Hopkins’s  “emphasis  on  the  work,  rather  than  the  author 
underlines his chagrin by trying to hide it.”
133 Indeed, in this instance, Hopkins can be 
seen to have practiced self-effacement whilst asserting himself. Contending that the 
absence of praise for work of great merit was unnatural and almost morally wrong, 
Hopkins gave Dixon the encouragement that he himself was craving and thus covertly 
vindicated his own poetic genius.  
Despite  his  growing  desire  to  communicate  with  a  wider  audience,  which 
became all the more accentuated in the 1880s, Hopkins tried to reconcile himself with 
the reality of forced muteness, as can be seen in his letter to Bridges of February 15
th 
1879: 
When I say I do not mean to publish I speak the truth. I have taken and mean 
to take no step to do so beyond the attempt I made to print my two wrecks in 
the Month. If some one in authority knew of my having some poems printable 
and suggested my doing it I shd. not refuse, I should be partly, though not 
altogether, glad. But that is very unlikely. All therefore that I think of doing is 
to keep my verses together in one place—at present I have not even correct 
copies—, that, if anyone shd. like, they might be published after my death. 
 
Hopkins felt torn between his desire to be an ascetic saint and a free creative agent. 
Significantly,  he  dissimulated  his  obvious  desire  for  public  acclaim  by  further 
abnegating his agency and putting an unknown editor in charge of publishing his 
manuscripts. By preparing his poems for publication, Hopkins adopted the position of 
the object that needed to be “inscaped” by the “other”—a very emasculating attitude. 
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The 1880s: Poetic Dryness 
The 1880s were characterised by an alternation between moments in which Hopkins 
admitted that his escape from society and the restrictive identities it permitted had led 
to endless disappointment, and instances at which he forced himself to restore his 
faith.  Hopkins’s  lifelong  difficulties  to  negotiate  his  masculinity  accentuated  his 
feelings of having failed, both as a man and as a poet, which shows that he never 
freed himself from societal conventions in determining the value of individual. As 
Saville has held, for Hopkins, his homosexuality was the source of an intense anxiety 
that went beyond the discomforts of social judgment that Chapter One has described, 
but that threatened his sanity:  
attraction  to  men  was—along  with  nocturnal  emissions  and  masturbatory 
pleasure—a  manifestation  of  unrestrained  male  lust  liable to  lead  to  moral 
degeneracy and even mental decline, hence [Hopkins’s] anxious insistence on 
the  need  for  rigorous  self-discipline  to  cultivate  manliness  in  both 
comportment and poetic style.
134 
 
Saville has convincingly argued that Hopkins’s extremely crafted poems reflect his 
efforts to ‘re-masculinise,’ as it were. Through his intricate poetic technique, Hopkins 
distanced himself from effeminate and unrespectable writing (Chapter One).  
  Hopkins  portrayed  himself  as  a  eunuch  in  several  different  contexts 
throughout his writing, which demonstrates the impossibility to be wholly respectable 
and to live correctly. Indeed, as John D. Rosenberg has suggested, Hopkins’s self-
conceptualisation as an infertile eunuch “changes from the unjust thwarting of his 
chances in life to his impotence as a begetter of poems.”
135 Like the eunuch, Hopkins 
was always in some respect incomplete: had he asserted himself and devoted his life 
to  poetry,  he  would  have  released  the  dangerous  silenced  physical  and  emotional 
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impulses that threatened his very existence. On the other hand, eradicating his love for 
beauty and his need for ontological groundedness would have robbed Hopkins of all 
livelihood. Hopkins found himself in a constant crisis of conscience because he could 
only  ever  reconcile  self-assertion  and  self-effacement  temporarily  through  an 
enormous effort of the will and an elaborate ontological construct. We see that any 
code  that  Hopkins  sought  to  live  up  to  made  him  violate  another  code  and  that 
consequently he was caught in a web of mutually exclusive duties. 
The  artificial  harmony  that  Hopkins’s  religio-aesthetic  system  created  was 
fragile, as he could only maintain the illusion of groundedness for as long as he had 
enough time to observe nature and was placed at a strikingly attractive location. When 
the reality of Hopkins’s life changed in the late 1870s, he acutely felt the lack of 
“presence” in his life, which was primarily built on abstract foundations. Nature had 
functioned  as  a  signifying  mediator  between  Hopkins  and  God  but  this 
communication became increasingly difficult.  Terry Eagleton has similarly suggested 
that  the  cause  of  Hopkins’s  depression  lay  in  the  tragic  recognition  that  his 
communication with God was in fact one-sided: “a mere awareness of God’s presence 
behind or beneath Nature [was not] enough; some strenuously subjective, realising 
response to that presence [was] also demanded.”
136 Until the late 1870s, Hopkins had 
relatively successfully, if arbitrarily, imagined that his role as an observer connected 
him to God.  
  When his ontological construct became shaky, Hopkins did not only accuse 
himself of being unable to keep an optimistic outlook and to remain steadfast in his 
faith,  but  he  also  blamed  nature’s  inadequacy  to  provide  accurate  proof  of  God’s 
magnificence. Hopkins’s sermon of October 25
th 1880 suggests that he attempted to 
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locate the discordant element—the “something”—that prevented him from durably 
achieving ontological groundedness:   
But yet […] providence is imperfect, plainly imperfect. The sun shines too 
long and withers the harvest, the rain is too heavy and rots it or in floods 
spreading washes it away; the air and water carry in their currents the poison 
of disease. […] everything is full of fault, flaw, imperfection, shortcoming; as 
many marks as there are of God’s wisdom in providing for us so many marks 
there may be set against them of more being needed still, of something having 
made of this very providence a shattered frame and a broken web.
137 
 
In this sermon Hopkins universalised his personal discontent, forcefully stressing his 
connectedness to the rest of creation. Hopkins did not blame God for the imperfection 
of providence or the unstoppable destruction of all worldly life. Instead, he isolated an 
unnamed  force  that  broke  the  interconnectedness  of  God’s  creations.  While  thus 
affirming the groundedness of the individual in the universe, Hopkins also blamed 
nature’s flaws for his increasingly insecure relationship with God. Nature did not live 
up to the narrative framework Hopkins had constructed to provide personal validation 
through  universal  groundedness  and  thus  rendered  universal  communication 
impossible, which alienated Hopkins further and further from God.  
In  the  1880s,  after  years  of  trying  to  unite  the  universe  through  narrative, 
Hopkins struggled to view nature and humanity as a commonwealth governed by God 
the “landlord” and could no longer deny the division between God, divine creations 
and himself. Hopkins’s religio-aesthetic system had been specifically constructed to 
circumvent the atomistic view that because all creatures were “unlike” himself and 
unlike each other, he was alone in the world. In “On Principium sive Fundamentum” 
(1880),  however,  Hopkins  established  his  individuality  as  radically  different  from 
“and more important to myself than anything I see.”
138 To himself, Hopkins was the 
“highest  pitched”  creature  in  the  universe:  “Nothing  in  nature  comes  near  this 
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unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. 
Nothing explains or resembles it.” This growing conviction that in fact there were no 
connections  between  creations  and  that  religio-aesthetic  communication  was  an 
arbitrary  construct  of  the  mind  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  earlier  writings  in  its 
insistence on the insuperable division between the human, nature and God lies at the 
root of the “world-sorrow” (l. 6) which had replaced the celebration of the signifying 
interplay between all creations. 
Despite this disillusionment, Hopkins consistently attempted to revive his faith 
by emphasising the productive interplay between God’s creatures, which, although 
not responsive to each other, nevertheless ensured the flawless functioning of creation 
as a whole. In his sermon of probably 1881, Hopkins presented duty as the glue that 
prevented the universe from disintegrating: 
The sun and the stars shining glorify God. They stand where he placed them, 
they move where he bid them. ‘The heavens declare the glory of God.’ They 
glorify God, but they do not know it. The birds sing to him, the thunder speaks 
of his terror, the lion is like his strength, the sea is like his greatness, the honey 
like his sweetness; they are something like him, they make him known, they 
tell of him, they give him glory, but they do not know they do, they never can, 
they are brute things that only think of food or think of nothing. This then is 
poor praise, faint reverence, slight service, dull glory. Nevertheless what they 
can they always do.
139 
 
God’s creations were still animated but Hopkins no longer attributed consciousness to 
them.  Hopkins  absolved  nature’s  flawed  ignorance  because  all  natural  objects 
accomplished  the  tasks  they  were  designed  to  do  without  fail.  Hopkins  again 
established  himself  at  the  top  of  nature’s  hierarchy  as  the  observer  on  whom  all 
objects  depended  for  being  interwoven  into  the  universal  web  of  communication, 
which can be seen as an endeavour to counteract his status as a eunuch. Hopkins’s 
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obstinate efforts to ground himself in creation of the early 1880s did not suffice to 
arrest the intense crisis of faith of 1885.  
 
The Crisis of Renunciation: the “Terrible” Sonnets 
The  group  of  autobiographical  poems  that  Hopkins  composed  in  the  spring  and 
summer of 1885 bear witness to a personal crisis that was directly tied to the downfall 
of his religio-aesthetic system. Hopkins at that time no longer possessed the necessary 
mental and physical strength to uphold his signifying narrative and to view the world 
in terms that stressed his inclusion in a conscious and caring universe. As Loomis has 
noted, “a man of even such firm faith as Hopkins’s [needed] more trustworthy bonds 
with Christic substance on which to rely than visions from the landscape.”
140 Nature, 
once perceived as deliberately inviting the human gaze, was now presented as an 
atomised, self-contained entity. Hopkins felt offended by nature’s disinterested and 
cold attitude; running its course independently of his input. As a consequence of this 
altered  attitude  towards  nature,  disillusioned  Hopkins  felt  caught  in  a  circle  of 
unnatural, suffocating self-inscaping.  
Hopkins was obligated to attribute meaning to himself in the absence of a 
response from the natural environment. Because his self was no longer needed as a 
beholder, it became both object and subject of its contemplative energies, as J. Hillis 
Miller has claimed: “Within this vacant creation the self is imprisoned in its own 
immobile  self-consciousness.”
141  The  unresponsive  “behaviour”  of  nature,  not 
requiring  Hopkins’s  “inscaping,”  and  the  consequent  silence  of  God  established 
Hopkins as the ultimate eunuch; an impotent, ineffectual and superfluous creature. As 
Bell Gale Chevigny has rightly argued, Hopkins viewed his earlier nature poems as 
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the  joint  effort  between  himself  and  nature,  representing  “a  demonstration,  or 
revelation, of [their] fused gaze.”
142 When this imagined cooperation was obliterated, 
Hopkins’s “eye on God,” was blinded, “as if he were suddenly deprived of vision.”
143 
Thus, not only had his religio-aesthetic foundation collapsed because of emotional 
desolation; but Hopkins’s depression escalated due to the ontological consequences of 
this break-down.   
Many  critics  agree  that  Hopkins’s  “terrible”  sonnets  are  the  products  of 
loneliness, overwork, alienation from the homeland and spiritual confusion. Whereas 
Loomis,  in  accordance  with  Robert  Boyle,  has  viewed  the  sonnets  to  enact  the 
“tormenting  pangs  of  rebirth,”  of  an  individual  who  is  desperately  willing  “to 
participate  in  an  archetypal  process  of  Christian  sacramental  biography,”  I  on  the 
contrary find the sonnets to represent obstructed conception and impossible birth.
144 
As  opposed  to  Loomis’s  interpretation  of  the  sonnets  as  a  process  of  spiritual 
maturation in which “Hopkins’s sanctified soul is readied for its ultimate dwelling 
place:  Heaven,”  I  believe  that  the  sonnets  represent  a  continuation  of  Hopkins’s 
lifelong struggle to maintain and regain an optimistic outlook, which ends in a forced 
settlement in which Hopkins accepts, but does not embrace, the reality of inevitable 
renunciation. 
There is no known chronology to the “terrible” sonnets but “No worst there is 
none” can be seen to present the cause of Hopkins’s spiritual crisis. A confirmation of 
the  fears  expressed  in  “Nondum”  (1866),  this  sonnet  expresses  the  inconsolable 
misery  of  an  isolated  being.  In  a  pained  cry,  the  speaker  shouts  into  the  void: 
“Comforter, where, where is your comforting? / Mary, mother of us, where is your 
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relief?” (l. 3-4). The speaker’s desperate pleas to God, “wince and sing” (l. 6) and, 
without  being  heard  or  answered,  finally  capitulate  and  “leave  off”  (l.  7).  The 
consolations  of  religion  are  revealed  to  be  futile  as  God  and  Mary,  the  sacred 
immaculate couple do not offer shelter to the speaker’s lonely soul. He must thus rely 
on  the  “mind”  (l.  9),  but  the  mental  constructs  he  tries  to  cling  to,  which  could 
represent Hopkins’s religio-aesthetic system, resemble the slippery “steep”-ness (l. 12) 
of “mountain” (l. 9) slopes, which cannot ground the human being ontologically.  
Yet, the despair does not escalate in suicide because the speaker of “Carrion 
Comfort” contains his strong emotion through rigorous self-discipline: “NOT, I’ll not, 
carrion comfort, Despair, not feast on thee (l. 1).” Despite God’s cruel oppressive rule, 
the speaker rejects the possibility of ever taking his own life: “I can […] / not choose 
not to be” (l. 3-4), which is both an assertion of his masculinity and his compliance to 
the Jesuit codes of conduct. In a poem that is distinguished by its homosexual imagery, 
Hopkins addresses the conflict between traditional masculinity and religious servitude 
and attempts to assess whether self-assertion or self-effacement is more laudable. By 
“wrestling with (my God!) my God” (l. 14), Hopkins defends his masculine pride, but 
violates God’s authority, whereas the reverse situation would make him a docile and 
therefore virtuous disciple of God but dishonour him as a male. 
The blatantly autobiographical “To seem the stranger lies my lot” illustrates 
the  multiple  forms  that  Hopkins’s  “remove”  from  the  social  community  took. 
Hopkins’s “lot” was determined by his sexual orientation, which established him as 
the  eternal  “other.”  His  homosexual  nature  irreconcilably  alienated  him  from  the 
shelter of the traditional family: “Father and mother dear, / Brothers and sisters are in 
Christ not near” (l. 2-3). Hopkins’s association with Christ represents the alienating 
factor:  “my  peace  my  parting,  sword  and  strife”  (l.  4),  who  has  both  soothed   271 
Hopkins’s  spiritual  anguish  but  enkindled  new  conflicts  of  an  interpersonal  and 
political nature.  
 “I  wake  and  feel  the  fell  of  dark”  epitomises  this  hell  of  self-reflexive 
barrenness  in  which  all  communication  that  could  give  meaning  to  Hopkins  is 
obliterated: “My lament/ Is cries countless, cries like dead letters sent/ To dearest him 
that  lives  alas!  away”  (l.  6-8).  In  the  absence  of  a  signifying  “other,”  Hopkins 
discovers that his religio-aesthetic system, which he believed to be “God’s most deep 
decree” (l. 9), requesting him to realise the inscapes of the world, was futile and that 
in fact no such communication ever existed. Instead, the only reality was Hopkins’s 
bodily self, “bones built in me, flesh filled” (l. 11), which he “inscapes” by observing 
and materialising it in his poetry. But this “inscaping” brings no religious satisfaction 
without the contemplation of nature: “my taste was me” (l. 10). The corporeality of 
his self inspires him with disgust and he likens the secretions of his body “blood 
brimmed the curse” (l. 11) to the “sweating selves” (l. 14) of the “lost” (l. 13), who 
are tied to their physical desires and obliged to fulfil them—slaves under their own 
tyrannical  rule.  In  his  self-disgust,  Hopkins  positions  himself  with  the  “simple 
people,” whose self-obsession is “their scourge” and to whom “beauty of inscape [is] 
unknown and buried away” because they do not “[have] eyes to see it,” as he wrote in 
his  diary  on  July  19
th  1872.
145  The  double-consciousness  inherent  in  self-
consummation  is  a  sterile  and  repetitive  process  and  cannot  lead  to  “inscaping:” 
“Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours” (l. 12). The self does not have the power to 
“inscape” itself but must depend on God or a signifying human being to attribute 
meaning to it. J. Hillis Miller has similarly claimed that the self “absolutely requires 
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help from the outside itself in order to be.”
146 Hopkins’s realisation of his paralyzed 
and uncreative self leaves him utterly depressed.  
Hopkins’s  conviction  that  he  must  passively  hold  out  until  his  condition 
changes—one  which  characterises  “Patience,  hard  thing!”—recalls  the  cultural 
demands  imposed  on  the  Victorian  artist  by  critics  such  as  Eastlake  and  Crabb 
Robinson, which simultaneously required him or her to exert self-assertion and self-
effacement (Chapter One). In this poem, Hopkins portrays patience as a strength that 
arises from an inner core and the individual cannot effect its emergence. Even to 
“ask” (l. 3) for it would destroy its delicate essence.  
“My own heart let me have more have pity on” is a more sustained attempt to 
break through the hell of self-reflexivity by asking God to “let” him be gentle and 
“charitable” (l. 3) with his fallible self and requests permission to stop “tormenting” 
(l. 4) his already “tormented mind” (l. 3). Daniel A. Harris has argued that through 
this poem, Hopkins tries to abort his “masochistic scrupulosity in ferreting out his 
sins” and to employ the “discipline of charity.”
147 The self then, by  force of will 
chooses to be a Christian and have mercy on his soul. The meticulous self-monitoring 
voice with which Hopkins administers his inner self is replaced by “self-mercy.”
148 
Significantly, this poem represents a decision to refrain from self-inscaping and to 
stop blindly “groping round” in an effort to realise the self and to find meaning in the 
world.  
The  fact  that  Hopkins  asked  God  for  permission  to  have  compassion  on 
himself  signals  a  suffocated  act  of  emancipation  and  a  continuation  of  eunuchal 
dependency  which  was  representative  of  the  remainder  of  Hopkins’s  life  as  well. 
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Although Hopkins was entirely conscious of the futility of his endeavours to assert his 
individuality  and  publish  his  work,  he  nonetheless  kept  working,  as  this  letter  to 
Bridges of January 12
th 1888 shows:  
I am now writing a quasi-philosophical paper on the Greek Negatives: but 
when shall I finish it? Or if finished will it pass the censors? Or if it does will 
the Classical Review or any magazine take it? All impulse fails me: I can give 
myself no sufficient reason for going on. Nothing comes: I am an eunuch—but 
it is for the kingdom of heaven’s sake.
149  
 
Like  Henry  Crabb  Robinson,  Hopkins  longed  for  an  audience  but  was  deeply 
concerned  that  his  readers’  judgment  might  not  be  favourable.  The  numerous 
perceived and real obstacles to literary fame caused intense frustration for Hopkins as 
much  as  for  Crabb  Robinson;  both  can  be  seen  to  hide  behind  the  seemingly 
insuperable  impediments  to  publication.  Hopkins  thus  found  himself  without 
motivational drive; at this point his religious duties, besides the academic work in 
Dublin, consisted simply  in non-activity, which was a forced  and to some degree 
chosen, paralysis. 
  In conclusion, Hopkins was unique among the diarists this thesis has examined 
in that he silenced his emotions and aspirations much more fiercely than any of them. 
He experienced his homosexuality as a stigma of otherness, which he sought to hide 
under the Jesuit habit. Unable to assume the traditional role of husband and father, 
Hopkins’s virginity was a “countercultural sign,” to use Philip Healy’s term, which 
alienated him both from his social community and deprived him of the fruits of his 
labour.
150 Unlike all of the other diarists who, each for different reasons, felt it was 
their duty to publish their work, Hopkins was impeded from publishing his poetry by 
the  duty  to  efface,  rather  then  assert,  his  worldly  self.  The  following  extract  of 
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Hopkins’s letter to Bridges of October 13
th 1886 epitomises the unnatural, eunuchal 
state of forced muteness: “By the bye, I would have you and Canon Dixon and all true 
poets  remember  that  fame,  the  being  known,  though  in  itself  one  of  the  most 
dangerous  things  to  man,  is  nevertheless  the  true  and  appointed  air,  element,  and 
setting of genius and its works.”
151 Publication was the only solution to prevent self-
inscaping and although it catered to and created feelings of vanity, only the reader 
could validate the author, as we have seen in Eliot and Gissing.
152  
  Hopkins’s  and  Ruskin’s  visual  aesthetic  has  been  compared  by  numerous 
critics. Both writers insisted on gaining access to the universal by dutifully tending to 
the  particular  and  felt  the  strong  compulsion  to  appreciate  God’s  work.  Both 
contended that the act of observation was beyond the mere reproduction of the visual 
object  and  needed  to  be  fuelled  by  the  observer’s  full  emotional  and  intellectual 
capacity.  Ruskin  saw  himself  as  an  educator,  Hopkins,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a 
socially  isolated  observer  who  did  not  share  Ruskin’s  desire  for  total  temporal 
possession—his  diary  entries  are  less  elaborate  than  Ruskin’s  and  display  less 
emotional  investment  in  the  scenes  depicted.  For  Hopkins,  observation  was  an 
ontological necessity from which to draw the validation that the other diarists received 
through satisfying family lives and/or professional success. Unlike them, Hopkins was 
not integrated in society and led “a single life,” which was a “difficult, not altogether 
[…] natural life.”
153 For Hopkins, of all the Victorian spheres, Roman Catholicism 
was the most welcoming because it discouraged worldly competitiveness and offered 
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a  life  of  the  mind  at  the  margins  of  society,  one  which  contained  Hopkins’s 
undesirable  emotions  but  asphyxiated,  but  perhaps  beneficially  concentrated,  his 
poetic genius.     276 
Conclusion 
 
 
The analysis of the ideal self of which Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and particularly 
Eliot, Gissing, Ruskin and Hopkins conceived and which they attempted to construct 
in and through their diaries can be seen to reflect the value system of the cultural 
context in which they wrote. We see that Felicity Nussbaum is right when asserting 
that,  in  the  diary,  “linguistic  constructs  of  the  self  (or,  more  accurately,  the 
significations  of  the  subject)  are  produced  through  social,  historical,  and  cultural 
factors; and the ‘self’ both positions itself in the discourses available to it, and is 
produced by them.”
1 The study of diaries is of great significance for deepening our 
understanding of nineteenth-century subjectivity and the codes of respectability that 
moulded individual selves. As this thesis has shown, all these diarists were influenced 
by their culture’s equation of productivity with personal value, which drove them to 
strive for professional progress at the expense of personal emotions, time and space—
the concepts through which the self articulates itself in these diaries. I have interpreted 
the striking absence of confession as a deliberate attempt to merge the personal with 
the public so as to construct a professional self. Hence I have read these diarists’ 
general omission of personal experience, their frequent silences concerning the self, 
their  recurrent  calls  for  discipline  and  their  expressions  of  dissatisfaction  with 
personal progress as symptoms of a cultural need for selected repression. Juxtaposing 
the diarists’ utterances with seminal Victorian texts propagating a diligent work ethic, 
this thesis has presented some of the socio-cultural influences—the push towards self-
improvement  and  altruism—that  acted  upon  the  diarists,  who  then  reinforced  and 
disseminated these standards of conduct through their work.  
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Chapter  One  illustrated  the  disdain  of  self-obsession  in  literary  and  art 
criticism  and  analysed  the  ways  in  which  Victorian  psychology—a  burgeoning 
science—prescribed an ideal human being who was in perfect control of his or her 
emotions  and  used  them  to  good  effect.  Through  reading  Alexander  Bain’s  The 
Emotions and the Will in light of contemporary theories of the civilising process, I 
have visualised a model of the process of ideological indoctrination as proposed by 
Norbert  Elias  and  Michel  Foucault.  Through  reading  the  diary,  as  well  as  the 
publications,  of  the  remarkably  harsh  art  critic  Elizabeth  Eastlake,  I  have  drawn 
attention to both the pressure that she exerted upon her fellow females— instructing 
them to be family-oriented, well-travelled and  well-dressed  at all times— and the 
intimidation  she  instilled  in  the  artists  who  would  necessarily  have  known  of  her 
influential work. As a counterpart to this unforgiving cultural commentator, I have 
presented Henry Crabb Robinson, who, although seemingly less eager to correct the 
moral  flaws  of  his  contemporaries,  displays  similar  convictions  regarding  the 
association of both complete self-effacement and self-assertion with weakness in his 
diary. Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, as well as the other diarists this thesis has 
examined, likened strength of character to willpower. The psychological discourse of 
the time unquestionably reinforced this equation of complete emotional mastery with 
talent, intelligence and quality.  
Through analysing a variety of historical documents, such as religious and 
anti-theistic  psychology  handbooks,  literary  reviews,  conduct  manuals,  letters  and 
diaries,  Chapter  One  highlighted  the  many  sources  of  cultural  prescriptiveness  to 
which a diarist reacted from childhood onward. As even the purpose of the diary was 
delineated by psychologists such as Bain, it becomes clear that for the writers under 
investigation, writing a diary was only partially an act of self-assertion, as specific   278 
conduct, such as self-referencing, expressions of pride, feebleness and doubt, as well 
as laziness, was consistently toned down. The diaries discussed in this chapter were 
heavily edited, and it is essential that further research considers the manuscripts in 
order  to  assess  the  extent  and  possible  purpose  of  these  editorial  omissions. 
Additionally, a new study based on diaries could compare and contrast the moral, 
altruistic purposes attributed to the emotions which this thesis has described and the 
late-Victorian  decadent  beliefs  in  the  individual’s  right  and  duty  to  experience 
pleasure. 
The examination of the silence of the self in the professional diary consists of 
an  evaluation  of  the  predominance  of  certain  values  over  others.  Chapter  Two 
explained that the selected diarists filled this silence with an intense preoccupation 
with  professional  productivity.  It  illustrated  this  claim  by  juxtaposing  two  very 
different novelists, who are often mentioned as the prime Victorian advocators of 
social reform: George Eliot and George Gissing. The study of their diaries calls for an 
adjustment of these beliefs. Eliot, as assumed, firmly believed in the individual’s duty 
to extend altruistic emotion towards the community. Gissing, however, despite his 
subject matter, did not fight for social change. Rather, he needed to produce literature 
for financial survival. Despite these fundamental differences in philosophical outlook, 
both writers defined their personal value in relation to their professional output, in 
proportion to the efficiency with which they used the time available to them. They 
both treated emotion with professional diligence and generally left emotion out of 
their diaries, because, for them, personal joy or trauma had no place in the diary but 
were to be communicated in letters. Future research should therefore compare the use 
that these writers made of the letter to the function that their diary held and discuss the 
importance of audience. As Eliot and Bain were friends, it would be rewarding to   279 
analyse their correspondence—as well as other texts attesting interactions between 
them—revealing the ways in which they influenced each other. Reading Eliot’s diary 
in conjunction with George Henry Lewes’s and/or her great admirer and friend Edith 
Simcox’s  could  shed  light  on  the  subjectivity  of  a  group  of  influential  Victorian 
figures.  
 The analysis of John Ruskin’s diaries conducted in Chapter Three makes clear 
that Ruskin’s obsession with productivity and his total identification with his work as 
an observer can be held accountable for the despair and bitterness that characterised 
the latter half of his life, which are not to be solely attributed to his disappointing 
romantic experiences. The diaries reflect Ruskin’s choice to cultivate his self as an 
observer who professionalised emotion and sought to eradicate human fallibility from 
the persona he constructed. Like for Eliot and Gissing, emotion was an integral part of 
Ruskin’s work. His diaries show that his inability to feel awe on command increased 
his urge to be stunned by great beauty and left him in a state of over-stimulation and 
perpetual hunger for more excitement. Reading the diaries in light of Modern Painters 
and The Stones of Venice, Chapter Three has exemplified that despite his apparent 
acceptance  and  even  praise  of  fallibility,  Ruskin  was  consumed  by  his  efforts  to 
eliminate satiability, boredom and indifference from his professional self. Because he 
expected  himself  to  function  as  a  human  camera  obscura,  eagerly  taking  in  and 
reproducing visual objects/events for his own possession and for his audience, Ruskin 
was no longer able to enjoy the act of observation, but still performed the motions of 
pleasure.  
Ruskin, although seemingly existing on the margins of Victorian culture, re-
inscribed and reinforced its call for professional and emotional self-discipline. His 
lessons to his audience were heavily didactic, as can be seen in the introduction to The   280 
Elements of Drawing of 1857, in which he advised that parents should sternly instil 
self-discipline in their child by “[praising] it only for what costs it self-denial, namely 
attention and hard work; otherwise they  will make it work for vanity’s sake,  and 
always badly.”
2 This passage, as well as the assiduity with which he treated his own 
work, shows that Ruskin did more than initiate his readers to a “method of study;” 
namely,  through  his  teachings  on  art,  he  communicated  his  take  on  the  codes  of 
respectability disseminated in his culture.
3 Ruskin just as severely reproached himself 
in his diary when he failed to pay sufficient attention to the observed object or scene, 
namely, when an intrusion of personal emotions, such as over-saturation by visual 
stimulation and fatigue, made proper observation impossible.  
Future research might consider the importance of Ruskin’s diary as a pre-work 
in the writing of Praeterita. It might also inspect the self-concept expressed by his 
self-portraits of the 1870s, as well as Fors Clavigera, and juxtapose it to his diary 
entries of that time. Because Ruskin’s diaries can further our understanding of his 
subjectivity  to  such  a  significant  degree,  there  is  a  definite  need  to  introduce 
undergraduates  to  these  crucial  documents  with  the  help  of  a  companion  book, 
proposing ways in which to read this immense diaristic record.  
The study of Gerard Manley Hopkins’s diary conducted in Chapter Four, has 
revealed that Hopkins, even more so than Gissing or Ruskin, existed on the periphery 
of culture. Because of his homosexuality, physical and mental emotions were doubly 
subversive  to  Hopkins,  which  explains  his  diary’s  stern  focus  on  the  visual 
characteristics of natural objects. This targeted silencing of the unrespectable aspects 
of the self shows that, through drastic measures (such as joining the Jesuits), Hopkins 
sought  to  respect  the  cultural  codes  of  respectability.  His  diary  reflects  cultural 
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circumstances through its deliberate silence and is thus the pinnacle of the selective 
repression  at  work  in  many  Victorian  diaries.  Further  research  might  investigate, 
contextualise  and  theorise  the  interplay  between  the  strict,  alternating  focus  on 
semantics and visual sights that characterises Hopkins’s diary. There is also a need for 
a study reading Hopkins’s diary, letters and poetry in light of the attitudes towards 
homosexuality  he  encountered  during  his  lifetime,  as  for  example  in  textbooks, 
general medical practices and both explicitly and implicitly stated codes of propriety.  
While this thesis has focused on the private records of canonical Victorian 
writers, it is essential to extend the range of diarists to non-artists and workers, male 
and female, in order to develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship 
between the Victorian culture of self-improvement and individual subjectivity through 
exploring and comparing the degree of professional zeal and self-conscious repression 
of emotional needs in their diaries. As the discourse on the emotions can provide such 
illuminating  information  on  the  “spirit  of  the  age”  of  any  period  or  culture,  the 
methodology  used  in  this  thesis  would  also  lend  itself  to  a  comparative  study  of 
diaries of different languages and nationalities in order to investigate the ways in 
which individuals have sought to create and negotiate their own value.  
Undoubtedly, the diary genre generally deserves further study, both from a 
generic and a historical point of view. The diary as a literary form should not be 
discredited as a mere source for biographical references, which, very often, it does not 
offer. Rather, like novels, diaries deserve to be treated as primary texts and to be read 
in light of the socio-cultural context in which they appeared, as, without question, 
they  are  indispensable  documents  that  allow  us  to  further  our  understanding  of 
persons and periods.   282 
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